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Preface 
In January 2008, when this author started to work for the Diplomatic Academy of 
Vietnam under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, the Vietnam War had ended more 
than 30 years ago and Vietnam’s foreign policy aimed to strengthen economic, political, 
diplomatic and cultural relations with the United States and the European Union both major 
powers on the world stage. Fostering relations with the United States and the European Union 
will help Vietnam to integrate in the world economy and trading system, achieve sustainable 
economic development and improve the country’s status and prestige. On the whole, in a 
world facing changes in the distribution of capabilities and identities, Vietnam needs to 
develop and deepen its diplomatic relations with both the Americans and the Europeans to 
advance its security and prosperity. 
This implies that there should be more research into U.S. and European foreign policy 
from a Vietnamese perspective to enhance Vietnamese understanding of diplomatic history in 
the United States and European Union. This realization contributed to my decision to 
establish a research project in which there is a combination of both U.S. and European history 
of foreign relations, from which valuable lessons can be drawn by Vietnamese diplomats and 
policy-makers in their missions to make policy recommendations to Vietnamese leaders to 
enhance relationships with the United States and the European Union. These lessons can also 
be useful for other nations in their own relations with Washington and Brussels. In my search 
for relevant literature on the United States and Europe, Thomas A. Schwartz’s Lyndon 
Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam War and The Strained Alliance: From Nixon 
to Carter coedited by Matthias Schulz and Schwartz attracted my attention with their deep 
and original analysis of the changing dynamics of the U.S.-Europe relations. These books 
inspired me to question the conventional wisdom that the European integration project was 
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realized by U.S. support and enthusiasm. I aimed to work on the U.S. policy towards 
European integration drawing on multi-archival sources. 
While closely examining literature on the United States and European integration, I 
found most studies of the United States and Western Europe overwhelmingly conclude that 
supporting the European integration process is an unchangeable and permanent part of U.S. 
foreign policy. Looking at the case of the Nixon administration policy towards European 
integration it is possible, I believe, to demonstrate that U.S. support for the integration 
process between the states of Western Europe was not always strong. U.S. promotion for 
European economic integration was strong until 1968 but weakened between 1969 and 1974. 
The Nixon administration’s redefining U.S. policy to European integration was driven by 
U.S. external and domestic politics as well as the economic and political moves from the 
European Community itself. The growing discords between Washington and Brussels and the 
U.S. relative decline under the Nixon presidential years led, to some extent, the European 
leaders to take action to broaden and deepen the European integration process.  
That I was structurally excluded from a personal visit to California – according to the 
terms of my scholarship – to consult the documents at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library 
has not prevented me from shedding new light on the Nixon administration’s policy to 
European integration. Besides consulting the secondary literature, I have thoroughly and 
thoughtfully mined the online archives to extract primary data. The online textual materials, 
White House tapes and audio-visual materials obtainable from Richard Nixon Presidential 
Library and online digitized historical documents from Office of the Historian of the 
United States Department of State, for example, have been valuable to this research. Having 
analysed these documents, I am able to demonstrate the sources of change and continuity in 
U.S. policy towards European integration by the late 1960s and early 1970s. Also, I can 
explain how the changes impacted the U.S.-EC relations. It will be asserted that Western 
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Europe was still a place where the United States found significant allies. In a rapidly 
changing international environment, the United States needed to have strong allies in Western 
Europe which, because of its own economic and geopolitical history, could become stronger 
when it was united. Thus, supporting European integration was a firmly embedded part of 
U.S. foreign policy that the Nixon administration could not deny. 
As Keith Middlemas wrote, “Without contemporary history, studies in the 
contemporary world - by political scientists, lawyers, economists, or specialists in 
international relations  -  rest on a dangerously relative foundation, and students are faced 
with a blind spot for the ‘years not taught’.” In modern times, the United States remains a 
dominant player on the world stage, and in the European integration process, having achieved 
significant goals though still in the process of deepening, enlarging and completing. 
Understanding the historical connections between the two continents will constitute a sturdier 
intellectual basis for us to explain current movements in international politics in general and 
in United States-European Union relations in particular. The history of U.S. policy towards 
European integration from 1969 to 1974 is valuable not just for its historic perspective on 
U.S. foreign policy and European integration but also for the guidance it implies to the 
nation-states in the modern international community which are currently seeking to develop 
relations with the United States and the European Union. 
Thi Thuy Hang Nguyen 
 
Melbourne, March 2017 
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Introduction 
As Mark Twain observed, “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme a lot.” In 
many respects the years from 1969 to 1974 do not appear to be a distant mirror of our own 
day and age however there are many of the same issues, developments, and challenges. 
Indeed, the late 1960s and early 1970s era of U.S. foreign relations with Western Europe 
offers us many rhymes for today and this thesis aims to bring the Nixon administration’s 
policy on European integration to new light. From the recent past of the U.S. policy towards 
European integration, 1969-1974, it is possible to outline future scenarios of U.S.-EU 
relations and implications for nations in their relations with Washington and Brussels.  
When the Marshall Plan for Europe was publicised in the spring of 1947 then 
Congressman Richard M. Nixon was chosen by Speaker Joe Martin as a junior member of a 
special bipartisan House committee headed by Congressman Christian Herter which spent 
some weeks investigating the European situation. The committee soon approved the Marshall 
Plan, and Nixon succeeded in convincing his sceptical California constituents of the necessity 
of the Plan. This experience did much to establish him as an experienced practitioner of 
foreign policy. 
 On January 20, 1969, Richard M. Nixon assumed the presidency and inherited the 
U.S. Cold War policy which was almost unchanged since mid-century.1 Containment had 
been the keystone of successive U.S. administrations’ foreign policies though it was 
expressed in various languages and styles. President Nixon acknowledged a new international 
system was emerging and held clear views on the broad objectives of his administration in 
foreign relations with Western Europe:  
 
                                                          
1 Graebner NA, Burns, RD and Siracusa, JM, 2010, America and the Cold War, 1941-1991: A Realist 
Interpretation, Volume II, Praeger, Santa Barbara, p. 343. 
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It’s time for America to look after its own interests … they [Western Europe] 
have got to know that I supported the Marshall Plan, I was on the Herter 
Committee, I supported reciprocal trade, I’ve been supporting the damn 
foreign aid. I believe in world responsibility. … My point is, that right now, 
we are in a period, where the United States, the people of this country, could 
very well turn isolationist unless their President was looking after their 
interests. And we must not let this happen.2  
 
With that belief in world responsibility, President Nixon envisaged the role Western Europe 
had in the new global environment and assumed European integration was a necessity to 
produce a united Europe, a Europe which would be more able to fulfil its responsibility in the 
Atlantic alliance and throughout the world. Likewise, Henry A. Kissinger, who entered the 
Nixon administration as National Security Adviser on January 20, 1969, shared Nixon’s 
beliefs about the end of a period of international order which naturally led to a new design for 
U.S. foreign policy: “When I came into office, we were really at the end of a period of 
American foreign policy in which a redesign would have been necessary to do no matter who 
took over.”3 In the context of the Cold War, building a strong and prosperous Europe was 
inevitable in the redesign of U.S. foreign policy. Both Nixon and Kissinger expected the 
integration process in Western Europe would help to strengthen the Atlantic alliance and that 
a united Europe would be the United States’ reliable partner on the other side of the Atlantic 
Ocean. However, the Nixon administration also recognised that in this new kind of world 
order, a united Europe would present a challenge to U.S. hegemony. Kissinger 
acknowledged, “During the Cold War, European integration was urged as a method of 
strengthening the Atlantic partnership; today many of its advocates view it as a means of 
creating counterweight to the United States.”4  
 
                                                          
2 President Nixon, 1971, Nixon Tapes, Oval Office 570 - 4, September 11, 1971, 12:07 - 12:53 p.m. 
3 Kissinger interview with Pierre Salinger, April 12, 1975, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
Office of Media Service. 
4 Kissinger, H 2001, Does America Need a Foreign Policy?: Towards a New Diplomacy for the 21st Century, 
Simon & Schuster, New York, p.34. 
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During his presidency from 1969 to 1974, Nixon and his team worked to solve this 
dilemma while the European Economic Community (EEC) of the Six worked to end the 
political and institutional stalemate which existed because of General de Gaulle’s radical 
positions on a number of European issues.5 The leaders of the Six saw the need to revive 
European integration. The new President of the French Republic, Georges Pompidou, 
summarised the EEC’s new priorities in three words, “Completion, deepening, enlargement.” 
European integration was widely accepted as “the process of EEC/EC/EU construction and 
policy formulation by a wide range of actors - representative of governmental as well as 
nongovernmental entities, of member states as well as of the EU - engaged in decision 
making at the EU level.”6 
The modern history of European integration began with the end of  the Second World 
War in Europe in May 1945 when serious efforts to encourage regional integration were 
made in order to rebuild Western Europe economically, defend it in the context of Cold War 
tensions and prevent extreme forms of nationalism.7 The creation of a European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950, which placed the French and German coal and steel 
industries under a supranational High Authority, reflects some significant aspects of Europe 
 
                                                          
5 See, Lois, PD 1978, Who Speaks for Europe? The Vision of Charles de Gaulle, Macmillan, London; Mahan, E 
2002, Kenedy, de Gaule and Western Europe, Palgrave, Basingsoke; Desmond, D 2003, Ever Closer Union: An 
Introduction to European Integration, Lynne Rienner, Colorado; Palayret, JM, Wallace, H, and Winand, P, 2006, 
eds,. Vision, Votes and Vetoes: The “Empty Chair” Crisis and the Luxemburg Compromise Forty Years On, Peter 
Lang, Brussels; Ludlow, N 2006, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: The Gaullist Challenge, 
Routledge, London. 
6 See, Wallace, H, Pollack, MA & Young, AR 2000, (eds.) Policy-Making in the European Union, 4th ed., Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2000; Cowles MG, Caporaso J, & Risse, T 2001, (eds.), Transforming Europe: 
Europeanization and Domestic Change, Cornell University Press, New York; Schmidt, VA 2002, The Futures of 
European Capitalism, Oxford, Oxford University Press; Wallace, H & Wallace,  Albrecht, R 2005, Uniting Europe: 
Journey Between Gloom and Glory, Imperial College Press, London and Eilstrup, SM 2006, Debate on European 
Integration: A Reader, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. 
7 See, Milward, AS 1984, The Construction of Western Europe, 1945-1951, University of California Press, 
Berkeley; Williams, AM 1994, The European Community: The Contradictions of Integration, 2nd ed., Blackwell, 
Oxford; Urwin, DW 1995, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945, Longman, 
London; Thody, P 1997, An Historical Introduction to the European Union, Routledge, New York; Oudenaren, JV 
2000, Uniting Europe: European Integration and the Post-Cold War World, Rowan & Littlefield, Lanham; and 
Dinan, D 2004, Europe Recast: A History of the European Union, Palgrave, Basingstoke. 
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in the post-war period: it was important to bring Germany into Europe to constrain its 
dependence of action; Great Britain was hostile to surrender its sovereignty; France had lost 
its glory and the United States wanted to support a united Europe, strong enough to push back 
the feared Communist expansionism but not as strong as to challenge U.S. economic and 
political hegemony.  
U.S. policy on European integration during the Cold War was consistently supportive. 
According to Armin Rappaport, it was a “first” in international history: It was the first time a 
major power promoted integration rather than disintegration among nations on a continent in 
which it had strategic interests. “Divide and conquer” seemed to be outmoded. “Unify and 
federate” emerged as a modern pattern in the practice of international relations.8 The 
formulation of U.S. policy towards European integration in the Nixon presidential years was 
conditioned by the perceived relative decline of the United States, Western European 
emergence and competition, the feared Communist expansionism, and U.S. national interests. 
Against that backdrop, the Nixon administration saw the need to re-evaluate its policy on 
Western Europe and the integration process on this continent. President Nixon and Kissinger 
wanted to ensure that the United States was well able to shape and adapt to European 
integration. Their efforts to sustain the role of the U.S. in European integration and to adapt 
to the development of the European integration process were a colourful thread in the fabric 
of the U.S.-EC relations. The Nixon administration’s foreign policy in the changing 
international environment had an impact on its policy toward European integration and 
created new interactions and difficulties in U.S.-EC relations. The question of “whether the 
Nixon administration strengthened or weakened U.S. support for European integration” has 
to be explained in the context of U.S. foreign relations. That period of time in the history of 
 
                                                          
8 Rappaport, A 1981, ‘The United States and European integration: The first phase’, Diplomatic History, vol.5, 
issue 2, p.121. pp. 121-150. 
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U.S. policy toward European integration remains a puzzle in the broad picture of U.S. and 
EU relations. As Keith Middlemas observed, “Without contemporary history, studies in the 
contemporary world - by political scientists, lawyers, economists, or specialists in 
international relations - rest on a dangerously relative foundation, and students are faced with 
a blind spot for the ‘years not taught’”.9 This study hopes to help overcome this difficulty for 
U.S.-EC relations and U.S. policy towards European integration in the late 1960s and the 
early 1970s.  
Many scholars have analysed U.S. policy on European integration, yet only a few 
have done so in the context of the Nixon presidential time. Literature that relates specifically 
to the Nixon presidential years and European integration tends to be briefly mentioned in a 
more comprehensive examination of U.S. policy toward European integration since 1945. For 
example, Geir Lundestad’s “Empire” by Integration (1998) and The United States and 
Western Europe (2005), and Klaus Larres’ The United States and European Integration 
(2009) illustrate a turning point in the United States’ European policy in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s within the wider history of the U.S. policy to European unification. Though they 
are excellent accounts of U.S. policy stance towards the creation of a united Europe in the 
Cold War and the post-Cold War as they explain how the United States saw European 
integration as part of the over-arching Cold War, they do not offer a detailed analysis of the 
Nixon administration’s policy to European unity. Similarly, European Integration and the 
Cold War (2007) edited by N. Piers Ludlow and Mike Smith’s “The USA and the EU” in 
U.S. Foreign Policy (2014) make fleeting mention of Nixon and Kissinger’s policies as part 
of the linkages between and U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War and the development of 
the European Union  while J. G. Giauque’s Grand Designs and Visions of Unity (2002), 
 
                                                          
9 Keith Middlemas, Orchestrating Europe: The Informal Politics of European Union, 1973-1995, Fontana, 
London, p. xii. 
- 16 - 
 
Pascaline Winand’s Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe (1996), Thomas 
A. Schwartz’s Lyndon Johnson and Europe (2003), and Ludlow’s The Real Years of Europe 
(2012) touched on Nixon’s policy on European integration in their wider examination and 
discussion of U.S. policy on European integration under the other U.S. administrations.  
The Nixon administration’s policy towards European integration has more commonly 
been presented within the historical context of the Atlantic alliance. Vital work has been 
published on the tensions between the Nixon administration and Europe in the context of the 
Atlantic alliance. Examples include Robert Schaetzel’s The Unhinged Alliance (1975), 
Catherine Hynes’ The Year that Never Was (2009), Niklas H. Rossbach’s Heath, Nixon and 
the Rebirth of the Special Relationship (2009), Silvia Pietrantonio’s “The Year that Never 
Was” in the Journal of Transatlantic Studies (2010), Matthias Schulz and Schwartz’s The 
Strained Alliance: U.S. - European Relations from Nixon to Carter (2009), Ludlow’s 
Transatlantic Relations (2010), and Luke A. Nichter’s Richard Nixon and Europe: The 
Reshaping of the Postwar Atlantic World (2015).  
Also, Nixon’s policy on Europe are commonly touched on in a wider discussion of 
the events during the Nixon presidential years as academic attention has been devoted much 
to détente with the Soviet Union, the opening to China, the oil shock, and the economic crisis. 
These include Jussi M. Hanhimäki’s The Rise and Fall of Détente (2014), Ykinori Komine’s 
Secrecy in U.S. Foreign Policy (2008), Norman A. Graebner, Richard D. Burns and Joseph 
M. Siracusa’s American and the Cold War, 1941-1991: A Realist Interpretation (2010). 
Missing from the scholarship is a comprehensive and dedicated understanding of the 
Nixon administration’s policy changes to European integration process and a profound 
analysis of the impacts of such changes on the relations between the United States and the 
European Economic Community. The closest example is the work of Youri Devuyst. His 
working paper, American Attitudes on European Political Integration: The Nixon - 
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Kissinger’s Legacy (2007) is an exceedingly rare work focusing on the Nixon 
administration’s policy stance towards the European integration process. However, in the 
framework of a working paper, Devuyst hardly provides a full picture of Nixon’s policy on 
European integration and the U.S. and EC relations in the era and the various problems, 
phenomena, and protests. 
As Nixon policy on European integration is presented in the wider discussion of a 
related field, some scholars devote a mere single page to the Nixon administration to 
European integration process; others may treat the subject at more length. This reveals that 
the Nixon administration’s views and attitudes towards European integration have not been 
fully explained. This lack of sufficiency in academic efforts in making a detailed analysis of 
the Nixon administration to European integration process means that more attention needs to 
be dedicated to this subject. It is time to produce a work which provides a thorough 
investigation of the political and diplomatic dynamics behind the U.S. policy towards 
European integration between1969 and 1974. 
This research project aims to examine U.S. policy towards European political and 
economic integration between 1969 and 1974 under the Nixon administration. It argues that 
despite the redefining of U.S. policy to European political and economic integration, U.S. 
promotion for this process between 1969 and 1974 continued to be strong. By arguing against 
a “hands off” approach in U.S. policy towards European integration under the Nixon 
administration, the research helps to prevent the misunderstanding that there was a 
discontinuation in the United States’ support for moves to European integration. This 
certainly contributes to the development of literature on U.S. foreign policy and European 
integration. Some lessons for policy makers will be drawn from the changes and continuities 
in the Nixon administration’s policy towards European integration from 1969 to 1974. These 
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lessons from history will be valuable for the policy making circles of nations in their relations 
with the United States. 
 The research project seeks to answer four main questions: 
1. What was the Nixon administration’s policy towards European integration from 1969 
to 1974? 
2. How did the Nixon administration change U.S. policy towards European integration 
from 1969 to 1974? 
3. How were the eco-political relations between the United States and the European 
Community influenced by such changes? 
4. What are the lessons for contemporary policy makers of nations in their relations with 
the United States? 
 The United States was in a good economic condition before 1969, thus its 
administrations tended to directly and enthusiastically advocate the moves toward European 
integration in the European Community (EC).10 When the Nixon administration entered the 
White House in 1969 the United States was relatively deteriorating in various strategic, 
geopolitical and economic positions.11 This made the United States reconsider its policy to 
both its foes and friends. A substantive written argument for a shift in Nixon’s policy towards 
European integration has been developed.12 It has been mainly argued that Nixon and 
Kissinger’s attitudes towards European integration, leaving the internal evolution of a United 
Europe to the Europeans, was a departure from those of the previous U.S. administrations and 
 
                                                          
10 Baldwin, R & Wyplosz, C 2009, The Economics of European Integration, McGraw Hill Higher Education, 
Berkshire. 
11 Thornton, RC 2001, The Nixon-Kissinger Years: The Reshaping of American Foreign Policy, Paragon House, 
Minnesota. 
12 Calleo, D & Rowland, B 1973, America and the World Political Economy: Atlantic Dreams and National 
Realities, Indiana State University Press, Bloomington; Rosecrance, R 1976, America as an Ordinary Country: 
U.S. Foreign Policy and the Future, New York: Cornell University Press; and Peterson, J 1993, Europe and 
America in the 1990s: The Prospects for Partnership, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham. 
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led to certain rifts in U.S. and EC relations.13  Most of these studies place much emphasis on 
the changes in U.S. policy towards European integration under the Nixon administration and 
pay undue attention to the principle that, as with other U.S. administrations, the Nixon 
administration needed to calculate to defend its national interests “on the grand 
chessboard”.14    
Unlike previous studies in which scholars and researchers tend to discuss the weak 
promotion of European integration during the Nixon administration, this research will counter 
by arguing that there has been no hands-off approach in Nixon-Kissinger’s policy towards 
European integration. The shift in U.S. policy regarding European integration during 1969 
and 1974 does not signal any significant discontinuity in the Nixon administration’s support 
and promotion for moves towards European integration. The first decade of the twenty-first 
century witnessed the eruptions of tensions between the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean and 
this easily makes people forget that Washington consistently supported the European 
integration project. U.S. leaders saw the European Community as an essential part of global 
peace and a significant contributor to global prosperity. The United States and the EU 
relationship has, thus, become the world’s largest and deepest one: “the United States and 
Europe have … been the main engines of global growth and wealth creation, leading the 
world in consumption, innovation, and competition, and accounting for a disproportionate 
share of global production, trade and investment.”15 Evidently, the U.S. policy to the 
European Community is not confined to Washington and Brussels. In an interdependent and 
globalized world, nation-states know that it is in their economic, political and security 
 
                                                          
13 Thornton, RC 2001, The Nixon-Kissinger Years: The Reshaping of American Foreign Policy, Paragon House, 
Minnesota, p. xviii. 
14 Brzezinski, Z 1997, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, 
New York. 
15 Quinland, J 2008, “The Shape of the Future: The Transatlantic Economy by 2025”,   Policy Brief, German 
Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, DC, p.2. 
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interests to develop relations with both the United States and the EU. The relationship 
between the United States and the European Union remains important to understand the 
world politics, and the study of its history, notably the study of U.S. policy towards European 
integration is vital. 
Underpinning this study is the extensive use of newly-released archival materials 
from the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, the Library of Congress, and the State 
Department. Furthermore, the work is based on the public papers in the American Presidency 
Project and the materials on the topic of European integration and unification in the Archive 
of European Integration. Finally, the study has extensively used the declassified online 
documents, memoirs and diaries of former U.S. officials and newspapers. Mining these 
sources made it possible to shed new light on the complexity and dynamism of the Nixon 
administration’s policy towards European integration. 
This thesis on U.S. policy towards European integration in the Nixon presidential 
years, 1969-1974, will be structured into six chapters. Chapter One provides a historical 
review of U.S. attitudes towards European economic and political integration from 1945 up 
to 1968 before President Nixon took possession of the White House. Chapter Two highlights 
the main features of the Nixon administration’s foreign policy making and examines how 
Nixon and Kissinger developed their respective perception of European integration which 
formed the basis for U.S. policy towards European integration in the Nixon presidential 
years. Chapters Three and Four reflect how the Nixon administration reconsidered U.S. 
policy towards European integration and demonstrate the changes that President Nixon and 
his foreign policy team made in U.S. policy towards European integration. Chapter Three 
examines the impacts of the New Age characterized by U.S. economic recession, Western 
European emergence, the international monetary crisis and the relaxation in international 
relations in the Nixon administration’s policy towards European integration. Facing rapid 
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changes in the international environment, the Nixon administration re-evaluated its economic, 
monetary and political policies and this somehow led to new elements in its policy design 
towards European integration. Chapter Four focuses on the Nixon administration’s initiatives 
in Europe and their effects on the European integration process. Chapter Five assesses how 
the relationship between the United States and the European Community was influenced by 
changes in the Nixon administration’s policy towards European integration. Post-1945 
cooperation, dependence and direction increasingly gave way to economic competition and 
division over military and foreign policies. Yet Americans and Western Europeans were tied 
by their own strategic interests, thus, their relations featured both cooperation and 
confrontation. Chapter Six points out that the Nixon administration, despites changes in its 
policy towards European integration, never discontinued traditional support for European 
integration. Though the relationship between the United States and the European Community 
was bound to have frictions, Washington and Brussels were well aware of the importance of 
the cooperation and coordination between the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean for their 
security and prosperity. These chapters will demonstrate that the Nixon administration’s 
redefining U.S. policy towards European integration had a profound effect on European 
integration and the relationship between Washington and Brussels. On the whole, the 
Americans and the Europeans continued to have close relations. At the same time, the United 
States and the European Community simply meant less to each other than they had done 
before 1969. Western Europe was still important, though less so than before 1969. Here the 
United States had its most significant allies. The knowledge of changes and continuities in 
the Nixon administration’s policy towards European integration will be valuable for us to 
explain the current events and predict future developments in the United States and European 
Union relations. 
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Chapter 1 
U.S. and European Integration Prior to 1968: An Overview 
 
It is of vital importance to the United States that European recovery be continued to ultimate 
success…If Europe failed to recover the peoples of these countries might be driven to a 
philosophy of despair - the philosophy which contends that their basic wants can be met only 
by the surrender of their basic rights to totalitarian control. Such a turn of events would 
constitute a shattering blow to peace and stability in the world. 
 
Harry S Truman, 1947 
 
I will say here and now, on this Day of Independence, that the United States will be ready for 
a Declaration of Interdependence, that we will be prepared to discuss with a united Europe 
the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership, a mutually beneficial 
partnership between the new union now emerging in Europe and the old American Union 
founded here 175 years ago. 
All this will not be completed in a year, but let the world know it is our goal. 
 
John F Kennedy, 1962 
Introduction 
The U.S. views and attitudes towards European economic and political integration 
from 1945 to 1968 before President Nixon took possession of the White House were 
generally supportive. The Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations’ 
enthusiasm for European moves towards integration were driven by their calculations of U.S. 
security and strategic interests in the Cold War setting. On the surface, the U.S.’s pro-
European integration policy appears to be the story of a U.S. foreign policy seeking to 
promote peace in world politics.  A closer examination, however, suggests that the path of 
this foreign policy was carefully designed by U.S. administrations constantly placing U.S. 
national interests as the first priority in their foreign policy agenda. 
To understand changes and continuity in the Nixon administration’s policy towards 
European integration it is essential to review U.S. policy on Western Europe from 1945 to 
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1968. This historical excursion will show why and how the U.S. administrations prior to 1968 
had supported Western European integration. Henceforth, this chapter will begin with a short 
description of the tragic European situation after the Second World War before analysing 
how the aid and promotion offered by the  U.S. administrations helped to pacify much of 
Europe that had been the main battlefield of virtually permanent war for centuries. While 
defending the peoples of Europe, not only against the Soviet Union but also against 
themselves, the United States established a grand alliance with Western Europe and laid 
European integration as a cornerstone to its foreign policy design. It will be concluded that 
the United States had been a crucial force to drive the European economic and political 
integration process. It was undeniable that the European integration process evolved from 
within Europe, however, such evolution would be hardly smooth without concerted efforts 
made by the U.S. administrations.  
 
Post-war Europe: Tragic and Divided  
When the First World War ended, it had been likely to expect that everything would 
be going back to business as usual. By comparison, 1945, the year when the Second World 
War came to an end, was so different that it has been named “Year Zero” by Ian Buruma.16 
The destructive capacity had been so much greater than in the earlier war that many parts of 
Europe and Asia were in ruins. It was noted that during the Second World War civilians had 
been targeted as much as the military.  More than 60 million had died, 25 million of them 
Soviet and 38 to 55 million civilians died including 13 to 20 million from war related 
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diseases and famine.17 “Genocide” became a new entry in the language to handle the mass 
killing of 6 million of Europe’s Jews by the Nazis.  
The major theme which emerges in reports and documents about Europe after the 
Second World War is that almost all the European nation-states had either suffered heavy 
defeat or were exhausted by the fighting.18 The Second World War had extensively 
devastated the economy, ruined most of the industrial infrastructure, disentangled economic 
production and caused severe social dislocation and divisions in Europe.19 Communications 
infrastructure, especially the road and railway networks, had been badly damaged.20 This 
meant it was very hard to transport even essential food and goods around in various areas of 
Europe. Walter Laqueur observed that coal production by the end of the war was 42 percent 
of its pre-war level; iron and steel productivity approximately one-third of that before the 
outbreak of the war.21 Severe inflation was widespread and millions of refugees were 
wandering around Europe either seeking to return to their original homes or without any 
homes to return to.22 
Philip Dark, a British lieutenant, arrived in Hamburg (Germany) in May 1945 right 
after the end of the Second World War described the devastation of Hamburg in his diary:  
We swung in towards the centre, and started to enter a city devastated beyond 
all comprehension. It was more than appalling; as far as the eye could see, 
square mile after square mile of empty shells of building, twisted girders scare 
crowed in the air; radiators of a flat jutting out from the shaft of a still-
standing wall, like a crucified pterodactyl skeleton; horrible, hideous shapes of 
chimneys sprouting from the frame of the wall; the whole pervaded by an 
 
                                                          
17 Source list and detailed death tolls for the primary megadeaths of the twentieth century, viewed September 
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18 McGuire, S & Smith, M 2008, The European Union and the United States: Competition and Convergence in 
the Global Arena, Palgrave, New York, p.7. 
19 George, S & Bache, I 2001, Politics in the European Union, Oxford University Press, New York, p.47. 
20 Ibid, p.47. 
21 Laqueur, W 1972, Europe since Hitler, Penguin, Harmondsworth, pp. 17-18. 
22 Ibid, p26. 
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atmosphere of ageless quiet. Such impressions are incomprehensible unless 
seen.23  
 
That situation of Europe after the Second World War was repeatedly mentioned in 
U.S. official reports and documents, and they have shared the same view that the continent 
lay in ruins. In the memorandum by William L. Clayton, the Under Secretary of State for 
Economic Affairs, after returning to Washington from his trip to Europe in April 1947, 
Europe was described as in crisis: 
1. It is now obvious that we grossly underestimated the destruction to the 
European economy by the war. We understood the physical destruction, but 
we failed to take fully into account the effects of economic dislocation on 
production, – nationalization of industries, drastic land reform, severance of 
long-standing commercial ties, disappearance of private commercial firms 
through deaths or loss of capital, etc., etc. 
2. Europe is steadily deteriorating. The political position reflects the 
economic. One political crisis after another merely denotes the existence of 
grave economic distress. Millions of people in the cities are slowly starving. 
More consumer goods and restored confidence in the local currency are 
absolutely essential if the peasant is again to supply food in normal quantities 
to the cities. (French grain acreage running 20-25% under prewar, collection 
of production very unsatisfactory, much of the grain is to cattle. The modern 
system of division of labor has almost broken down in Europe).24  
 
Clayton’s words indicated that the Second World War shattered the European 
economy severely. Two years after the defeat of Germany, Europe was still in an economic 
morass. Such unprecedented destruction was also highlighted in the President Harry S. 
Truman’s special message to the Congress on the Marshall Plan on December 19, 1947: “the 
end of the fighting in Europe left that continent physically devastated and its economy 
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24 Clayton, WL 1947, Memorandum by the Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, the European Crisis, 
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temporarily paralysed.”25 Similarly, in his letter to Committee Chairmen on the situation in 
Western Europe on October 1, 1947, President Truman again described the hopeless 
circumstance in Western Europe, particularly in France and Italy:  
The situation in Western Europe has, in the last few months, become critical. 
This is especially true in the cases of France and Italy, where slow recovery of 
productivity, particularly of goods for export, combined with the increasing 
drain on their dollar resources, has produced acute distress. 
     The unusually bad harvests in western Europe, together with rising costs of 
imports, the unfortunate results of the temporary cessation of sterling 
convertibility and the near exhaustion of gold and dollar reserves, have placed 
these two countries in a position where they are without adequate food and 
fuel supplies for the fall and winter, and without sufficient dollars with which 
to purchase these essentials. They cannot, by their own efforts, meet this major 
crisis which is already upon them.26  
 
A noble European continent with the fairest and the most cultivated parts of the globe, 
in which most of the culture, philosophy, arts and sciences of ancient and modern times were 
created and in which a well-developed and integrated economy consisting of agriculture, 
industry and trade was in ruin. After the end of the Second World War it was referred to as a 
new dark Europe.27 
Along with the tragic circumstances caused by the Second World War, the Europeans 
witnessed a political division that started to take shape on their soil. Between February 4 and 
February 11, 1945, while the Second World War was raging in Europe, the “Big Three” (U.S. 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet leader 
Joseph Stalin) met at the Black Sea seaside resort, Yalta, to discuss the future of the post-
 
                                                          
25 Truman, HS 1947, Special Message to the Congress on the Marshall Plan, viewed December 23, 2013, 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12805>. 
26 Truman, HS 1947, Letter to Committee Chairmen on the Situation in Western Europe, viewed 30 September 
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war world. They deliberated important issues of establishing post-war order and rebuilding 
economies of war-torn nations in Europe: 
The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic 
life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to 
destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and fascism and to create 
democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic 
Charter – the right of all people to choose the form of government under 
which they will live – the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government 
to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived to them by the aggressor 
nations.28  
 
However, reality showed that the Allies were divided in their vision of how the 
European map should be drawn. Each side had different views on how post-war security 
should be established and maintained.29 The Western Allies sought to have the promise of 
free elections in Poland and other liberated Eastern European nations. The Western Allies 
wanted to build a security system in which there was a great possibility for democratic 
governments to be established. This system allowed nations to solve differences peacefully 
through negotiations and international organizations.30 By contrast, having historically 
experienced frequent invasions31 and with an estimate of over 20 million dead in the Second 
World War the Soviet Union desired to enhance security by controlling the internal affairs of 
nations sharing borders with it.32 Therefore, despite having agreed with  the United States and 
Britain in 1945 on “the Declaration of Liberated Europe” that pledged to let the European 
people to choose the kind of government they preferred to live under, the Soviet Union   
 
                                                          
28 Avalon project 2013, The text of the agreements reached at the Crimea (Yalta) Conference 
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encouraged Eastern and Central European nations to establish Communist governments. Yet 
it was noted that the Soviet Union still desired to maintain peaceful relations and cooperation 
with the Soviet Union’s wartime allies, Britain and the United States, to concentrate on 
internal reconstruction and economic growth.33 
Also, the Western Allies themselves did not reach an agreement on the new post-war 
world. The United States desired to gain military victory in both Europe and Asia, to achieve 
global American economic dominance and to create a world peace organization. While the 
U.S. goals were global, the British were mostly focusing on seizing control over 
the Mediterranean, guaranteeing that the British Empire would survive and the independence 
of Eastern European countries as buffer states between the Soviet Union and the United 
Kingdom.34 From the U.S. perspective the Soviet Union appeared as a potential ally in 
achieving their global goals. However, from the British perspective the Soviet Union was 
seemingly the greatest obstacle to accomplishing their goals. Such different viewpoints 
between the United States and the United Kingdom resulted in some separate deals with the 
Soviet Union. This was considered as one of the factors leading to the outbreak of the Cold 
War in 1947. That no agreements over Germany and Eastern Europe were reached 
made tensions increase between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies and the Yalta 
Conference in February 1945 failed to reach a firm agreement on the framework for a post-
war balance in Europe.35 
After the victory of the Allies in May 1945, Eastern Europe was controlled by the 
Soviet Union and Western Europe was controlled by the United States and Western allied 
forces.  On March 5, 1946, Prime Minister Churchill paid a visit to the United States on 
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invitation from the President Truman and made “the Sinews of Peace” speech at Westminster 
College, Fulton, Missouri. Churchill said,  
From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has 
descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the 
ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, 
Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the 
populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are 
subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high 
and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow.36  
 
Europe was ideologically, symbolically and physically divided in two halves: the 
Western half included the democratic, capitalist nations and the Eastern half included the 
communist nations. After Germany surrendered, the Allies divided it into four zones. Each of 
the four allies, the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union, took control of one 
zone. Each country was supposed to control its own zone for a temporary time. Their 
occupational troops would leave when a new government was established. Though Berlin, the 
capital city of Germany, was in the Soviet zone, it too was split into four. Open hostility and 
disagreement between the pro-Western countries and the Soviet Union about controlling 
Germany eventually led to the Berlin Airlift, the supply of food and fuel to West Berlin by air 
transport under U.S. auspices from June 1948 to September 1949. This was a U.S. initiative 
in response to the Soviet Union’s land and water blockade of West Berlin.37 After this event 
Britain, France and the United States merged their zones into an independent country, and 
named it the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). In response, the Soviets turned 
their zone into a new, separate state called the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). 
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This divided Germany into two separate states. Europe too stayed a divided continent and 
was split into two ideological worlds: communism and capitalism.  
 
Filling Power Vacuums  
Apart from a war-weakened Europe, world politics in the post-1945 era was 
characterized by the search for global influence between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, popularly termed the Cold War.38 Germany, Italy, and Japan were all defeated. This 
left vacuums of power in the world politics landscape. The United Kingdom was “nearly 
bankrupt, dependent and unable to police its empire, was reduced to a resentful second-rate 
power” and France was suffering from political instability and incapable of mustering 
international respect.39 Nationalist movements in the colonial world broke out, seeking 
independence and struggling to “make the world less Europe-cantered.”40 The United States 
and the Soviet Union, equally enthusiastic to realize their universalist visions of the post-war 
world and expand their respective influence, sought to fill power vacuums left by both the 
defeat of Germany, Italy, and Japan and the decline of Britain and France.41 Subsequently, 
the United States and the Soviet Union had many conflicts over occupation policies in 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Australia and Korea. 
After the Second World War, only the United States and the Soviet Union were able to 
challenge each other for influence in Europe and for the capacity to establish the parameters 
of the post-war world. The United States aimed to contain further inﬂuence of the Soviet 
Union in Europe by developing free market capitalism on this continent. From a U.S. 
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perspective, this would contribute to the rehabilitation of West European economies and their 
political stability. By tying these economies to its own economy, the United States would 
enhance its opportunity to expand its inﬂuence in the word.42  
As the Soviet Union consolidated their control over the territory that had been 
liberated from Nazi occupation by the Red Army, the relationship between the two wartime 
allies became worse. The consolidation of Moscow-controlled communist governments in 
East and Central Europe, the communist coup in Prague in February 1948 and the Soviet 
blockade of West Berlin put an end to the Grand Allies established during the Second World 
War. On the U.S. side, the Truman Doctrine was announced as a bulwark against further 
Soviet expansion in Europe and elsewhere: 
At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose 
between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. 
One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished 
by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of 
individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political 
oppression. 
The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly 
imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled 
press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms. 
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free 
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by 
outside pressures. 
I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in 
their own way. 
I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial 
aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes. 
The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot 
allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United 
Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political 
infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, 
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the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations.43  
 
In addition, the United States positively responded to the European initiative to create 
a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO):  
The Parties to this Treaty … seek to promote stability and well-being in the 
North Atlantic area. 
… Article 3 
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, 
separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and 
mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity 
to resist armed attack.  
… Article 5 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe 
or America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently 
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the 
right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the  
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by 
taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action 
as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.44  
 
The North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950 turned NATO from a paper 
tiger into a real collaborative alliance that challenged the position of the Soviet Union in 
Europe.45 The Korean War could be seen as one of the main factors leading to the rebuilding 
of U.S. military capabilities, not only to tackle with the conflict on the Korean peninsula, but 
also to confront what was considered as the military dominance of the Soviet Union in 
Europe.  
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By 1950 the background for the Cold War had been established: two superpowers, the 
United States and the Soviet Union, each supported by groups of allies, confronted each other 
in the middle of Europe. At the time of the Hungarian uprising against continued domination 
of the Soviet Union in 1956, the future nature of the relationship between the two 
superpowers became apparent. In spite of calling for rolling back the Iron Curtain during the 
1952 presidential election, President Dwight D. Eisenhower decided not to risk direct military 
confrontation with the Soviet Union for either the cause of workers in East Berlin in 1953 or 
of patriots in Hungary in 1956. The concern that military confrontation might trigger another 
world war was the main factor leading to the stalemate in Europe. For the United States and 
its West European allies, the superiority of the Soviet Union’s ground forces was the primary 
security reality. For the Soviet Union, the U.S. monopoly of nuclear power was their central 
concern in the years of 1950s.  
It is noticeable that the ﬁeld of competition between the United States and the Soviet 
Union shifted from Europe to the Third World.46 Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, held 
the view, firmly based on Leninism, that the peoples in the colonial world were de facto allies 
of the working class and the Soviet Union was the very ﬁrst state of the working class. Their 
struggle for independence from the Western imperialist countries would help to weaken the 
United States and its allies, the major opponents of the Soviet Union. The most salient 
conﬂict in the Third World throughout the decade of the 1960s was the war in Vietnam. The 
Soviet Union was the main external provider of military and economic support to the North 
Vietnamese government.47 Through the lens of the global confrontation and competition for 
power with the Soviet Union, the United States failed to stem the nationalist fervour in 
Vietnam and to contain further expansion of communism.  
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To recall the words of then undersecretary of the U.S. Department of State, Dean 
Acheson, “not since Rome and Carthage, had there been such a polarization of power on this 
earth.”48 The multi-polar system of the 1930s was replaced by a bipolar structure. Yet, it 
should be noted that this bipolar world does not mean that the two poles were equal in power. 
There existed basic asymmetries between the United States and the Soviet Union from the 
early post-war years. The United States had unchallenged economic power. To compensate 
its economic weakness relative to the United States, the Soviet Union sought to sustain its 
military strength and impose ideological and political dominance in the sphere of influence 
which it had set up in Eastern Europe. Indeed, in their struggle for global influence, the 
United States and the Soviet Union employed a wide range of means such as a massive and 
expensive arm race, propaganda campaigns and especially the creation of rival alliances and 
the extension of military and economic aid to both client states and would-be client states.49  
 
Perpetual Interests 
Lord Palmerston underlined in 1848 that core national interests could be seen as the 
“eternal” and ultimate justification for national policy.50 With the omnipresence of Soviet 
power Washington had to consider which regions and issues the United States needed to care 
about. Wilson D. Miscamble argues Roosevelt’s administration: 
failed to appreciate that their national interests were tied up with either 
complementing or assuming the long time British role of preventing Eurasia’s 
domination by a single power. President Franklin Roosevelt and the United 
States did not fight the war to become the ‘balancer’ in international politics. 
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They fought it primarily to defeat the Axis powers and to preserve their way of 
life.51  
 
However, in the recognition of the threat to the United States and its institutions that a 
powerful Soviet Union represented Washington had fundamentally redefined its core 
interests. Melvyn P. Leffler highlights that “the essentials of American grand strategy called 
for a Eurasian land mass free from the domination of a single hostile power (or coalition of 
adversaries) and a world trading system hospitable to the unrestricted movement of goods 
and capital.”52 Explicitly, this meant that a recovered Europe would certainly help the U.S. 
national interests avoid being profoundly affected as shown in the Department of State’s 
report titled “Certain aspect of the European recovery problem from the United States 
standpoint” in July 1947. The report shows that the United States had important economic 
interest in Europe. Europe had been U.S. market and main source of supply for a wide range 
of products and services to the United States people. Furthermore, the report affirmed that the 
security in Europe had been strategically important to U.S. security. This underpinned U.S. 
determination to defend Europe from disintegration:   
But beyond this, the traditional concept of U.S. security has been predicated 
on the sort of Europe now in jeopardy. The broad pattern of our foreign policy, 
including the confidence we have placed in the United States, has assumed the 
continuation in Europe of a considerable number of free states subservient to 
no great power, and recognizing their heritage of  civil liberties and personal 
responsibility and determined to maintain this heritage. If this premise were to 
be invalidated, there would have to be a basic revision of the whole concept of 
our international position a revision which might logically demand of us 
material sacrifices and restraints far exceeding the maximum implication of a 
program of aid to European reconstruction. But, in addition, the United States, 
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in common with most of the rest of the world, would suffer a cultural and 
spiritual loss incalculable in its long-term effects.53  
 
To sum up, the core national interests of the United States were physical security, the 
promotion of democracy, economic prosperity and world order. It also should be noted that 
the very first priority was given to U.S. influence. These interests have been somewhat 
reconfirmed in President Barack Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize lecture in Oslo in December 
2009: “The United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six 
decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms. … We have done so out 
of an enlightened self-interest because we seek a better future for our children and 
grandchildren.”54 The pursuit of such “enlightened self-interest” has been an essential 




U.S. politicians’ public statements about their support for European integration fairly 
reflected U.S. foreign policy but the motives for such U.S. assistance were much more 
complicated. An analysis of the themes emerging from the documentary research has 
revealed five main reasons why the United States supported European integration. 
Firstly, from its own experience of development from thirteen colonies to a successful 
federal model and market economy, the United States strongly hoped to conduct its economic 
and political system in Europe through the course of European integration. The endeavour to 
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realize this high hope was expressed in various U.S. politicians’ addresses. For instance, in 
his speech before the OEEC council (Organization for European for Economic Cooperation) 
calling for greater integration in Europe in Paris on October 31, 1949, Paul Hoffman, the 
head of the Economic Cooperation Administration, lectured U.S. lessons as follows, 
The substance of such integration would be the formation of a single large 
market within which quantitative restriction on the movements of goods, 
monetary barriers to the flow of payments and, eventually, all tariffs are 
permanently swept away. The fact that we have in the United States a single 
market of 156 million consumers has been indispensable to the strength and 
efficiency of our economy. The creation of a permanent, freely trading area, 
comprising 270 million consumers in Western Europe would have a multitude 
of helpful consequences. It would accelerate the development of large-scale, 
low-cost production industries. It would make the effective use of all resources 
easier, the stifling of healthy competition more difficult.55 
 
Supporting the move for economic integration from within Western Europe, the United States 
wanted to apply such a pattern in the region. This would ensure not only economic and socio-
political stability on the continent but also the U.S.’s long-term economic development. U.S. 
enterprises would see in Western Europe not merely a chance to share the fruits of an 
expanding economy but also the opportunity to have a part in the exploitation of a great new 
mass market on this continent. 
Secondly, the United States held the view that an economically integrated Europe 
would be more efficient and rational. This would definitely in the interests of the U.S. 
President Eisenhower indicated that “Europe cannot attain the towering material stature 
possible to its peoples’ skills and spirit so long as it is divided by patchwork territorial 
fences” and was unable to solve its problems.56 In the spirit of an old age axiom “united we 
stand, divided we fall” he also pointed out that “once united, the farms and factories of 
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France and Belgium, the foundries of Germany, the rich farmlands of Holland and Denmark, 
the skilled labour of Italy, will produce miracles for the common good.”57 In addition, 
European integration would help prevent movements of nationalism and wars in Europe. The 
United States profited more from dealing with a united European partner than with individual 
larger and smaller European nations. The question “Who do I call if I want to speak to 
Europe?” raised by U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, implicitly meant it was 
necessary for Europe to be united to speak in one voice. This eventually produced a more 
efficient and rationale European partner for the United States in the international politics. 
Thirdly, European unity in the security and economic arenas would lighten the burden 
put on the United States after the Second World War. This was probably the reason for 
Clayton’s recommendation for a three year grant only to help Europe to rebuild its economy 
based on a European economic federation, an unthinkable measure in the United States itself. 
Eisenhower firmly held that European unity “would mean early independence from American 
aid and other Atlantic countries” as he really sought to decrease U.S. federal expenditure 
which required a massive deduction in defence expenditure.58 President John F. Kennedy, the 
Republican’s successor, also concerned about the increasing negative balance of payment 
effecting the U.S., shared the view that a united Europe should be able to play a greater role 
in mutual defence, do more for developing countries and, together with the United States, 
lower the trade barriers and solve economic disputes:  
A united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in the common 
defense, of responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations, of 
joining with the United States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving 
problems of commerce, commodities, and currency, and developing 
coordinated policies in all economic, political, and diplomatic areas. We see in 
such a Europe a partner with whom we can deal on a basis of full equality in 
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all the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of 
free nations.59  
 
U.S. concern about reducing economic and military burden could be solved partly 
with “a solid, healthy and confident Europe” as stated clearly by President Eisenhower, “If 
with our moral and material assistance, the free European nations could attain a similar 
integration, our friends would be strengthened, our own economies improved, and the 
laborious NATO machinery of mutual defence vastly simplified.”60 
Fourthly, a strong Europe could help to contain the Soviet Union. The United States 
was determined to contain the expansion of communism in Europe. The United States sought 
to prevent the scenario in which the peoples of Western European nations wouldn’t strongly 
resist the Soviet Union’s invasion because they were disappointed with capitalism and 
democracy and considered communism as a fairer and better system. 
France and Italy had strong communist parties. Communists played leading roles in 
the resistance in these two countries during the Second World War. Communists had also 
done well in democratic elections in France and Italy. The United States diminished any 
possibilities that communist parties in such nations were able to gain power, either through 
the ballots or revolutions as this would eventually lead to the further expansion of the Soviet 
Union’s sphere of influence: 
Acting on our own, by ourselves, we cannot establish justice throughout the 
world; we cannot insure its domestic tranquillity, or provide for its common 
defense, or promote its general welfare, or secure the blessings of liberty to 
ourselves and our posterity. But joined with other free nations, we can do all 
this and more. We can assist the developing nations to throw off the yoke of 
poverty. We can balance our worldwide trade and payments at the highest 
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possible level of growth. We can mount a deterrent powerful enough to deter 
any aggression. And ultimately we can help to achieve a world of law and free 
choice, banishing the world of war and coercion.61  
 
From a U.S. perspective, the most effective way to avert those possibilities was to 
sustain strong U.S. military forces in Western Europe following the Second World War to 
deal with any potential expansion of communism or the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence 
and to provide economic assistance to Western European nations to help them reconstruct 
their infrastructures and economies destroyed by the tragic events during the Second World 
War. This would indicate the superiority of the capitalist system and democracy to the 
communist system. 
The last motive behind U.S. support for European integration is associated with its 
concern about Germany. Seemingly, from the U.S. approach, it was important to restore 
Germany’s industries because contributions from Germany to the rehabilitation of Europe 
were crucial. Yet an industrially restored Germany would accumulate economic might and 
ultimately military power and political dominance in Europe. Such German dominance was 
one of the deep roots of the war which had just devastated Europe. The United States held the 
view that the best solution to the Germany problem was to integrate Germany with Western 
Europe generally and with France particularly. An industrialized Germany in a strong 
European framework would decisively contribute to preventing future problems with this 
state.  
These motives were central to U.S. thought between 1945 and 1950 when the United 
States promoted the Marshall Plan and the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization.  
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Indispensable Contributions  
Policymakers in Washington had the intention to guarantee that the United States 
would have a long-lasting influence on the European continent and continue to shape the 
future of Europe.62 U.S. enthusiasm for the creation of a more united Europe was clearly 
expressed in the European Recovery Program (ERP), the Marshall Plan aimed at 
reconstructing Western European economy and the establishment of NATO aimed at 
defending physical security on the continent. Yet it should be noted that European economic 
integration was a process evolved from within Western Europe. European leaders designed a 
plan for the birth of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European 
Economic Community (EEC) with the hope that economic integration would ensure peace 
and prosperity on the continent. The United States was interested in their scheme and 
encouraged European economic unity. U.S. policy ensured that a more united Europe 
remained friendly to the United States. The Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations between 1945 and 1968 tried to make the new Europe fit into a wider 
Atlantic framework. The Marshall Plan and the establishment of NATO were the important 
contributions of the U.S. leading to the formation of the ECSC and the EEC. 
 
The Marshall Plan and European Integration 
The U.S. leadership firmly believed that economic recovery in Europe was vital to 
achieve and sustain stability in the region. From the U.S. view Western Europe was crucial in 
establishing a stable equilibrium between the United States and the Soviet Union. Even 
though the United States enjoyed a position of unparalleled military might and great 
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economic and political influence immediately after the Second World War, its leadership was 
guided by the conviction that no nation could build a safer and better world alone and the 
realization that there was a strong connection between global stability and national security as 
one of the concluding remarks underlined in the report completed by the Special “Ad Hoc” 
Committee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in 1947 stated that “The United 
States has need of friends in the world today and particularly needs to take care that other 
nations do not pass under the influence of any potentially hostile nation.”63  
Implicitly, the report affirmed that it was in the interest of the United States to help 
European and other devastated areas during a period of reconstruction. The main purpose of 
the U.S. assistance was to support socio-economic stability, prevent political chaos and 
extremism, contain the spread of communism and orientate foreign countries to Capitol Hill.  
On May 28, 1947, the U.S. Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, made a decision 
that the U.S. government needed to do something about the situation in Western Europe. 
Based on the assessments of European circumstances put forth in the reports and memoranda 
from committees of the U.S. State Department, which repeatedly described the urgent needs 
of Western Europe and called for immediate action to be taken by the United States, it was 
agreed that these Western European countries, especially Italy and France, were running out 
of food and fuel supplies for the fall and winter and had insufficient finances to buy such 
necessities.64 It was concluded that these Western European countries were unable, by their 
own efforts, to deal effectively with the major crisis on their soil.  
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Seriously, “a collapse of France and Italy could initiate expanding economic 
depression and political repercussions throughout Europe and, potentially, over a wide part of 
the world.”65 Under-Secretary Acheson recommended a speech be delivered by Marshall to 
explain the problematic situation in Europe but not to put forth any blueprint for action. The 
speech was prepared at the instruction of Marshall and he gave the speech at Harvard 
University on June 5, 1947.66 This was an official proposal for what was then known as the 
Marshall Plan which provided over $12.5 billion (equivalent to roughly $60 billion today) for 
rebuilding Western Europe. He made clear in his address that Europe was definitely in a 
political and economic chaos and the response from the United States was needed urgently to 
cope with the problem facing the Europeans. He emphasized that the aid for European 
reconstruction of its economy and society was not aimed to fight any nations but to fight 
hunger and depression. In the speech it was made clear that a solution had to be set forth by 
the Europeans and the United States which would provide friendly assistance and support for 
a practical European program.  By calling on European governments to design a coordinated 
aid program on their own, Marshall indicated that Washington wanted Western European 
countries to come up with a scheme for using the aid. This plan was expected to be designed 
as “a joint effort rather than a hodgepodge of national requests.”67  
The Marshall Plan was lauded by Western Europe as the Europeans understood that a 
large-scale program entirely funded by the United States could enable them to rebuild 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Peace”,  March 1947, JM Jones Papers, 
<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/documents/index.php?docume
ntdate=1947-03-00&documentid=1-3&pagenumber=1> 
65 Objective Committee1947, European recovery program basic document no. 1, 31 October 1947, viewed  
September 29, 2013, 
<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/documents/pdfs/6-
3.pdf#zoom=100>. 
66 See Hogan, M 1987, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Milward AS 1984, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951, 
University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles;  Jones JA 1955, Fifteen Weeks, The Viking Press, New 
York; and Gimbel J 1976, The Origins of the Marshall Plan, Stanford University Press, Stanford. 
67 Aren, JVO 2000, Uniting Europe: European Integration and the Post-Cold War World, Rowan & Littlefield, 
New York, p.3. 
- 44 - 
 
European economies and only the United States was in the position to give them a helping 
hand.  The main requirements for the economic recovery of Europe were reviving industrial 
and agricultural production, rehabilitating the European transport network, developing 
facilities for increasing European exchanges and meeting interim import deficits. Moreover, 
adopting a federal structure was a condition to receive Marshall Plan aid. Free trade, customs 
union, and the reduction of social welfare were included in the list of essential characters the 
United States gave to Western European governments.68 Funds were also offered to the 
Soviet Union and its allies but the conditional terms on economic cooperation and disclosure 
of information were unacceptable to the Soviet Union.69 The Soviet Union was suspicious of 
U.S. motivations for aiding the European reconstruction. Its leaders even made an accusation 
that Washington’s motives behind the Marshall were to gain control of Europe and penetrate 
into the Moscow’s sphere of influence. U.S. desire for entire Europe recovery could not be 
realized as eight countries behind the Iron Curtain, under the pressure from the Soviet Union, 
refused to take part in the European Reconstruction Conference in Paris on July 12, 1947.70 
U.S. aid recipients included Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Great 
Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland and Turkey. These nation-states established the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC - later the OECD) to coordinate the program based on 
national needs and make sure it was implemented in consistence with U.S. guidance.71 The 
OEEC was the very first of a long line of organizations that contributed to uniting Europe. 
Although, contrary to U.S. expectation, the OEEC was principally intergovernmental in 
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nature, this was one of the first institutions that helped to enhance the liberalization of trade 
among the member states; it brought in the ideas of monetary agreements and economic 
cooperation between Western European countries. European industrial and business practices 
were modernized on the basis of high-efficiency U.S. models, artificial trade barriers were 
reduced and a sense of hope and self-reliance were promoted.72 
Due to the energetic efforts of President Truman himself and his administration, the 
Marshall Plan became a reality. The passage of the Marshall Plan was “America’s answer to 
the challenge facing the free world.”73  It was ironic that Joseph Stalin was also an important 
figure behind this reality. President Truman once said that without his “crazy” moves “we 
never would have had our foreign policy … we never could have got a thing from 
Congress.”74 
It is undeniable that the United States was motivated by self-interest in initiating the 
Marshall Plan. This was expressed, for example, in the declaration of Under-Secretary 
Clayton after his fact-finding mission to Europe in May 1947: “It is now obvious that we 
grossly underestimated the destruction to the European economy by the war. … Europe is 
steadily deteriorating.”75 He added that “the immediate effects on our domestic economy 
would be disastrous: markets for our surplus production gone, unemployment, depression, a 
heavily unbalanced budget on the background of a mountainous war debt. These things must 
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not happen.”76 The United States, Clayton concluded, must create a substantial aid program 
and that “the United States must run this show.”77   
By the time the Marshall Plan ended in 1952, industrial production in Western Europe 
had amounted to 40 percent above the pre-war level78 Trade and exports also increased far 
above what they were before the war. The economy of all recipient states had surpassed pre-
war levels and their output in 1951 was 35 percent higher than in 1938.79 In the next two 
decades, the economy of Western Europe continued to grow and prosper extraordinarily. The 
Marshall Plan was a great success, a contributing factor of European integration since it lifted 
trade barriers and established institutions to coordinate the economy on a continental level.80 
This ultimately stimulated the whole political reconstruction of Western Europe.81 
This was also echoed by Herman Van der Wee, a Belgian economic historian. The 
Marshall Plan, he argued, “gave a new impetus to reconstruction in Western Europe and 
made a decisive contribution to the renewal of the transport system, the modernization of 
industrial and agricultural equipment, the resumption of normal production, the raising of 
productivity, and the facilitating of intra-European trade.”82 The Marshall Plan indeed was a 
great success of U.S. foreign policy. It established a firm foundation for the integrative 
process in Europe: 
The material assistance and the moral encouragement provided by the 
Marshall Plan brought a powerful new impetus to the campaign for European 
unity. In fact, it can be said that the American policy of economic aid, coupled 
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with the pressure of the Communist danger, created conditions in which, for 
the first time, the unification of Europe became a practical possibility.83  
 
The success of the Marshall Plan was greater than the United States and Western 
European peoples had expected. Perhaps the biggest benefits brought by the Marshall Plan 
were intangible. It promoted cooperation and coordination among traditional foes enhancing 
openness in governments. In addition, it gave the Western Europeans hope and confidence 
for the future.84 European moves towards unification came more slowly. The first effort was 
made soon after the beginning of the Marshall Plan by Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg which formed the Benelux Customs Union in 1948. All three nations were small 
players in the European economy with inefficient and uncompetitive industries. By 
combining their economies, through the elimination of internal tariffs and the creation of a 
common external tariff, they expected to better their economic capacity.85 Future plans of 
European integration generally had the same logic.  
The Marshall Plan aid was contingent on Western Europe adopting the liberal ideas of 
free trade, reduction of protectionism, and easy convertibility of currency.86  The OEEC 
formed the European Payments Union (EPU) on July 7, 1950, to facilitate cross-nation 
currency trade among eighteen member states. This led to an intra-European trade boom 
during the 1950s. By 1958 the EPU was not needed as the OEEC currencies were convertible 
directly.87 An increase in European dialogue and cooperation in order to receive Marshall 
Plan aid money resulted in the movement towards European unification. 
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Without this U.S.-sponsored program, it was very unlikely that the Western European 
economies and polities would have stabilized so quickly. The Marshall Plan contributed to 
the creation of a post-war order in Western Europe and transatlantic relations which have 
favourably served U.S. core interests. Noticeably, this was a collaborative order in which the 
Europeans were full partners and could have the greatest voice in their nations’ affairs. 
  
The Formation of NATO and European Integration 
Along with the concern for reconstructing the European economy, both U.S. and 
Western European leaders were worried about gaining power to confront the Soviet Union 
with superior force and ambitions, especially when the Soviet ambitions were revealed not by 
verbalization but through its course of action. In February 1948, a coup d’état was engineered 
in Prague by the Kremlin and Czechoslovakia was pushed behind the Iron Curtain. Four 
months later, in June, a blockade was imposed on Berlin by the Soviet Union in order to 
dislodge the Western powers from that city. To the Americans and Europeans these events 
signalled Moscow’s overt hostility and aggressive intention and they held the view that 
Europe’s economic recovery was impossible in the atmosphere of tension and insecurity. 
According to State Department expert John D. Hickerson, if the Soviet Union was able to 
topple the anti-Communist regime of Czechoslovakia so easily, they could undermine other 
governments and Czechoslovakia might not be the last target of the Kremlin.88 In the Truman 
administration’s perspective, after its destruction of the independence and democracy of 
nations in Eastern and Central Europe and now the fall of free Czechoslovakia into its orbit, 
the Soviet Union posed a real threat to the other free nations in Europe. In such a crisis 
situation, both the U.S. and European leaders realized the need to protect Europe physically 
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was as urgent as the need to rebuild this region economically. From the realization that a 
precondition for European recovery was military security, European leaders started to have 
conversations on the establishment of an effective European security alliance in February 
1947. Though European leaders expressed their wish to have the involvement of the United 
States in their alliance, the Truman administration was not prepared to take part in a joint 
security system with the Europeans, particularly in an election year. On March 17, 1948, the 
United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and France signed the Brussels 
Pact of collective self-defence which officially created the Western European Union’s 
Defence Organization. Article IV of the Brussels Treaty stated clearly the mechanism of 
collective defence: “If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed 
attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military 
and other aid and assistance in their power.”89  
The old isolationism prevailed in U.S. foreign policy making and formulating was 
weakened after the coup d’état in Prague. In May of 1948, a resolution was proposed by 
Republican Senator Arthur H. Vandenburg to recommend that the United States could join 
the new European defence pact that would abide by the United Nations charter but was not 
under the control of the Security Council in which the Soviet Union had veto power. The 
Truman administration approved the Vandenburg Resolution which “established bipartisan 
support for American participation in a European system of collective defense” and started to 
have formal negotiations with the Europeans.90 France, which had been fearing expansionism 
from  both Germany and the Soviet Union, required the United States to automatically take 
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part in any European wars whether it was triggered by the Germans or the Russians. However 
Washington only accepted if the menace came from the Soviet Union and reminded Paris that 
Western occupation of Germany would prevent an invasion in France from the Germans. 
This reflected that Washington’s commitment to the European defence system stemmed from 
its fear of Soviet expansionism and its aim to create a new balance of power. It also reflected 
acceptance that large-scale military assistance from Washington to support rebuilding 
Western Europe’s defence capabilities was needed. While the European nations preferred 
individual grants and aid from Washington, the United States refused to provide aid for 
individual nations and insisted on giving support on the basis of regional coordination. The 
question of scope was also put on the negotiation table. The Brussels Treaty signatories 
demanded that membership in the alliance had to be restricted to the members of that treaty 
and the United States. The U.S. negotiators reminded the Europeans that there was more to be 
gained from an enlargement of the alliance with an inclusion of the North Atlantic nations 
(Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Ireland, and Portugal). From a geographically strategic 
view, the combination of these nations’ territories would form a bridge between the two 
shores of the Atlantic Ocean and this would certainly constitute a favourable condition for 
military action to be taken effectively if it was deemed necessary.91 The United States played 
a vital role in countering the military power of the Soviet Union and European security was 
an important condition for European economic recovery, subsequently, formal treaty 
negotiations were concluded shortly meeting the conditions put forth by the United States. 
The five Brussels Pact states along with the United States, Canada, Iceland, Denmark, 
Norway, Ireland, and Portugal signed the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 in Washington 
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to establish a new intergovernmental military alliance. They reached an agreement that any 
armed attack against one or more of either the European state parties or the North American 
state parties to the North Atlantic Treaty would be seen as an attack against all of them.92 
The establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was part of a 
wider process of European integration. It critically helped to safeguard freedom and security 
to support the greater political and economic integration in Western Europe. In his 1954 
lecture on NATO Lord Hastings Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO, recalled: 
It became obvious that unless something was done to restore the balance of 
military and economic power, there was no reason why the States of Western 
Europe should not also be gobbled up, one by one. But how was this to be 
done? No single nations could do it alone. It could only be done by combining. 
It was in that dark hour that the North Atlantic Treaty was conceived and 
signed.93 
 
It was undeniable that the United States played a strategic role in the structure of 
NATO and in the pursuit of its goals, as stated by Ismay, “to keep the Russians out, the 
Americans in, and the Germans down.”94 With the U.S. commitment to Western European 
security the Europeans could step forward with plans for the reconstruction and integration of 
their economy. As the Cold War escalated and Europe was divided, integration came to be 
considered as a means by which Europe was able to enhance its security, in close cooperation 
with the United States, against the Soviet threat and the danger of communism. The United 
States was drawn deeper into European affairs to defend the vulnerable nation-states and 
Washington came to be seen as a “zealous champion on European integration.”95 
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Concerted Efforts: The European Coal and Steel Community  
The above-mentioned movements, although remarkable and full of hope, “fell far 
short of the integrationist objectives of those who sought to escape from national rivalries.”96 
The question of Franco-German relations was unsolved. France, after three German 
invasions, remained very much concerned with Germany’s future and saw European unity as 
a solution.97 Washington agreed with Jean Monnet, the key figure behind the formation of the 
ECSC, on the limits of national sovereignty and the advantages supranationality in Western 
Europe. According to Washington, the lessons of modern U.S. history could be applied to 
war-torn Europe. With the enhancement of interstate trade and the establishment of a single 
market, the United States had become a prosperous and mighty power. So could Western 
Europe. In that way, European integration became a crucial part “of a grand design for 
remaking the Old World in the likeness of the New.”98 Put simply, Monnet’s idea of 
eliminating nationalism and developing supranationalism in Europe was supported by the 
United States. Washington wanted France to come up with a supranational solution to the 
German problem. In October 1949, then Secretary of State Dean Acheson had a meeting in 
Washington, DC, with “the more important American Ambassadors in Western Europe,” and 
called for French action towards European integration.99 He wrote in a letter to them, “I have 
in mind a timetable for the creation of supra-national institutions, operating on a less than 
unanimity basis for dealing with specific, economic, social and perhaps other problems.”100 
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What the United States described was a kind of very strong federal system or 
supranationalism: “A single market involving the free movement of goods, services and 
capital.”101   
The partnership between France and Germany had to be the first step in the creation 
of a united Europe as British Prime minister, Winston Churchill, emphasized in his speech at 
Zurich University on September 19, 1946. “In this way only can France recover the moral 
leadership of Europe. There can be no revival of Europe without a spiritually great France 
and a spiritually great Germany. The structure of the United States of Europe, if well and 
truly built will be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important. … In 
all this urgent work, France and Germany must take the lead together.”102  
On May 9, 1950, the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, argued for European 
economic integration as a way to rapprochement between France and Germany and proposed 
the Schuman Plan. The fundamental scheme was to create a supranational High Authority to 
take control of the coal and steel industries of France, Germany and any other states which 
wished to join. This, Schuman stated, would “make war not merely unthinkable but 
materially impossible.”103 On April 18, 1951, the Treaty of Paris was signed creating the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The six nation-states of France, Germany, 
Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg made up this first European Community. The 
objectives of the Treaty, as stipulated in Article 2, was to contribute, through the common 
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market for coal and steel, to economic development, increase employment and the 
improvement of living standards: 
The European Coal and Steel Community shall have as its task to contribute, 
in harmony with the general economy of the Member States and through the 
establishment of a common market … to economic expansion, growth of 
employment and a rising standard of living standard in the Member States. 
     The Community shall progressively bring about conditions which will of 
themselves ensure the most rational distribution of production at the highest 
possible level of productivity, while safeguarding continuity of employment 
and taking care not to provoke fundamental and persistence disturbances in the 
economy of Member States.104 
 
With the formation of the common market, the free movement of products without 
customs duties or taxes was introduced. This put an end to discriminatory measures or 
practices, subsidies, aids granted by States or special charges imposed by States and 
restrictive practices. Subsequently, ECSC could be understood as an international community 
on the premise of supranationalism and international law, formed to help the European 
economy and prevent future wars by integrating its member states as stated in the Schuman 
Declaration:  
It proposes that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be 
placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an 
organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe. The 
pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the 
setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in 
the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which 
have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they 
have been the most constant victims.105 
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The very first supranational organization of Europe began work in August 1952 and 
was governed by four institutions: a High Authority, a Special Council of Ministers, a 
Common Assembly and a Court of Justice. 
The U.S. attitudes and views towards the formation of the ECSC were that it was both 
positive constructive. The United States favoured the French efforts and considered the 
Schuman Plan as the most significant step towards economic prosperity and peace in Europe 
since the Marshall speech on ERP. According to Secretary of State Acheson, the ECSC was a 
community which could offer reconciliation and cooperation: 
Monnet most anxious that this proposal be accepted as a significant far-
reaching effort not only toward Franco-German understanding but European 
federation and not viewed as an expedient or trick by which France could gain 
any particular advantage on the continent. … In commenting on proposal 
believe it is important that French be given credit for making a conscious and 
far reaching effort to advance Franco-German rapprochement and European 
integration generally.106   
 
The United States considered the birth of the ECSC as a means to unify Europe and 
preserve lasting peace as indicated in President Eisenhower’s letter to chairmen of senate 
foreign relations and house foreign affairs committees on June 15, 1953: 
While in Europe, I watched with keen interest the efforts to work out the first 
steps toward European federation. My experience there convinced me that the 
uniting of Europe is a necessity for the peace and prosperity of Europeans and 
of the world. 
     … This Community (the ECSC) seems to me to be the most hopeful and 
constructive development so far toward the economic and political integration 
of Europe. As such, this European initiative meets the often expressed hopes 
of the Congress of the United States.107  
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That both Germany and France mutually re-emerged and cooperated was a chance for 
the hopes often expressed by U.S. leaders to be realized. European federation would help to 
diminish the need of the United States to guarantee peace in Europe. In the mind of U.S. 
leaders, this very community was also seen as a potential and essential ally against the Soviet 
Union. That seemed to be what the United States was deeply concerned about. Though there 
was also a fear of the formation of a cartel by France, which might cause conflicts with the 
interests of the United States, Washington soon overcame the fear.108 The split between 
France and the United Kingdom continued to concern U.S. leaders also and Britain’s refusal 
to join the ECSC was criticized.  
 
Concerted Efforts: The European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy 
Community  
Due to the European energy crises, the Common Assembly put forward a proposal of 
extending the powers of the ECSC to cover other sources of energy. Jean Monnet, the chief 
architect of European unity, wanted a separate community to cover nuclear power. Louis 
Armand was given the task to study the prospects of nuclear energy use in Europe. His report 
concluded that further nuclear development was essential to fill the shortage left by the 
exhaustion of coal deposits and to decrease dependence on oil producers.  
The Benelux states and Western Germany were enthusiastic about initiating a general 
common market as they claimed sectoral integration had its weaknesses: 
In the last four years the Coal and Steel Community has proved that the 
common market is not only feasible but, on balance, advantageous for all 
concerned. But it has also shown that ‘integration by sector’ raises its own 
problems of distortion and discrimination. The Benelux, Western Germany 
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and Italy had therefore chosen to create a common market for all products 
rather than continuing to experiment with the sector approach.109   
 
Unfortunately, it was strongly opposed by France because of its protectionism and Jean 
Monnet considered it too ambitious. In an effort to satisfy all interests, Monnet ultimately put 
forth the proposal of creating separate economic and energy communities. 
Following the Treaty of Paris, the signing in Rome of the Treaties in 1957 setting up 
the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EAEC or Euratom) has been viewed as a crucial stage in the history of European integration. 
The EEC established a general common market featured by a customs union which was based 
both on the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital and common policies. 
Only one year after the official creation of the EEC, there were tariff deductions and quota 
increases in early practical moves to the economic union of Europe. The United States and 
European leaders highly hoped that the EEC would be much more than simply a customs 
union. They expected it would be a vehicle which could provide the impetus for full 
integration in Europe. The EEC had to work out common policies for agriculture, transport, 
and foreign trade. Additionally, it had to bring into effect common economic, financial, 
monetary and labour policies. In essence, the EEC was leading the road to both political and 
economic integration as its leaders put forth with particular vigour: 
We look upon the Common Market, the Coal and Steel Community, and 
Euratom as a single unit. They are all aspects of a process of development 
which in the end should lead to a politically united Europe. Our aim is a free 
and peaceful Europe, a Europe worth living in and able to attract all European 
peoples who can freely determine their own destiny.110  
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During a meeting at the White House on May 16, 1961 with Dr. Walter Hallstein, 
President of the Commission of the EEC, Kennedy reemphasized the U.S. government’s 
strong assistance to the EEC and for the course of European integration as outlined in the 
Treaty of Rome. President Kennedy held the view that the European integration process of 
the six signatory nations of the Treaty of Rome constituted a complementary driving force for 
the development of the Atlantic community. Also, President Kennedy expressed the U.S. 
wish to have a common agricultural policy within the EEC. 
Continuously, in his “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union” on 
January 4, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson showed the U.S. government’s high hope of a 
strong and united Europe that would be in cooperation with the United States. The European 
integration, in President Johnson’s perspective, was not built on any abstract design. It was 
created and developed on the basis of “the realities of common interests and common values, 
common dangers and common expectations.”111 In addition to ensuring Hallstein of the 
continued strong support of the U.S. for the goal of European unification, President Johnson 
embraced European leaders’ decision to merge the executive bodies of the three European 
Communities (the ECSC, the EEC and Euratom) as a further essential step in the European 
integration process.  
Regarding Euratom, its first pact for cooperation was inked with the United States. In 
this 25-year agreement, Washington provided a long-term credit of $135 million to the EEC 
to purchase reactors and nuclear components which would be used to build atomic-power 
plants within the European Community. Moreover, the United States offered of an amount of 
$90 million for fuel guarantees and pledged to give an amount of $50 million for research and 
development over the first five-year period. The United States-Euratom agreement for 
 
                                                          
111 Johnson, LB 1965, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, the American Presidency 
Project, 16 September 2013   <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26907>. 
- 59 - 
 
cooperation was an indication of Washington’s consistent support to European leaders’ 
efforts to strengthen unity in the continent. Euratom, dedicated to the civil importance of 
atomic energy, initiated a common nuclear market: “Euratom’s very name is significant, for it 
couples in a single word two of the revolutionary changes brought about in the twentieth 
century. The first is the new industrial revolution unleashed by the peaceful application of 
nuclear energy. The second is the economic and political revolution that is leading toward the 
unity of Europe.”112  
Roughly five years after the Treaty of Paris establishing the ECSC came into effect 
Western Europe took an irreversible step towards integration. There was no doubt about 
continued support from the U.S. for more comprehensive forms of European integration. 
Washington was particularly satisfied that Western European leaders had recognized the need 
for their countries to continue to advance “beyond cooperative arrangements to Federal 
institutions, with necessary transfer of sovereign power.”113 The United States encouraged 
and supported Germans and other Europeans advocating such views. U.S. ambitions of 1947-
1949 for a customs union under the OEEC were basically similar to the European common 
market concept expressed in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Thus, in principle the United States 
had a very favourable attitude towards the creation of the EEC. President Eisenhower 
publically announced full U.S. support for a European common market that would further 
speed up the economic integration of Western Europe in his speech in Miami, Florida, on 
October 29, 1956: 
Nothing has been more heartening than the recent announcement of two new 
proposals that would advance further the economic integration of Europe. 
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     The first is the concept that six Western European countries might establish 
a common market in which all internal barriers to trade would be completely 
eliminated, just as they are within the United States. The second is the 
challenging idea that, thereafter, Great Britain, in association with other 
countries on the European Continent might gradually, over a period of years, 
establish a free trade area around the common market. 
     We watch these exciting new developments with the keenest interest. 
Because, my friends, as Europe grows stronger economically we gain in every 
way.114  
 
Despite its keen interest in the founding of the EEC, the Eisenhower administration 
realized this new and crucial advancement of European integration might pose challenges 
such as the discriminatory effects of the EEC and consequences on the balance of trade. But 
President Eisenhower and the State Department supposed that when the U.S. economy was in 
good condition, it was unproblematic for Washington to confirm that European integration 
process could be worth certain economic sacrifices.115 Like U.S. views towards European 
integration in the Eisenhower administration, U.S. support for the EEC remained enthusiastic 
and consistent during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations as shown respectively in 
their joint statements with President of the Commission of the EEC Hallstein: 
The President took the occasion to reaffirm the strong support of the U.S. 
Government for the European Economic Community and the movement 
toward European integration as envisaged by the Treaty of Rome. The 
President and Dr. Hallstein were in full agreement that the European 
integration movement of the six signatory countries of the Treaty of Rome 
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The President and Hallstein agreed on the high value of existing close relations 
between the United States and the Common Market. They agreed that continued progress 
toward European integration strengthens the free world as European partnership with the 
United States grows closer. President Johnson assured Dr. Hallstein of the continued strong 
support of the United States for the goal of European unity. The President extended his 
congratulations on the recent decision to merge the executive bodies of the three European 
Communities, which the President sees as another significant step in the process of European 
integration.117  
 
During the mid-1960s, there appeared a number of crises in the EEC. The root cause 
was French President Charles de Gaulle’s policy on Europe. He tried to enhance France’s 
position in the EEC by keeping the latter’s supranational power to a minimum. Instead of 
which he sought to pursue intergovernmental cooperation among member states. In addition, 
tensions increased between France and the other five members because of the failure of the 
Fouchet Plan for a “Union of States” in 1962 and France’s refusal of the British application 
for accession to the Common Market in 1963. However, such tensions could not deny the fact 
that the Six still attempted to find an appropriate roadmap for European integration. 
In summary, the Treaty of Paris and the Treaty of Rome leading to the creation of the 
ECSC, the EEC and the Euratom were strong indications of the early concrete achievements 
of the European integration process. Politically and economically, the launch of the ECSC, 
EEC and Euratom were major historical events. They formed the firm foundation for the 
development of “the European Family”. The coming together of European countries helped 
eliminate the old-time opposition of France and Germany and to definitively move away the 
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ghost of war on the European continent. As French economist and politician Robert Marjolin 
recalled in his memoirs, “who would have thought during the 1930s, and even during the ten 
years that followed the war, that European states which had been tearing one another apart for 
so many centuries and some of which, like France and Italy, still had very closed economies, 
would form a common market intended eventually to become an economic area that could be 
linked to on great dynamic market.”118 The process leading to the formation of both the 
ECSC and the EEC was enthusiastically encouraged by the United States as it had been 
implemented within the Atlantic framework that U.S. governments outlined. With its 
Marshall Plan aid and participation in NATO, the United States was a leading contributor to 
the peace, security and economic recovery in Western Europe. The vitality of the European 
integration project depended on U.S. economic and political capital for its success.  
 
Conclusion 
With an historical approach, this chapter has demonstrated that the U.S. policy 
towards Europe from 1945 to 1968 was built on Washington’s endorsement of the 
development of Western Europe into a regional union based on a U.S. socio-economic and 
political model. U.S. leaders from Truman to Johnson made fundamental decisions to 
rehabilitate Western Europe economically and build up its confidence politically. Their 
policy stance was clear: the best way to achieve stability in Europe was by uniting Europe. 
From the Marshall Plan and the creation of NATO, to the promotion for the births of the 
ECSC and the EEC, the United States had consistently shown its willingness to expend 
wealth, and even troops, to bring peace and prosperity to Europe. Explicitly, this meant that 
the United States could not live in isolation. This long support and encouragement for a 
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united Europe was, however, challenged from 1969 when Richard Nixon entered the White 
House. This will be thoroughly discussed in the next chapter which focuses on analysing the 
relative decline of U.S. economic and political power in the international arena and the 
impacts of such changes on Nixon’s foreign policy agenda in general and Nixon’s policy on 
Europe in particular.  
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Chapter 2 
Foreign Policy Making and U.S. Vision of European Integration in Nixon-Era 
If we were to establish a new foreign policy for the era to come, we had to begin with a basic 
restructuring of the process by which policy is made.  
 
President Richard Nixon, 1970 
 
Introduction 
History recorded the changed nature of U.S. foreign policy making in the Nixon era 
and the realist view President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger held regarding U.S. 
external affairs. It became clear that President Nixon preferred to formulate U.S. foreign 
policy with only a few National Security Council officials and ignored traditional diplomacy 
insisting that U.S. decisions on external affairs were to be made at the White House. With 
advice and assistance from Kissinger, Nixon was known to conduct U.S. policy either 
secretly or bilaterally. This reforming of the foreign policy making apparatus led to the 
centralization of foreign policy decisions, that is, virtually all in the hands of President and 
his national security adviser. This characteristic of U.S. foreign policy making in the Nixon 
presidential years contributed to the changed nature of U.S. vision of the European 
integration process. An examination into the archival records reveals two important aspects 
of the Nixon administration regarding European integration: the United States embraced the 
emergence of a European community in a multi-polar international order and the evolution of 
such a community on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean was expected to occur under U.S. 
leadership. This chapter will shed light on the main features of the Nixon administration’s 
foreign policy making before concentrating on analysing the model of the European family 
from a U.S. perspective. Having looked at Europe and the world through the realist lenses, 
the Nixon administration had a fresh view of U.S. national interests and threats in a changing 
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world environment, and thus developed a new image of European integration that would help 
the Nixon administration to perpetuate U.S. interests and defend its nation from potential 
dangers.  
 
Nixon’s Realist Approach 
U.S. foreign policy making in the Nixon presidential years was framed by a realist 
approach. The realist approach is conceptualized as a theory of international relations that 
places concentration on the nation-state’s competitive self-interest. This means that the 
central ground of international relations is based upon nation-states competing for survival, 
predominantly making use of military power in the pursuit of this goal. In other words, the 
realist approach is built on four main assumptions: (i) nation-states are the principal actors in 
the global politics; (ii) self-interest is the main motivation for nation-states’ actions; (iii) the 
main concern of nation-states is the balance of power in the international system; and (iv) it is 
the relationship between or among nation-states (not domestic politics) that decides how one 
nation-state reacts to the others.119  
Realists stress the constraints placed on politics by human nature and the state of 
anarchy in the international system. The combination of these two factors makes international 
relations a domain full of power and interest as Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. 
Thompson once emphasized, “human nature has not changed since the days of classical 
antiquity.”120 In the realist view, human nature, is basically pertaining to egoism, and 
therefore is prone to immorality. This had been put forth by Niccolò Machiavelli, in politics 
“it must be taken for granted that all men are wicked and that they will always give vent to 
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the malignity that is in their minds when opportunity offers.”121 According to the realist 
approach, morality in the realm of foreign affairs is fundamentally decided by what is good 
for the nation-state and its position in world politics. Thus, foreign policy in the realist view 
is full of conflicts. Nation-states do their utmost to protect and foster their own interests and 
watch the other nation-states’ activities with wariness. Power politics becomes dominant in 
the global politics because the key concerns of every nation-state are always the distribution 
of power and the maximization of its own power. 
The Nixon administration’s foreign policy was seen to be closer to the realist 
approach than that of previous U.S. presidents.122 It was built on the balance of power among 
the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Western Europe and Japan. The realist approach 
taken by the Nixon administration would help the United States reduce the cost of a global 
hegemon and make use of a large amount of regional power to further U.S. interests. Also, 
this approach would create favourable conditions for the United States to maintain its 
dominance in world politics. This realism was accelerated by factors surrounding Western 
European integration including the Vietnam War, détente with the Soviet Union and opening 
to China. Together they made the Nixon administration build a distinctive foreign policy with 
new concentrations. The difference in the Nixon administration’s foreign policy was clearly 
stated in the first annual report to the Congress on United States foreign policy for the 1970’s 
on February 18, 1970, self-reflected by President Nixon as “more than a record of one year. It 
is this administration’s statement of a new approach to foreign policy to match a new era of 
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international relations.”123 President Nixon and his administration supposed that building a 
long lasting peace needed a foreign policy to be guided by three fundamental principles:  
-  Peace requires partnership. Its obligations, like its benefits, must be shared. 
This concept of partnership guides our relations with all friendly nations. 
-  Peace requires strength. So long as there are those who would threaten our 
vital interests and those of our allies with military force, we must be strong. 
American weakness could tempt would-be aggressors to make dangerous 
miscalculations. At the same time, our own strength is important only in 
relation to the strength of others. We--like others-must place high priority on 
enhancing our security through cooperative arms control. 
-  Peace requires a willingness to negotiate. All nations - and we are no 
exception - have important national interests to protect. But the most 
fundamental interest of all nations lies in building the structure of peace. In 
partnership with our allies, secure in our own strength, we will seek those 
areas in which we can agree among ourselves and with others to accommodate 
conflicts and overcome rivalries. We are working toward the day when all 
nations will have a stake in peace, and will therefore be partners in its 
maintenance.124  
 
These three principles implied that the United States would reduce its global 
responsibility and require the other nation states to share the burden of preserving the world 
order. This new approach to foreign policy also implied that the Nixon administration would 
defend U.S. interests by using its military power. In addition, it implied that the United States 
would prefer negotiations as a measure to deal with any international issues. In general, this 
U.S. foreign policy was, to a large extent, different from that in the post-war administrations 
which placed so much emphasis on U.S. ability and responsibility to carry the burden for 
building a “Free World.”125 Nixon had taken office during an unusually fluid time in global 
politics: the economies of Western Europe, Japan, and China ruined by the Second World 
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War had recovered fast in the late sixties. With the emergence of new economic powers and 
centres, the bipolar power structure of the post-war era, dominated by the United States and 
the Soviet Union, had been replaced by a multi–polar world. Even though the United States 
was still the most powerful state in the world, the confrontations with the Soviet Union and 
China and the Vietnam War had shown the limits of its strengths. Realizing the limits of the 
United States, Nixon put forth the idea of a “new diplomacy” to deal with future aggression 
in his campaign speech delivered in Omaha, Nebraska, on May 6, 1968:  
While we are the richest nation and the most powerful nation in the non-
Communist world, we must remember that we are only two hundred million 
Americans, and there are two billion people in the non-Communist world. It is 
time to develop a new diplomacy for the United States, a diplomacy to deal 
with future aggression - so that when the freedom of friendly nations is 
threatened by aggression, we help them with our money and help them with 
our arms; but we let them fight the war and don’t fight the war for them. This 
should be the goal of a new diplomacy for America.126  
 
Nixon’s realist approach was underlined in his goal to strengthen the United States so 
that its president was able to negotiate from strength and never from weakness. He insisted on 
the need to restore U.S. power as the most important task that his administration had to 
concentrate on: 
the United States must be strong. We’ve got to make sure that our president 
will always be able to negotiate from strength … that is why I will re-establish 
the strength of the United States, not only here, but re-establish also the 
strength of our NATO Alliance which has been allowed to crumble and go to 
pieces during this Administration.127  
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The grand strategy known as the Nixon Doctrine128 developed by Nixon and 
Kissinger, his then Assistant for National Security Affairs, to adjust U.S. foreign policy to the 
new multi - polar system was deeply rooted in realism. This realist response to the new 
situation reflected their strategic goal, the balance of power.  
It should be noted that President Nixon had renewed realism in the way that he used 
idealism rhetoric to hide his true foreign policy objectives in international relations. He knew 
that to have public support for his administration’s realist policies, though these realist 
policies aimed to defend realist national interests, he had to describe his foreign policies on 
the basis of liberalism and idealism. In a transcript of the March 1, 1973 meeting about 
Middle Eastern affairs, President Nixon showed his view on the connection between realism 
and idealism in U.S. foreign policy: “Well, we work toward the ideal, but we have to work 
for it pragmatically. That’s really what it comes down to.”129 He even used a vivid example to 
make his view clearer: “If you’re going to humiliate somebody, you must destroy him. 
Otherwise, he’s going to be able to destroy you. You never strike the king unless you kill 
him.”130 In an effort to illustrate his own idealism President Nixon employed liberal rhetoric 
to discuss his administration’s realist foreign policies based upon national interest and the 
balance of power.131 In an interview with Cyrus L. Sulzberger in 1986, he expressed his 
belief in realist approach to foreign affairs and stressed that there existed idealism in U.S. 
foreign policy as the implementation of global balance of power had to be cast in idealistic 
terms: 
It is very important to have in mind that we live in a world of power politics 
[“realism”]. On the other hand, Americans do not like power politics. We 
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never have. We are dragged into it against our will. For Americans to support 
any foreign policy initiative, it must be cast in idealistic terms. Wilson, for 
example, talked about making the world safe for democracy. That was in his 
mind. And a lot of Americans believe that was also the case when they walked 
in and supported World War II. … I think at the present time it is very 
important for the United States in its position of leadership to cast its role not 
just in terms of balance of power, arms control, etcetera, but in idealistic 
terms. That is why I think it is very important that despite the traditional 
unpopularity of foreign involvement, Americans respond to a positive 
initiative. They should see that we’re not just spending all this money to 
defend ourselves and all the rest, but that we want peace for ourselves and 
everybody else too. … Of course, a good dose of idealism exists in American 
foreign policy. We should practice power politics because that’s the way the 
world is. But it must be cast in idealistic terms in order to get people to 
support it.132 
 
In this regard, Nixon was a true believer in a realist approach to foreign relations and 
he practiced what he believed in. His administration efforts to take advantage of the split 
between China and the Soviet Union perhaps constituted the most spectacular example. It 
was apparent that Nixon wanted to open to China and have détente with the Soviet Union to 
divide the global communist bloc, thus reducing the immediate communism threat to the 
United States, a strategic interest. Yet the Nixon administration rarely spoke this to the 
public. Instead, President Nixon and his team explained Washington’s “era of negotiations” 
as a strategy to win peace for all peoples from both sides of the Iron Curtain: “The peace we 
seek - the peace we seek to win - is not victory over any other people, but the peace that 
comes ‘with healing in its wings’; with compassion for those who have suffered; with 
understanding for those who have opposed us; with the opportunity for all the peoples of this 
earth to choose their own destiny.”133   
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Realism does explain the Nixon administration’s foreign policy towards the emerging 
powers in the international arena. Confronting the global developments in the late 1960s 
President Nixon and his administration designed a new foreign policy approach for the 
United States based on the principles of the balance of power. Though the world politics in 
the late 1960s was typically described as a rigid, bipolar period with an international system 
split into two hostile blocs, the Nixon administration saw the emergence of new powers: 
Japan, China and Western Europe. In addition to the United States and the Soviet Union, 
these would-be powers would escalate the changing contour of the world order. A pentagonal 
balance of power would characterize the global political, economic and military structure. As 
President Nixon indicated: 
as we look ahead 5, 10, and perhaps 15 years, we see five great economic 
superpowers: the United States, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, mainland 
China, and, of course, Japan. … These are the five that will determine the 
economic future and, because economic power will be the key to other kinds 
of power, the future of the world in other ways in the last third of the 
century.134 
 
This, in President Nixon’s view, was an interesting period. He vividly illustrated it 
with his fingers:  “the most significant areas of the world in the immediate future are like five 
fingers of the hand … First the thumb, the U.S., still the strongest; next Western Europe and, 
boy, that Common Market is coming along fast; third, the Soviet Union; fourth, China; fifth, 
Japan.”135 This was echoed by Kissinger himself: “It is wrong to speak of only one balance of 
power, for there are several which have to be related to each other. … In the military sphere, 
there are two superpowers [the U.S. and the Soviet Union]. In economic terms, there are at 
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least five major groupings. Politically, many more centers of influence have emerged.”136 The 
Nixon administration’s outlook on the new world came from the idea that “history has never 
been produced in the South. The axis of history starts in Moscow, goes to Bonn, crosses over 
to Washington, and then goes to Tokyo. What happens in the South is of no importance.”137  
The United States in such a period would have “a live-and-let-live situation” with the 
Soviets; a strong partner in Western Europe though the Western Europeans were not able to 
defend them physically; a competing China which was no longer isolated; and a stronger 
Japan.138 What made the Nixon administration worried was that if the moment of emerging 
powers came when the U.S. economy was not competitive, the U.S. living standard had 
dropped, inflation increased and the American spirit low, the chances for a generation of 
peace would be diminished.139  
Through his realist view of U.S. foreign policy history, President Nixon regretted that 
the previous administrations had not done much to promote national self-interests. They had 
not acquired as much power as possible to sustain U.S. as a hegemon and to prevent the 
emerging of the United States’ potential peer competitors. The United States was a 
distinguished nation in the world of great power politics. However, according to President 
Nixon, the legacy was that the United States was put in a hard situation in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s and it was his administration that had to deal with this situation: “As 
distinguished from other great powers throughout civilization, we did not ask for our position 
of power, nor did we even have a policy for acquiring the power. It fell into our lap.”140  
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President Nixon, thus, was of the understanding that his administration’s policy was 
not to withdraw from the world. The United States continued to engage in the world, 
however, such engagement had to advance U.S. interests. For the non-Communist world, the 
Nixon administration declared that the United States could not defend them beyond the point 
where they could not defend themselves. The nations in the West had to take the lead both 
intellectually and organizationally.141 The United States urged the high-level policy makers in 
the non-Communist world to think for themselves, to settle their own problems and not to 
turn to the United States automatically for answers to their problems.142 The Nixon 
administration made a commitment that the United States would not withdraw from the 
global affairs: President Nixon and his team continued to fight against Congressional leaders 
who made proposals for limiting U.S. military presence in the world. The message that the 
Nixon administration wanted to send to the non-Communist world was that the United States 
was going to “demand more from” them.143 As for the nations in the Communist world, the 
Nixon administration wanted to settle real problems with them through talks and hoped that 
political advances would result in tremendous growth in trade with them. This realist 
approach helped the Nixon administration to set a new direction in U.S. foreign policy: “a 
direction desirable without regard to party affiliation - a new direction which would 
contribute not only to the likelihood of international peace, but also to the unity of the 
American nation.”144  
This vision of a future world order and this new direction in foreign policy inspired 
the Nixon administration to encourage the development of a balance of power in the modern 
world through the U.S. détente with the Soviet Union, normalization of political relations 
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with China and more even-handed relations with Japan and Western Europe. President Nixon 
explicitly explained the views of his administration’s foreign policy as follows: 
We must remember the only time in the history of the world that we have had 
any extended period of peace is when there has been a balance of power. It is 
when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential 
competitor that the danger of war arises. So I believe in a world which the 
United States is powerful: I think it will be a safer world and a better if we 
have a strong healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan, each 
balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even balance.145  
 
Also stating, “the only alternative to a balance of power is an imbalance of power … and 
history shows us that nothing so drastically escalates the danger of war as such an 
imbalance.146  
Kissinger made this clear as well in his address to the Commonwealth Club and the 
World Affairs Council of Northern California on February 3, 1976: 
We must strive for equilibrium of power, but we must move beyond it to 
promote the habits of mutual restraint, a coexistence, and, ultimately, 
cooperation. We must stabilize a new international order in a vastly dangerous 
environment, but our ultimate goal must be to transform ideological conflict 
into constructive participation in building a better world.147 
 
With such a realist approach to foreign policy, the Nixon administration achieved 
significant diplomatic successes: ending the Vietnam War, signing the first major arms 
control agreement with the Soviet Union, SALT I, and opening up to China. This realist 
approach to foreign policy during the Nixon administration reflected a fundamental departure 
from the policy stance in the U.S. leadership during the post-war period. 
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Along with a realist approach to foreign policy and a fresh view of the U.S. role in a 
new world environment, the Nixon administration revaluated the U.S. position to redefine its 
national interests and threats. In his well-known book Strategies of Containment: A Critical 
Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis put 
forth an argument regarding Nixon and Kissinger’s redefining of what constituted threats. In 
the previous administrations, threats were defined in terms of an enemy’s ideology. This was 
because ideology determined behaviour.148 The Nixon administration’s definition of threats 
was fundamentally based on an enemy’s actions. In a White House press briefing on 
December 18, 1969, Kissinger stated, “We have always made it clear that we have no 
permanent enemies and that we will judge other countries, including Communist countries, 
and specifically countries like Communist China, on the basis of their actions and not on the 
basis of their domestic ideology.”149 The Nixon administration considered that the fact that 
the United States and the Soviet Union had two different ideologies, capitalism and 
communism respectively, this did not constitute a threat to Washington. However, the 
combination of both hostility and capability embedded in the foreign policy of the Soviet 
Union was threatening to the United States.  
Along with a change in understanding what constituted a threat, the Nixon 
administration reshaped the relationship between threats and interests. In the preceding 
administrations perceived threats would define policy interests, particularly the threats from 
communism. Subsequently, containment of communism had become an interest in and of 
itself without considering “the precise way in which communism as a unified force might 
endanger American security.”150 Yet the Nixon administration placed emphasis on defining 
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what they thought to be the national interest and then defined threats to be what would harm 
that national interest. This redefining allowed the Nixon administration to have more freedom 
in building and developing foreign relations with communist nation states, as Gaddis 
observed, the United States was able to “feasibly work with states of differing, even 
antipathetic, social systems as long as they shared the American interest in maintaining global 
stability.”151 
 
Foreign Policy Made at the White House  
Bureaucratic resistance has been what U.S. presidents have had to overcome to achieve their 
desired policy. Even where there is no resistance from bureaucratic bodies, the process of 
implementing policies is likely to produce outcomes which are not the same as a president’s 
policy preferences. As a result, U.S. presidents tend to employ administrative strategies to 
exert an impact on making and implementing foreign policy. This was especially clear in the 
Nixon presidential years when Nixon sought to concentrate the foreign policy decision 
making in the White House and fought against the bureaucratic forces of the Departments of 
State and Defense.152 Determined to control the foreign policy decision process and the 
implementation of presidential decisions, President Nixon decided to expand greatly the role 
of the National Security Council (NSC) and give it much greater authority over foreign 
policy. This came from his observation that “the decision making process of the Johnson 
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administration had been chaotic and too informal, and that the system for following up on 
bureaucratic implementation of Presidential decisions was too weak.”153 
 During his administration, President Nixon and Kissinger, who was “an obvious 
choice for Nixon as National Security Adviser in 1969,”154 were the leading figures in the 
making of U.S. foreign policy as Thomas A. Schwartz underlined in his review of Niall 
Ferguson’s work Kissinger. Volume I, 1923-1968: The Idealist (2015).155 In his memoirs 
Nixon recalled, “From the outset of my administration … I planned to direct foreign policy 
from the White House. Therefore, I regarded my choice of a National Security Advisor as 
crucial.”156 Robert Dallek recalled, “On the administration’s third day in the office, Henry 
began implementing Nixon’s plan to ensure White House dominance of foreign policy”157 by 
establishing a new National Security Council structure. Kissinger wanted the NSC to be “the 
principal forum for issues requiring interagency coordination, especially where Presidential 
decisions of a middle and long-range nature are involved.”158 He even emphasized the urgent 
need to establish the new NSC structure. He saw that a delay in building such a structure 
would lead to “a concomitant delay” in dealing with many significant foreign policy issues.159 
To avoid clashing with the Department of State on the new elements of the NSC structure, 
Kissinger advised President Nixon to show them that the new NSC “gives State a larger role 
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than it had under John Foster Dulles. It can make of the system what it wants.”160 Yet it was 
also crucial to inform them that the new NSC was created to protect President’s interests: the 
only way the President could make sure that all policy options were examined, and all 
arguments properly presented, was to “have his own people - responsive to him, accustomed 
to his style, and with a Presidential rather than departmental perspective - oversee the 
preparation of papers.”161 The reason for President Nixon to “have his own people” was that 
if he wanted to retain the control of foreign policy, he had to ensure that he could control the 
policy making machinery and the policy making process. The new NSC structure was not 
delayed under the Nixon administration. It was established in the very first month of Nixon 
presidency and the first meeting of the NSC Review Group was held in the White House 
Situation Room on 23 January, 1969, under the chairmanship of the Kissinger.162  
On September 1, 1969, President Nixon even sent a telegram to Secretary of State 
William P. Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird and the Director of Central 
Intelligence Richard M. Helms from Colorado Springs where he was attending a National 
Governors Conference to instruct these senior officials that all public communications and 
official communications had to be cleared by the White House: 
I have been disturbed in recent days by the lack of teamwork in the conduct of 
national security affairs. Consequently, I am reaffirming my policies with 
respect to this matter. 
     1. Public statements and press releases: Prior to release, all public 
communications on matters of known or potential Presidential interest must be 
carefully cleared by the White House (Assistant to the President for National 
Security) for consistency with Presidential policy and for coordination with 
the Departments and agencies who share overlapping interests and 
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responsibilities. Should there be any uncertainty as to Presidential or inter-
departmental interest, it will be resolved in favor of clearance. 
     2. Official communications: All official communications with policy 
implications must be cleared by the White House. When in doubt, the rule is 
that messages will be so cleared. This procedure requires close and 
confidential staff relationships at all levels between the White House and your 
Department as well as among Departments.163 
 
In the realm of foreign affairs, President Nixon was fundamentally fixed on 
presidential control. He developed a strategic approach to an administrative presidency which 
enabled him to maintain a powerful role in supervising the bureaucracy to achieve his foreign 
policy goals. In accordance with this, the power of cabinet members decreased and the power 
of Nixon’s most trusted advisor, Kissinger, greatly increased. Kissinger became one of the 
most powerful men in Washington under the Nixon administration. Kissinger’s offices were 
set up in the West Wing’s basement “from which he could have easy access to the 
president.”164 As Tim Weiner observed “they alone would conceive, command, and control 
clandestine operations. Covert action and espionage could be tools fitted for their personal 
use. Nixon used them to build a political fortress at the White House.”165  
The new NSC helped Nixon and Kissinger deal with delicate and sensitive matters 
without influence from the Department of State which was traditionally the main bureaucracy 
responsible for U.S. foreign policy making and implementation. The centralization of foreign 
policy making at the White House was especially helpful in establishing and maintaining 
direct channels of communication with foreign diplomats also ignoring the Department of 
State. For instance, a “back-channel” between Kissinger and Anatoly F. Dobrynin, the Soviet 
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Ambassador to the U.S., was made at the beginning of the Nixon administration. President’s 
Assistant, H. R. Haldeman wrote in his diary entry for February 15, 1969,  
Big item was meeting planned for Monday with the Soviet Ambassador. 
Problem arose because P[resident] wanted me to call Rogers and tell him of 
meeting, but that Ambassador and P would be alone. I did, Rogers objected, 
feeling P should never meet alone with an Ambassador, urged a State 
Department reporter sit in. Back and forth, K[issinger] disturbed because 
Ambassador has something of great significance to tell P, but if done with 
State man there word will get out and P will lose control. Decided I should sit 
in, Rogers said OK, but ridiculous. Ended up State man and K will both sit in, 
but P will see Ambassador alone for a few minutes first, and will get the dope 
in written form. K determined P should get word on Soviet intentions direct so 
he knows he can act on it.166 
 
The direct exchange between President Nixon, Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador 
Dobrynin and bypassing the Department of States was recalled in Kissinger’s memoirs, 
“Increasingly, the most sensitive business in U.S.-Soviet relations came to be handled 
between Dobrynin and me.”167 That President Nixon and Kissinger wanted U.S. foreign 
policy to be made at the White House and overseen by White House people characterized his 
foreign policy style. Such centralizing of policy making and implementation enabled 
President Nixon and Kissinger to obtain their policy preferences because they would not have 
to go through a decision making  process with many departments and agencies and, thus, they 
could limit opposition. 
           Director of Central Intelligence from June 1966 to February 1973, Richard Helms 
supposed that “Richard Nixon never trusted anybody,”168 that he did not believe in the 
capacity of departments and agencies such as the Department of State and the Central 
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Intelligence Agency (CIA) and, therefore, “Nixon insisted on isolating himself” from the 
Washington bureaucratic agencies he did not have confidence in:  
Very early in the Nixon administration it became clear that the President 
wanted Henry Kissinger to run intelligence for him and that the National 
Security Council staff in the White House, under Kissinger, would control the 
intelligence community. This was the beginning of a shift of power away from 
the CIA to a new center: the National Security Council staff.169  
 
Former Deputy Director of Intelligence at the CIA, Ray Cline, described how the CIA 
declined in its role during the Nixon presidential time:  
Nixon and his principal assistant, Dr. Kissinger, disregarded analytical 
intelligence except for what was convenient for use by Kissinger’s own small 
personal staff in support of Nixon-Kissinger policies. Incoming intelligence 
was closely monitored and its distribution controlled by Kissinger’s staff to 
keep it from embarrassing the White House. …170 
 
According to Cline, Helms and the CIA were employed mainly “as an instrument for 
the execution of White House wishes,”171 Noticeably, Gaddis pointed out that centralization 
of policy making and implementation was crucial in order to attain the Nixon 
administration’s foreign policy agenda: “to a remarkable extent, they succeeded [in achieving 
their goals], but only by concentrating power in the White House to a degree unprecedented 
since the wartime administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt.”172 Saul Landau even showed the 
existence of “a secret foreign policy apparatus” in the Nixon years. Such an apparatus 
allowed President Nixon to ignore the established bureaucratic bodies which still saw the 
Cold War through ideological lenses and were likely to oppose his foreign policy decisions.  
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Nixon created a special finance committee with its own funds, the Finance 
Committee to Reelect the President, headed by commerce secretary Maurice 
Stans, a White House controlled political grouping independent of the 
Republican party … and, finally, a secret foreign policy apparatus headed by 
Kissinger and designed to circumvent the clumsy and stagnant national 
security bureaucracy.173 
 
In order to make sure that the White House would be directly involved in the foreign 
policy making process and implementation President Nixon even had influence on the 
Department of State’s human resources. This was indicated in the case of Graham Martin, 
Dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. Graham Martin was kicked out of the 
Foreign Service Organization because he had opposed previous Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara’s positions and because “he was not in step with some of the State Department’s 
Asia hands.”174   
However, President Nixon thought that Graham Martin would be an excellent 
appointment for Tokyo, Bonn or Pakistan. That President Nixon wanted to bring Graham 
Martin back into the Foreign Service was justified as follows, “My purpose here, among 
others, is not to let the State Department play its usual game of promoting their favorites and 
kicking out those who may disagree with their policies from time to time.”175 Furthermore, 
President Nixon wanted to see more experienced and younger members of the Foreign 
Service Organization be appointed to ambassadorships. He thought that it would be beneficial 
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to the United States to have the nation represented abroad by young, seasoned and energetic 
diplomats.176  
President Nixon’s management of the Department of State was also evidenced by his 
decision to reduce the number of U.S. government personnel overseas.177 The cut in 
personnel progressed slowly and President Nixon was unsatisfied with it. He knew that his 
plan of a one-third cut in personnel in every mission abroad would get strong resistance from 
the Department of State but he made the decision and want it to be carried out 
immediately.178 This decision made by President Nixon implied that he had lost confidence in 
the Department of State “as a whole and more new faces was a strong step in that 
direction.”179 
President Nixon’s aversion to the Department of State could be seen very clearly by 
its people as pointed out in the memorandum from Executive Assistant Hastings to the Under 
Secretary of State Elliot L. Richardson:  
The President is very down on this Department and is continuously peppering 
his chats with his confidants with barbs aimed here. He stated in a recent staff 
meeting that the entire Department of State had opposed his trip (reference to 
Nixon's July 26–August 3 around-the-world trip) but that he brought off a 
great success despite State's opposition. HAK [Kissinger] was at his side 
during this conversation, smiling broadly.180 
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Indeed, foreign policy agenda in the Nixon years was established at the White House 
and the drivers of the foreign policy making process were President Nixon and his Assistant 
for National Security Affairs, Kissinger. Their aim was not only to ensure that the foreign 
policy options and implementation of foreign policy decision would be done at their direction 
but also to ensure that the international reputation of the United States would be framed in 
their way.  
“All policies encounter reality,” as an official of the Obama administration 
observed.181 President Nixon’s policy to control foreign policy making, create the new NSC 
and manage the Department of State was due to his view that the Department of States had 
not been systematic, competent, and aggressive enough to meet the responsibilities of 
sustaining dominant U.S. position in the changing world. As President Nixon endeavoured to 
move forward with his plans for a new age to come in which China, Japan and Western 
Europe would follow the United States and the Soviet Union to play a role in the world 
affairs, he needed to get his own White House people to run the foreign policy making 
machinery to avoid the cumbersome bureaucratic process which might delay or distort his 
foreign policy decisions. That he bypassed the Department of State in dealing with foreign 
affairs was an aggressive way President Nixon countered the reality of U.S. bureaucracy. 
What should be noted in here is that the centralization of foreign policy at the White House in 
the Nixon presidential years would contribute to new elements in U.S. policy making to 
Europe which aimed to protect U.S. national interests. The Nixon administration believed 
that a strong alliance with Western Europe was important and that alliance would be 
strengthened with a growing unity in Western Europe. This meant that President Nixon had a 
shifting image of European integration inspired by his new set of global images. Collectively, 
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those images would shape his stand he took on U.S. partnership with Western Europe. His 
administration needed to sustain U.S. hegemony and make Western Europe a more 
responsible partner to resist any expansion of communist influence. This was embraced by 
Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla A. Clapp with Arnold Kanter in their book Bureaucratic 
Politics and Foreign Policy (2006): “The United States and only the United States has the 
power, ability, responsibility, and the right to defend the free world and maintain 
international order. The rest of the free world must contribute as much as possible to the U.S. 
effort to defend against aggression.”182 In addition, the Nixon administration realized that 
Western Europe was able to take more responsibility only when its economy was well 
developed. Western European development and prosperity to a large extent came through 
European economic integration. This reality made the Nixon administration review its 
approach to European integration. As a result new U.S. views and, thus, attitudes towards 
European integration project were established with great influence from the White House. It 
was apparent that the Nixon administration wanted the United State to play a significant role 
in promoting the European integration process but it also wanted to ensure that the outcome 
of European integration would not only help to solve the German problem but also increase 
U.S. prosperity, maintain a favourable U.S. balance of payment and a good preservation of 
U.S. gold supply.183 From his acknowledge that domestic bureaucracies constituted a major 
obstacle to policy change, President Nixon had taken action to control of foreign policy 
himself. This could be seen as his administration’s adaptation to the national bureaucratic 
establishment in new international conditions. 
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Vision of European Integration 
U.S. administrations prior 1968 had made efforts to “see the economic integration of 
Western Europe into one common economic bloc … and ultimately into a common political 
area.”184 European economic integration was a means to prevent war in Europe and bring 
prosperity to the Europeans: “The United States aimed to sweep away the nation-state 
system,” and they hoped that “a cohesive integrated European economic bloc, immune from 
the economic nationalism and protectionism of the 1930s, would safely accommodate a new 
West German state and its economic recovery.”185 Washington’s vision of an economically 
integrated Europe prior 1968 simply focused on building “a liberal, free-trade, all-embracing 
common market” which had been cherished by Euro-federalists. U.S. leadership in that 
period were not ambivalent to how the outcome of the European integration project, common 
economic and political bloc, would behave towards the United States and the world.186 
However, President Nixon and his administration had a rather different vision of European 
integration and the responsibility of the European Community.  
At the core of the Nixon-Kissinger team’s vision of European integration was the 
European Community as a force in a multi-polar world, a unified power in international 
diplomacy. In the evening of July 29, 1967, Nixon delivered a speech to the Bohemian Club 
in the Bohemian Grove near San Francisco. In this splendid address, Nixon evaluated the 
main forces at work in the world and discussed U.S. foreign policy. Nixon spoke of a new 
world with new leaders, new people and new ideas. A world in which Charles de Gaulle, 
Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek were still on the world stage with the U.S., however, new 
actors were taking the power from “the other giants of the post-war period” Winston 
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Churchill, Konrad Adenauer, Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sukarno. 
A world in which a new generation who were born since the Second World War, thus with no 
real experience of the Second World War, were growing up. A world in which no “ism” had 
potential to imprison peoples and nations in both sides of the Iron Curtain was welcome. 
After outlining the new world landscape to the Bohemian men and the guests at Bohemian 
club, Nixon directed their attention to Western Europe particularly:  
Twenty years ago Western Europe was weak economically and dependent on 
the United States. It was united by a common fear of the threat of Communist 
aggression. Today Western Europe is strong economically and economic 
independence has inevitably led to more political independence. The winds of 
détente have blown so strongly from East to West that except for Germany 
most Europeans no longer fear the threat from the East. The consequences of 
this change are enormous as far as NATO is concerned. As Harold Macmillan 
puts it, “Alliances are kept together by fear, not by love.” Even without De 
Gaulle, the European Alliance would be in deep trouble.187 
  
He underlined that Western Europe was now in good economic condition. Their 
economic independence enabled them to design policies unfavourable to the U.S. and 
“economic strength of Western Europe thwarted their progressive designs on that area. They 
faced increased demand for consumer goods from the Russian people. They looked down the 
nuclear gun barrel in the Cuban confrontation.”188  
Two years later when Nixon arrived at the White House in 1969, his administration 
reviewed U.S. policy to freer world trade and reaffirmed that the continuation of the policy 
was in the interest of the U.S. but emphasized that a number of foreign countries were 
competing fully with the United States in world markets. This implied that the economic 
competition from Western Europe had led to the disappearance of the traditional surplus in 
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the U.S. balance of trade. The United States had been at its peak when the Second World War 
ended in 1945. However, the relative decline in its global predominance was starting to 
become more evident. This concern was revealed in the Press Briefing by Kissinger on 
December 18, 1969: 
For about 20 years after the end of the war, American foreign policy was 
conducted with the maxims and the inspiration that guided the Marshall Plan, 
that is, the notion of a predominant United States, as the only stable country, 
the richest country, the country without whose leadership and physical 
contribution nothing was possible, and which had to make all the difference 
for defense and progress everywhere in the world. 
     Now whichever Administration had come into office would have had to 
face the fact, I believe, that we have run out of that particular vision. 
Conditions have changed enormously. We are now in a world in which other 
parties are playing a greater role. They have regained some of their self-
confidence. New nations have come into being. Communism is no longer 
monolithic and we, therefore, face the problem of helping to build 
international relations on a basis which may be less unilaterally American.189  
 
The U.S. economy was producing less while other economies were producing more. 
By the early 1970s, confronting the shrinking of gold reserves and the rising of inflation, the 
Nixon administration had to float the dollar against the currencies of other countries which 
eventually led to a severe depreciation. Still, the U.S. government under the Nixon 
administration made a contribution to promoting a multi-polar world and creating a liberal 
international environment characterized by its open-market and capitalist traditions. In that 
global setting the European Community, which was in the process of deeper economic 
integration, was foreseen by the Nixon administration to be an emerging power and would be 
important to leverage in order to create an even balance in the international system: 
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When we see the world in which we are about to move, the United States no 
longer in the position of complete pre-eminence or predominance [and] that is 
not a bad thing. As a matter of fact, it can be a constructive thing. … We now 
have a situation where four economic powers [the Soviet, China, Japan, and 
Western Europe] have the capacity to challenge [the U.S.] on every front.190  
 
Not only had the Soviet Union gained a military strength comparable to that of the 
United States but Japan and Western Europe were vigorous competitors with the United 
States for markets. This, in the Nixon administration’s interpretation, meant that the world 
was now reaching an order called a multi-polar world. 
Along with his administration’s concept of a multi-polar world with five powers, 
President Nixon sent signals that he would be in support of developing and sustaining the 
European Community as a pillar in that multi-polar world. After his discussions with 
President de Gaulle in 1969, President Nixon indicated his agreement with de Gaulle about 
building a strong and independent European Community: 
[de Gaulle] believes that Europe should have an independent position in its 
own right. And, frankly, I believe that too … the world will be a much safer 
place and, from our standpoint, a much healthier place economically, 
militarily and politically, if there were a strong European Community to be a 
balance … between the United States and the Soviet Union.191 
  
President Nixon restated his administration’s support for developing the European 
Community as a balance in the a multi-polar world at a National Security Council meeting 
with the presence of British Prime Minister Harold Wilson in January 1970:  
I have never been one who believes the U.S. should have control of the actions 
of Europe … I have preferred that Europe move independently, going parallel 
 
                                                          
190 Nixon R 1971, Addressing Media Executives in Kansas City on July 6, 1971. 
191 The President’s News Conference of March 4, 1969, viewed on March 12, 2015 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2444>. 
- 90 - 
 
with the United States. A strong, healthy and independent Europe is good for 
the balance of the world.192  
 
National Security Adviser Kissinger also showed U.S. encouragement for deeper 
integration in the European Community when he stressed that “efforts to create a more 
coherent European voice in our NATO are in net interest” and wrote to Nixon, “European 
coherence would be quite consistent with what you have said about the desirability over the 
longer run of our being able to deal with Europe as a true and more equal partner.”193 This 
U.S. perspective of the integration process in the European Community was clearly 
summarized in Nixon’s Report to Congress on February 18, 1970: 
We favor a definition by Western Europe of a distinct identity, for the sake of 
its own continued vitality and independence of spirit. Our support for the 
strengthening and broadening of the European Community has not diminished. 
We recognize that our interests will necessarily be affected by Europe’s 
evolution, and we may have to make sacrifices in the common interest. We 
consider that the possible economic price of a truly unified Europe is 
outweighed by the gain in the political vitality of the West as a whole.194 
  
Though encouraging the development of European unity in a multi polar world in 
which the main pillars (the European Community, the United States, Japan, the Soviet Union 
and China) represented equal forces and strengths to sustain the structure of peace in the 
international politics, President Nixon wanted to prolong the spirit of previous U.S. 
administrations to keep London, Berlin and Paris under Washington’s influence. Discussing 
the future agenda of the U.S. as they worked with Western Europe to build a stable world 
order, the Nixon administration placed emphasis on the transformation from dominance to 
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partnership and affirmed the importance of enhancing cooperation in political and economic 
relations between the United States and the European Community as the Common Market 
grew. In his radio address on February 25, 1971, President Nixon made it clear that: 
In Western Europe, we have shifted from predominance to partnership with 
our allies. Our ties with Western Europe are central to the structure of peace 
because its nations are rich in tradition and experience, strong economically, 
vigorous in diplomacy and culture; they are in a position to take a major part 
in building a world of peace. … Our ties were strengthened on my second trip 
to Europe this summer.195 
  
Yet it is undeniable that U.S. policy towards European unity under the Nixon 
administration was mainly shaped by the fear that a strong and independent European 
Community would not be conducive to a healthy Atlantic alliance and to a strong partnership 
between the United States and Western Europe. This was underlined in President Nixon’s 
statement that:  
The structure of Western Europe itself - the organization of its unity - is 
fundamentally the concern of the Europeans. We cannot unify Europe and we 
do not believe that there is only one road to that goal. When the United States 
in previous Administrations turned into an ardent advocate, it harmed rather 
than helped progress.196 
 
The ambivalence over whether the European Community would be likely to emerge 
into a counterweight to the U.S. was greater with the development of Gaullism in France and 
particularly with the establishment of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970, 
whereby Western European countries were able to realize their goal to create a European 
foreign policy. Confronting the assertiveness of Western Europe in foreign policy and 
diplomacy, the Nixon administration had developed a strategic plan to ensure that Western 
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European countries would have pro-Atlanticist perspectives. The real rational behind this 
plan was to maintain U.S. control and influence over the European integration process, which 
was termed by President Nixon as “a new and mature partnership:” 
I went to Western Europe in February 1969 to reaffirm America’s 
commitment to partnership with Europe. 
     A reaffirmation was sorely needed. We had to re-establish the principle and 
practice of consultation. For too long in the past, the United States had led 
without listening, talked to our allies instead of with them, and informed them 
of new departures instead of deciding with them. Inspired by the success of the 
Marshall Plan, we had taken such pride our leadership of the alliance that we 
forgot how much even the origin and success of the Marshall Plan grew from 
European ideas and European efforts as well as our own. 
     After 20 years, the economic prostration, military weakness, and political 
instability in postwar Europe that had required a predominant American effort 
were things of the past. Our common success in rebuilding Western Europe 
had restored our allies to their proper strength and status. It was time that our 
own leadership, in its substance and its manner, took account of this fact.197  
 
In the course of reaffirming America’s commitment to partnership with Europe, the 
Nixon administration focused on having an American voice in the North Atlantic Alliance 
and also an American military umbrella for Western Europe. 
 
American Voice in the North Atlantic Alliance  
In their speeches, U.S. politicians repeatedly declared they had seen the development 
of European political and economic integration as a kind of benevolent Uncle Sam, speaking 
encouraging words but having no temptation to make suggestions how this course of 
development should take. Nonetheless, this rhetoric seemingly contradicted reality when the 
Nixon administration insisted on European consultations with the United States before 
making any decisions which, from the perspective of the U.S., could affect U.S. interests. The 
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Nixon administration wanted the EC to communicate its intentions and assumptions in order 
to maintain its influence in the Atlantic alliance. This also highlighted that the Nixon 
administration’s policy on Europe had been swinging between supporting continued 
European integration, as a means to share the burdens with the United States, and the fear that 
a united Europe would emerge as a competitor of Washington and the Atlantic institutions 
that the United States had dominated. 
The alliance between the United States and Western Europe had been seen as the 
cornerstone of U.S. post-war foreign policy. It provided a political framework for U.S. 
engagement in Europe. It provided a security commitment that allowed Europe to recover 
from the destruction of the Second World War. It provided support for European unity in an 
era of prolonged tensions and confrontations. Ultimately, the United States wanted to sustain 
its predominant role in the alliance.  
Martin J. Hillenbrand, then U.S. ambassador to Germany, indicated that Nixon 
administration insisted on guaranteeing that the United States was able to have its voice heard 
and to have consultations with Western Europe on issues of mutual concerns before a 
consensus was reached among the Europeans. On April 7, 1969, in a Memorandum from the 
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Hillenbrand, to Secretary of State Rogers, 
Hillenbrand underlines the means to improve Alliance consultation and possible new areas 
for NATO consultation which were what President Nixon had emphasized in his statements 
during his Europe trip. The United States needed to “support a wide-range Alliance 
consultations through special committees, ad hoc groups, meetings at Under Secretary level, 
restricted sessions of the North Atlantic Council at ministerial level, and possibly, periodic 
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heads of government meetings.”198 Importantly, the United States needed to ensure the lead 
in arranging “alliance meetings at the Under Secretary level to take place between ministerial 
meetings.”199 This mechanism would help U.S. foreign officials exchange their views and 
intentions with the European Community’s leaders. The Nixon administration saw that in the 
changed nature of the world, it was the absence of full consultation that would lead to 
misunderstanding between the United States and the European Community. Improved 
consultation was a remedy to avoid forming any conflicted policy stance between the two 
sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Yet it was noted that the problem of consultation was uneasy, as 
Kissinger pointed out: 
The problem of consultation is complex, of course. No doubt unilateral 
American action has compounded the uneasiness produced by American 
predominance and European weakness. The shift in emphasis of American 
policy, from the NATO multilateral force to the nonproliferation treaty, and 
frequent unilateral changes in strategic doctrine, have all tended to produce 
disquiet and to undermine the domestic position of ministers who had staked 
their futures on supporting the American viewpoint.200  
 
 He also stressed that “The minimum requirement for effective consultation is that 
each ally has enough knowledge to give meaningful advice.”201 The problem of consultation 
between the United States and the EC deepened their divergences in the world affairs and 
caused frictions in their relations. The Nixon administration wanted to improve consultation 
regarding both substance and framework. This was the consequence of U.S. frustration with 
declarations from the leaders of the European Community that were against U.S. foreign 
 
                                                          
198 Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to Secretary of State 
Rogers, FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe, NATO, 1969-1972, Document 11, viewed on May 26, 
2015, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d11>. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Kissinger, H, Central Issues of American Foreign Policy, FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume I, Foundation of Foreign 
Policy, 1969-1972, Document 4, , viewed on May 23, 2015, 
<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d4>. 
201 Ibid. 
- 95 - 
 
policy preferences. Revealingly Kissinger said, “there is no real negotiation, since the 
Europeans state their position, we state ours, and then the Europeans go away to work out 
their response after which the whole process is repeated. Thus, whereas we had hoped that 
the Common Market would lead to better relations with the U.S., we are now forced into a 
type of consultation that is worse than we have with any other country.”202 
Understandably, such ideas and perspectives from the Nixon administration were 
strongly criticized by Western European countries, particularly France, for considering the 
Europeans as subordinators in relationship with the United States.  Western European 
countries themselves prepared a draft proposal for a Joint Declaration on Atlantic relations 
without any consultations with Washington on its contents. Furthermore, the EC’s leaders set 
up the agenda for strengthening European political cooperation created in 1970 and adopting 
the declaration of European identity. At his press conference on September 27, 1973, 
President Pompidou said, “if, for instance, it is felt that, to develop more rapidly, political 
cooperation must from time to time - not too often but nevertheless regularly - be discussed 
between those with the highest responsibility and between them alone, then I support this and 
am prepared not to take the initiative but to talk about it with our partners.”203 This showed 
that France wanted the Heads of State or Government of the EEC Member States to meet 
from time to time to discuss political cooperation which was a framework to establish the 
EC’s political assertiveness and unity in relations with the United States. France’s urging for 
the EC’s regular high-level meetings was embraced by the United Kingdom.  Speaking at the 
Conservative Party Congress at Blackpool on October 13, 1973, British Prime Minister, 
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Edward Heath, convinced his audience of the need to organize such high-level meetings to 
work out European common policies especially European foreign policy: 
I believe that already some of my colleagues as Heads of Government feel the 
need for us to get together regularly without large staffs so that we can jointly 
guide the Community along the path we have already set. I would like to see 
the Heads of Government of the Member Countries of the Community 
meeting together, perhaps twice a year, as I have said, alone and without large 
staffs with the President of the Commission being present, as he was at the 
Summit, on matters which concern the Commission. I would hope that my 
partners would respond to an initiative of this kind. Our purpose in meeting 
together would be to lay down the broad direction of European policy, to keep 
up the momentum towards greater unity in foreign policy, to help forward the 
working out of common internal policies within the Community: and so to 
agree upon the strategic issues facing the Community as to avoid the 
damaging controversies which so often appear to the public to dog the 
deliberations in Brussels. ...”204 
  
The EC leaders welcomed the move to hold a Summit Conference. The European 
Summit in December 1973 was held in Copenhagen under the Presidency of Anker 
Jørgensen, the Danish Prime Minister. The Heads of State or Government of the nine 
Member States of the European Communities affirmed their common wills that Europe 
should speak with one voice in important world affairs.205 Noticeably, they also adopted the 
declaration of the European identity. The adoption of the European identity enabled the nine 
Member States to better define their relations with other countries. The leaders of the nine 
member states of the enlarged European Community affirmed their strong will to introduce 
the concept of European identity into their common foreign relations. The Declaration on 
European Identity issued after the summit mentioned that the relationship between the United 
States and the European Community had best be built on the basis of equality: 
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The close ties between the United States and Europe of the Nine - we share 
values and aspirations based on a common heritage - are mutually beneficial 
and must be preserved. These ties do not conflict with the determination of the 
Nine to establish themselves as a distinct and original entity. The Nine intend 
to maintain their constructive dialogue and to develop their co-operation with 
the United States on the basis of equality and in a spirit of friendship.206  
 
          The leaders of the European Community believed that European identity characterized 
the dynamic of the construction of a United Europe. The Declaration of European Identity 
would help the member states strengthen their own cohesion and make better contributions to 
the framing of a truly common European foreign policy. For Washington, that the European 
Community was determined to build up this policy was seen as a willingness to deal with the 
United States with confidence and realism. The prospect of a common European foreign 
policy heralded further stages in the construction of a united Europe which ultimately led to 
the transformation of European Community relations with the world and particularly with the 
United States. 
In addition to the conflicts between the United States and the European Community 
regarding dealing with the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 and the dragging oil crisis, such 
European reactions certainly worsened existing disputes and indicated that Western European 
countries did not want themselves as well as their interests to be subordinate to the United 
States. As a consequence of such tensions between the United States and the European 
Community, the United States forced the Willy Brandt government in West Germany to take 
a lead in the Gymnich formula, an agreement reached in the foreign ministers meeting on 
June 10, 1974, in Gymnich castle in West Germany’s Rhineland region, among the European 
Community member states and François-Xavier Ortoli, then president of the European 
Community Commission.  
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         The United States was treated in the agreement as a special case in the question of 
consultations. Authority was given to the rotating Presidency of the European Community 
Council to have consultations with the United States on elaborating on a common European 
position of foreign policy:   
The second point is the question of consultations. The Ministers were agreed 
that in elaborating common positions on foreign policy there arises the 
question of consultations with allied and friendly countries. Such consultations 
are a matter of course in any modern foreign policy. We decided on a 
pragmatic approach in each individual case, which means that the country 
holding the Presidency will be authorized by the other eight partners to hold 
consultations on behalf of the Nine. 
     In practice, therefore, if any member of the EPC [European Political 
Cooperation] arises in the framework of the EPC the question of informing 
and consulting an ally or friendly state, the Nine will discuss the matter, and 
upon reaching agreement, authorize the Presidency to proceed on that basis. 
     The Ministers trust that this gentlemen’s agreement will also lead to 
smooth and pragmatic consultations with the United States which will take 
into account the interests of both sides.207  
 
With this “gentlemen’s agreement” reached between the United States and the 
European Community on the consultation issue, the Nixon administration was basically in 
favour of the Gymnich formula. It was expressed that Washington was prepared to go 
forward on that basis. In addition, the Nixon administration stressed that both the United 
States and the EC needed to show their will and determination to make this informal 
arrangement work.  
Though the French Foreign Minister said, “it was normal to talk to our friends before, 
during and after events,”208 the Gymnich agreement was viewed as being against French 
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political will as it ensured the presence of the United States in the process of European 
decision making.209 Thus, the Nixon administration had to attach importance to the bilateral 
contacts with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in order to make sure that the United 
States would be informed and consulted about developments in the European Community 
political decisions. Bilateral contacts with FRG would also be seen as a principal channel, or 
“as a sort of safety valve”, to ensuring that the European Community’s political 
considerations would correspond to the Nixon administration’s wishes.210  
 Under pressure from Washington, a consultation mechanism close to U.S. views 
between the United States and the EPC was proposed by Western German political director, 
Günther van Well: 
If a member state government believes that an issue discussed within the EPC 
bears on important American interests, the U.S. government should be 
informed. This should happen once consensus is reached on the matter, but 
before the decision is formulated in order to give the U.S. government an 
opportunity to lay out its views, which the EC Nine could take into account 
during their final discussion round.211  
 
This actually repeated what had been made clear in Declaration on European Identity 
by the Nine Foreign Ministers in Copenhagen on December 14, 1973. Regarding the relations 
between the United States, the Nine Foreign Ministers reached an agreement that this country 
would be treated specially and constructive dialogues with the United States would be 
maintained:  
The close ties between the United States and Europe of the Nine - we share 
values and aspirations based on a common heritage - are mutually beneficial 
and must be preserved. These ties do not conflict with the determination of the 
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Nine to establish themselves as a distinct and original entity. The Nine intend 
to maintain their constructive dialogue and to develop their co-operation with 
the United States on the basis of equality and in a spirit of friendship.212  
  
The Nixon administration encouraged the Germans to continue their efforts toward 
more timely and intensive U.S.-European consultation procedures. Washington made it clear 
that the Nixon administration’s main concern was whether the European Community was 
going to shape its policies in opposition to or in harmony with the United States. The 
Germans, from their bilateral relations with the United States, knew that Western Europe 
would have to unite within the context of close Atlantic relations and only on that basis 
would the Americans continue their support for European integration. Through Chancellor 
Brandt, the Nixon administration wanted to convey its message to the other heads of states 
and governments of EC member states that “what happens next depends on their 
performance. Much remains to be done, but a beginning has been made.”213   
Furthermore, the Ottawa Declaration, a new declaration on Atlantic relations, was 
approved and published by the North Atlantic Council in a ministerial meeting in Ottawa on 
June 26, 1974. In addition to clauses on the economic cooperation and security issues, the 
Declaration reaffirmed the necessity of maintaining the consultation mechanism in the 
Atlantic alliance: 
The Allies are convinced that the fulfilment of their common aims requires the 
maintenance of close consultations, … they are firmly resolved to keep each 
other fully informed and to strengthen the practice of frank and timely 
consultations by all means.214  
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With a strong determination to have a role in European affairs, particularly regarding 
the European integration process, the U.S. government under the Nixon administration placed 
an emphasis on maintaining consultations between the two shores of the Atlantic. 
Consultations between the European Community and the United States on economic, 
diplomatic, political and security issues served as a means to send Washington’s messages to 
Western Europe and formed a basis for Washington to get to know Western European plans 
and intentions. In case such plans and intentions were in conflict with U.S. interests, 
Washington would be able to make its opinions heard before an agreement among the 
Europeans was reached. Ultimately, the Nixon administration maintained its influence on the 
European affairs in general and the European integration process in particular. It would not 
tolerate any European attempts to make a purely European decision against U.S. interests as 
explained by, “We are not against European identity or even a European defense community. 
But we are concerned that this not be on an anti-American basis.”215 The strategy that the 
Nixon administration employed to convey its policy preferences and policy stances was 
traditional. President Nixon and Kissinger tended to confine their consultations to such big 
countries in Western Europe as the United Kingdom, France and West Germany. Worrying 
about how insufficient consultations between the U.S. and the European Community would 
adversely affect U.S. grand strategy the Nixon administration placed much emphasis on 
improved consultations.  
The vision of European integration with an increasing transatlantic cooperation, as 
highlighted when President Nixon came into office in 1969, was echoed by the Bush 
administration 20 years later as his Secretary of States James A. Baker spoke at the Berlin 
Press Club on December 12, 1989: “As Europe moves toward its goal of a common internal 
 
                                                          
215 Memorandum of Conversation, U.S.-European Relations, viewed on May 26, 2015, 
<http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/ffus/00928.pdf>. 
- 102 - 
 
market, and as its institutions for political and security cooperation evolve, the link between 
the United States and the European Community will become even more important. We want 
our trans-Atlantic cooperation to keep pace with European integration and institutional 
reform.”216 
 
U.S. Military Umbrella for Western Europe  
Kissinger was reported to have said, “The European Union is in the process of creating 
a military force institutionally distinct from NATO,” a force which “could produce the worst 
of all worlds: disruption of NATO procedures and impairment of allied co-operation without 
enhanced allied military capability or meaningful European autonomy.”217 This again 
reflected the views that Kissinger and President Nixon held in the 1970s, a U.S. military 
umbrella for Western Europe was of importance to maintain U.S. leadership in the Atlantic 
alliance. 
The pace of European integration was based not only on a prosperous but also an 
invulnerable Europe. U.S. security commitments to Western Europe would help the Western 
Europeans to be invulnerable to its security threats. The Nixon administration was fully 
aware of Western Europe’s needs for U.S. defence commitments in the region. The crucial 
role of the United States in protecting Western Europe could be seen through Washington’s 
contribution to NATO. The United States “has two-thirds of NATO’s GNP, contributes about 
half of the direct costs of NATO’s defense, and provides the nuclear shield” in Western 
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Europe.218 The Nixon administration hence realized what the Europeans wanted to have on 
the defence side: 
The main objectives of our European allies are (a) to keep the United States 
physically committed to the defense of Western Europe, so that the 
engagement of our nuclear power is assured; and (b) to buy a right to be 
consulted by the United States on anything affecting their security.219 
  
For the Nixon administration, it was vital to retain the bulk of its forces in Europe and, 
at the same time, call for the Europeans to improve their own forces and correct recognized 
deficiencies. President Nixon knew that in facing the Soviet threat, Soviet military power and 
unfriendly political stance, Western European leaders had to depend on the United States as a 
shield from any potential dangers from Moscow. It meant that Western Europe and the 
United States shared the interests of maintaining a balance of power which could be 
preserved by sustaining such Atlantic military institutions as NATO. The Nixon 
administration also realized that Western Europe’s underlining concern was the U.S. 
commitment to NATO which, from a Western European perspective, had been reduced as 
Washington had been concentrating on strategic issues, nuclear defence and burden-sharing. 
Since 1969, the European Community had expressed their determination for economic 
and monetary integration in pragmatic steps. In spite some serious setbacks consequential to 
the Nixon administration’s new economic policy of 1971, the EC had made certain progress 
in its efforts for further integration. It was illustrated by their strong will to achieve 
meaningful political integration which aimed to produce a unified foreign policy for the 
Western Europeans in international relations. That the EC sought to become a more 
significant forum for intra-European consultation and stance in economic, monetary, and 
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even political issues did not lead to the possibility that the EC would be able to establish a 
common defence policy with the potential to substitute for the military that NATO, or more 
correctly the United States, offered. It was likely that Western Europe might question the 
value and the role of the Atlantic Alliance in the decades to come, but their military weakness 
and the intra-European divergences on strategic issues would make it impossible for them to 
do anything about it. Thus, the Nixon administration remained confident that “The basic 
community of politico-military interests between the U.S. and its major Allies has remained 
relatively stable, despite far-reaching changes in U.S. relationships with other areas of the 
world, and despite the resurgence of the economic power and self-assertiveness of these 
Allies.”220 
Certainly, Western European leaders knew their weakness. For them, Washington’s 
military commitment was too important to be allowed to be diminished. This allowed the 
Nixon administration to continue its “firm but quiet assertion of American interest and 
leadership, consonant with the spirit of the Nixon doctrine” as the “basis for preserving the 
integrity of Atlantic security relationships and Western European regional stability.”221  
This was reaffirmed in a telegram from the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization to the Department of State on February 2, 1969, which stated, 
the European members of NATO are painfully aware that the national security 
of each depends upon the United States; they know that their common security 
is a function of the U.S. commitment and the U.S. presence in Europe; and 
they therefore think about the most important of their common problems - 
defence - in an Atlantic and not in a European context. They do not conceive 
of their relationship to each other and to the United States in dumbbell 
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imagery but in triangular patterns; on the fundamental issue of security, their 
relations with each other in effect pass through Washington.222  
 
The Nixon administration, with the overwhelming strength in the Atlantic system it 
had constructed, was able to link U.S. national interests with the security of the European 
members. Nonetheless, the U.S. military umbrella for Western Europe was not taken for 
granted. The Nixon administration linked its commitments for military presence in Western 
Europe with certain economic and political conditions: 
Out of this dynamic deal, our allies get not only the protection of our military 
power but some negotiated degree of participation in U.S. political decisions 
that affect their destiny. By committing our resources and sharing our 
discretion in limited ways, we try to get our allies not only to do as much as 
possible for the common defense, but also to support our efforts to build a 
workable world order, especially by making sensible security arrangements 
with the Soviet Union.223  
 
President Nixon indicated very clearly the relation between U.S. defence commitments 
in Western Europe and this region’s trade policy in a cabinet meeting on economic policy on 
April 10, 1969 in Washington. Discussing with the member of the cabinet and particularly 
with Secretary Maury Stans, who was going to Europe, President Nixon underscored: 
Americans and Europeans have had some protectionist problems in the short 
run, but we have to make clear that this policy cannot be permanent. … Our 
mid-western friends here in America will stick with us on NATO but if we 
start fooling around with their soy beans, their votes are gone. Maury, if I were 
you, I would point out the growing isolationism in America. … There is no 
question about what the new leadership stands for … but we face a political 
problem at home. If the American people get the impression that the European 
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economy is turning inward, the Europeans can forget about political 
cooperation; no administration could survive supporting their case.224  
 
After a deep analysis of the consequences of European policy of inwardness or 
protectionism policy on U.S. economic situations and political views, the thirty-seventh 
president of the United States had no hesitations in directing his Secretary regarding his 
upcoming trip to Europe: “Maury, you have to use great discretion on this and not refer to it 
publicly at all. But tell them our problem. They don’t hesitate to tell us theirs.”225  
Implicitly this meant that the Secretary needed to let the Europeans know they had to 
lift their trade restrictions, on U.S. exports generally and on U.S. agricultural exports to their 
market particularly, in return for a U.S. freeze of troop levels in Europe. The President made 
it clear that traditional U.S. support for any manifestation of European unity would be 
provided on the condition that a united Europe did not run contrary to U.S. interests and to 
the broader framework of Atlantic partnership. The economic protectionism policy of the 
European Community was seen by the President and the U.S. Congress as signals of hostility 
and confrontation. This was exactly what the United States did not expect after making 
substantial efforts on economic, political and defence spheres for the Nine to be united in 
prosperity and security. In a nationally televised address on March 15, 1974, President Nixon 
publicly showed his administration’s increasing pressure on Western Europe by 
interconnecting military commitment with economic and political elements:  
Now the Europeans cannot have it both on the security front and then proceed 
to have confrontation and even ways. They cannot have the United States 
participation and cooperation hostility on the economic and political fronts … 
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In the event that Congress gets the idea that we are going to be faced with 
economic confrontation and hostility from the Nine, you will find it almost 
impossible to get Congressional support for continued American presence at 
present levels on the security front … we are not going to be faced with a 
situation where the Nine countries of Europe gang up against the United States 
– the United States which is their guarantee for security. That we cannot 
have.226 
  
Such a strategic interconnection of economic, political and security facets in the 
relationship between the United States and the European Community were a crucial factor in 
the Washington’s framework to the Europeans and their integration process. The Nixon 
administration was very certain that the integration process in Western Europe could not be 
smooth and achievable without U.S. military assistance. The threat of a U.S. troop 
withdrawal from Western Europe was, therefore, put on the negotiation table when the 
Europeans wanted to pursue a policy which in Washington’s view would be detrimental to 
U.S. interests. This was discussed and fully agreed upon by President Nixon and Kissinger:  
Nixon: And I am going to say too that this is all part of the same situation. The 
Europeans cannot expect cooperation on the security front where the 
American role is indispensable to their survival and confrontation and at times 
even hostility on the economic front. 
Kissinger: And political front. That I think would be excellent.227 
 
Believing the Europeans could not defend themselves without U.S. military assistance 
or the U.S. military umbrella the European Community would be an economic giant but a 
military pygmy, the Nixon administration had a strong bargaining tool in their negotiations 
with the Europeans. The leaders of the European Community were made to understand that 
their economic and political integration process would only be implemented successfully if 
they continued to have support from Washington in the security front. As an important 
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member in the great alliance, the United States under the Nixon administration sent direct 
messages to the other members in Western Europe which called for their economic sacrifices 
in the name of Cold War unity and their consideration of Washington’s thoughts before they 
made any decisions that could have an adverse influence on U.S. interest. These concerns 
must have also been on the mind of President Nixon when he spoke at a Cabinet-level 
meeting of the Council on International Economic Policy: 
[having] one hell of a time acting as a bloc. They do not get along with each 
other. The French don’t get along with the Germans, the Germans don’t get 
along with the British. It will be some time before they can learn to act as a 
group. This means we have to work with the heads of government in the 
various countries and not that jackass in the European Commission in 
Brussels.228 
  
President Nixon, throughout his entire presidency, sought to make clear the linkage 
between the U.S. security commitment to Western European and U.S. economic and strategic 
interests. He underlined the reality that the United States had been providing security for 
West Germany against the Soviet Union, while relieving Western Europeans anxieties about 
independent German military power. By committing U.S. military power to defending 
Western Europe, the United States had allowed Western European countries to keep their 
military budgets low. With low military budgets, Western Europe was able to focus its 
resources on constructing and developing its economy. President Nixon, in the context of 
U.S. decline, highlighted the need for Western Europe to see the roots of their economic 
prosperity: it was the U.S. military umbrella that contributed substantially to Western 
European wealth and stability. However, the expense to maintain the military umbrella for 
Western Europe was high. The Nixon administration henceforth reasserted U.S. economic 
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conditions in exchange for security shield from Washington. In the Nixon administration’s 
policy on Western Europe, the security bond was underlined as a firm foundation for Western 
Europeans prosperity and the enhancement of U.S. national interests: 
U.S. security is bound to that of Europe. Western Europe with 300 million 
people, a gross national product of more than $600 billion and an industrial 
output contributing about one-fourth of the world’s total, is an area of vital 
interest to the United States. This interest is reinforced by myriad other bonds: 
official, commercial, political, technological, cultural, and personal. Our 
security and our prosperity are both indissolubly linked with the security and 
prosperity of Western Europe.229  
 
This implied that the Nixon administration wanted the Western Europe’s leaders to see 
this reality and avoid economic policies which were unfavourable to the U.S. economy as 
discussed in a paper prepared in the Department of State and the National Security Council: 
“Even were Western Europe to become appreciably more structured and independent, it is 
unlikely that the ties with the United States would disintegrate. These ties are strong and 
extensive: They are already present in a complex of economic, political and military 
interests.”230  
The military umbrella was provided to defend the ongoing projects between the United 
States and Western Europe, to contain communism and to spread democracy. The United 
States, in its desire to strengthen the Atlantic alliance to achieve the goals of such ongoing 
projects, found itself in a situation where Western European allies had become competitive 
on the economic front and assertive in the political arena. A strong and prosperous European 
Community remained a vital U.S. interest but the Nixon administration could not lose sight of 
a broader strategic picture in which it needed a strong European Community as partner in 
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non-military areas. It was in these non-military areas that the Nixon administration wanted 
Western European aid and in which the European Community’s socio-economic successes 
would mean that it could have something real to offer. The Nixon administration continued to 
support a strong and wealthy European Community, and at the same time needed to find a 
way to ask the European Community to pay for the defence commitment that the United 
States had made. The return that the Nixon administration wanted was closer cooperation in 
economic and political fields to help the United States overcome its declining period. U.S. 
military power that Western Europe had enjoyed was the basis for the Nixon administration 
to claim for Western European assistance and cooperation. This was because military power 
was the area that President Nixon and his team felt the most self-confident. The changes in 
the global structure outlined by his administration made President Nixon place more 
emphasis on the U.S. military umbrella in relations with the European Community. In spite of 
the fact that Western Europe had pooled their resources and sovereignty under the European 
Community, the European Community remained a weak actor in the global affairs. Facing 
the problem of its weakness, the European Community’s leaders needed to have a more 
supportive and proactive approach from Washington. The security umbrella the United States 
provided permitted the European Community to evolve into a capable actor in the world 
affairs which in turn had to, in Washington’s perspective, subordinate to the United States.  
 
Conclusion  
With a strong interest in foreign policy President Nixon and his assistant for National 
Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, managed to change the way decisions on U.S. external 
affairs were made. Many of the important aspects of foreign policy were formulated at the 
White House. President Nixon and Kissinger shared a well-defined general perception of 
international politics and economics. Being led by realism, the Nixon and Kissinger team saw 
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the changes that were occurring in the world affairs. A multi-polar world order was going to 
emerge and replace the bi-polar one. Though the United States remained the wealthiest and 
powerful nation in the non-Communist world, it was underscored by Richard Nixon on May 
6, 1968, in his campaign speech delivered in Omaha, Nebraska, that there were only two 
hundred million Americans and there were two billion people in the non-Communist world. 
This meant the United States could not be the only nation responsible for the peace and 
prosperity of the non-Communist world in general and of the European Community in 
particular. The Western Europeans who had achieved certain success in their European 
integration project now needed to take more responsibility for their own security. The 
Americans who had been a benevolent global hegemon since the end of the Second World 
War needed to develop a new diplomacy to deal with strategic threats.231  
The emergence of a new world order and the need to maintain and extend the global 
dominance of the United States made them envisage the evolvement of the European 
integration in a way slightly different from the previous U.S. administrations. Though the 
United States under the Nixon presidential years still supported movements for integration in 
Western Europe, Washington could not hide their fear that a united Europe with increasing 
self-confidence and self-assertiveness would be running political and economic projects 
against U.S. national interests. Therefore, the European integration had to be, in the Nixon 
and Kissinger view, taking place under U.S. influence and leadership. A consultative 
mechanism was required by the United States to ensure that Washington could raise its voice 
before the European Community made up its mind in important matters. Making defence 
commitments to the European Community and sustaining bilateral relations with the core 
nations of the Community were the main channels employed by the Nixon administration to 
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keep Western Europe within its arm’s reach in order to ensure that the European integration 
process would take the shape that Washington desired.  
Guided by his vision of European integration, President Nixon and his administration 
made policy decisions which had certain impacts on the European integration process. That 
the United States sought to reduce tensions with both the Soviet Union and China was the 
main feature of the new age opened by the Nixon administration. In addition, President 
Nixon’s new economic policy of 1971 had made this new age more typical. How these new 
political and economic decisions made by the Nixon administration had impacted the 
European integration process is going to be examined in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3 
The Nixon Administration, the New Age and European Integration 
The postwar order in international relations – the configuration of power that emerged from 
the Second World War – is gone. With it are gone the conditions which have determined the 
assumptions and practices of United States foreign policy since 1945.  
 
President Richard Nixon, February 25, 1971 
 
I think of what happened to Greece and Rome, and you see what is left – only the pillars. 
What has happened, of course, is that the great civilizations of the past, as they have become 
wealthy, as they have lost their will to live, to improve, they then become subject to 
decadence that eventually destroys the civilization. The U.S. is now reaching that period.  
 
President Richard Nixon, July 6, 1971 
 
Introduction 
The term “Golden Age” has been widely used to refer to the economic and socio-
political position of the United States immediately after the end of the Second World War 
when the U.S. was enjoying its hegemony with unparalleled military, economic and 
technological might. Yet the Golden Age of the United States appeared to decline by the late 
1960s. When the Nixon administration arrived at the White House, the world was entering a 
New Age which was characterized by U.S. economic recession, Western European 
emergence, international monetary crises and relaxation in international relations. 
Confronting swift changes in the international environment, the new administration 
reconsidered its economic, monetary and political policies and this led to new elements in its 
policy design towards European integration. This was reflected in President Nixon’s new 
policy which put an end to the Bretton Woods system and his policy to reduce tensions with 
the Soviet Union and open to China. The demise of the Bretton Woods system adversely 
affected the European plan for a monetary union which aimed to deepen European 
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integration. The détente with the Soviets and the search for diplomatic normalization with the 
Chinese was seen as one of the impulses for the European Community’s leaders to develop 
their plan for political cooperation. Therefore, this chapter will start with a description of U.S. 
relative decline and Western European rise which set the scene for the Nixon administration 
to design the new economic policy of August 15, 1971. Following this, it will focus on 
analysing the Nixon’s decision to suspend the conversion of the dollar into gold and the 
effect of this decision on European Monetary Integration. Furthermore, this chapter will shed 
light on the Nixon policy towards the Soviet Union and China and how this policy drove the 
European political cooperation. It will be concluded that, with a realist view of the world 
order, President Nixon downgraded the European integration process in his foreign policy 
agenda. His focus was to respond to U.S. economic and political decline and to protect U.S. 
strategic interests. 
 
The New Age: U.S. Relative Decline and Western European Rise 
It is widely accepted that major wars have the potential to change the international 
political system and transform the position of the nation states within it. The Second World 
War, the most devastating world war thus far in human history, was no exception. The 
international system transformed fundamentally with the emerging of the United States as a 
superpower. 
When the Second World War ended, the U.S. society was more affluent than any 
other country in the world. The wartime period, between 1941 and 1945, witnessed the U.S. 
economy’s expansion at an unprecedented rate. The Gross National Product (GNP) of the 
United States increased to $135 billion in 1944 from $88.6 billion in 1939 though the country 
was still affected by the Great Depression. While the economies of the U.S.’s allies were 
devastated by the Second World War, the booming U.S. economy was engineered by war-
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related production which increased spectacularly to 40 percent in 1943 from only two percent 
in 1939.232 The output in many manufacturing sectors grew sharply from 1939 to 1944. The 
height of war brought with it the height of production in many industries of the U.S. economy 
as shown in Appendix 1. Along with the economic and manufacturing expansion was the 
expansion of employment. In 1944 it fell to a record low in U.S. economic history at 1.2 
percent of the civilian labour force. Appendix 2 shows the overall employment and 
unemployment figures during the war period. 
Economically, the Second World War helped the United States end the Great 
Depression and brought about favourable conditions for manufacturing production to 
spectacularly expand and create hundreds of thousands of new jobs for U.S. citizens. The 
United States that emerged from the Second Word War was not physically affected, but 
economically expanded by wartime industrial booming. The United States had an absolute 
advantage over both its friends and foes as described by British author, Harold J. Laski: 
America bestrides the world like a colossus; neither Rome at the height of its 
power nor Great Britain in the period of its economic supremacy enjoyed an 
influence so direct, so profound or so pervasive. It has half of the world’s 
productive capacity, and it exports more than twice as much as it imports. 
Today literally hundreds of millions of Europeans and Asiatics know that both 
the quality and the rhythm of their lives depend upon decisions made in 
Washington. On the wisdom of those decisions hangs the fate of the next 
generation.233  
 
With a larger and wealthier economy than any other countries throughout the world, 
U.S. leaders were determined to make the United States the centre of the post-war world 
economy. The United States decided to provide aid of $13 billion to Western Europe from 
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1947 to 1951. With this massive economic support, the economic reconstruction of West 
Germany, France and Great Britain was closely bound to U.S. needs for imports and exports.  
By the unfolding of the Cold War in the decade and a half after the Second World 
War, the United States had experienced phenomenal economic prosperity. The economic 
base left by the war helped the United States to consolidate its position as the world’s most 
affluent and influential country in the post-war period. GNP, a measure of all goods and 
services produced in the United States, grew to $300,000 million in 1950 and to over 
$500,000 million in 1960 from around $200,000 million in 1940. More and more U.S. 
citizens now belonged to the middle class. 
To borrow the words of British economic historian, Alan Milward, “the United States 
emerged in 1945 in an incomparably stronger position economically than in 1941. … By 
1945 the foundations of the United States’ economic domination over the next quarter of a 
century had been secured … [This] may have been the most influential consequence of the 
Second World War for the post-war world.”234 These words can best describe the affluence as 
well as influence that the U.S. society and economy enjoyed during the twentieth century. 
Building on the economic foundation left after the Second World War, U.S. society became 
richer in the post-war years than most U.S. citizens could ever have dreamed of before or 
during the war. From its absolute advantages over its allies and enemies, the leaders of the 
United States envisaged a new role for the United States in global affairs in general and in 
Western Europe in particular. From 1945 to 1968, the U.S. government forged a new foreign 
policy which consistently and constantly supported the economic construction, development 
and integration in Western Europe. However, the global economic circumstances changed 
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substantially during the late 1960s and this exerted certain impacts on the U.S. economic 
position as well as its vision of the European integration process in Western Europe. 
The United States by the late 1960s and early 1970s under the Nixon administration 
was not as strong as it used to be. The signals of economic recession on U.S. soil made it 
clear the United States was in a deteriorating economic position compared with the European 
Community. The picture of economic development in the United States as compared to the 
European Economic Community in the late 1960s contrasted greatly. While the U.S. share of 
the World Gross Domestic Product decreased to 30 percent from 40 percent, the share of the 
European Economic Community countries increased to 15 percent from 11 percent.235 It was 
noticed that in the decade prior to 1973, core states of the European Economic Community 
enjoyed a remarkable economic growth at about six percent annually, which was almost 
twice as fast as U.S. economy.236 The United States started to experience economic crisis in 
the late 1960s after a long period of stable development. Rising unemployment and inflation, 
known as stagflation, were becoming serious. On the contrary, the pace of economic growth 
in Western Europe was very rapid, bringing these nation-states closer to the United States by 
almost all the main economic indicators. In his 1971 study, Robert Rowthorn underlined that 
“with the exception of a brief period in the late sixties, … continental Europe has grown 
substantially faster than the United States during the last two decades.”237 This was echoed by 
Mario Pianta who recorded similar findings in research pertaining to the economic health of 
the United States, West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. Appendix 3 shows that the four major European economies (West Germany, 
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France, Italy and the United Kingdom) had enjoyed growth rates or increases in real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) consistently higher than the United States from 1969 to 1974.238  
Gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP in the four major European economies 
in each year from 1969 to 1974 can be noted as higher than in the United States (see 
Appendix 4) and a similar pattern emerges regarding the share of gross national saving in the 
GDP (see Appendix 5). The data on growth rates of GDP, shares of gross fixed capital 
formation and savings in GDP demonstrated a serious deterioration of U.S. economic 
position in relation to the four major Western European nations. The decline of U.S. economy 
and the rise of the European Community’s economy from 1969 to 1974 could also be seen in 
the comparison of the main economic indicators between the European Community as a 
whole and the United States as shown in Appendices 6, 7 and 8. In short, U.S. economic 
power was no longer unrivalled.  
The perceived decline of U.S. power was what concerned President Nixon. He was 
especially interested in the conclusion drawn by a survey carried out by Britain’s Institute for 
Strategic Studies, “The U.S. has lost ‘the desire and ability’”. The survey further predicted 
that the United States, due to its relative decline, would play a less active role in the world in 
the 1970s, perhaps the most modest role since before the Second World War, stressing that 
“It was largely accidental that the end of the American desire and ability to be the universal 
and dominant power should coincide with the end of eight years of Democrat rule. … This 
course is not due to a choice of Americans of ‘isolation for its own sake’, but because their 
recent experience at home and abroad, had exhausted their confident sense of purpose and 
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ability.”239 In reference to the content of this survey President Nixon wrote to Kissinger: “(1) 
Very important and accurate; (2) We need to get this broadly circulated.”240  
The slowdown of the United States economy in the late 1960s and early 1970s was 
particularly obvious with the increasing economic competition from the European 
Community. The Nixon administration was deeply concerned about this. In the 1960s, the 
countries of the European Community enjoyed fast economic growth. The European 
Community became one of major players in the world’s economy. Many countries in the 
world wanted to build closer trade relations with the European Community. Economic 
cooperation with the members of the European Free Trade Association and the United States 
was enhanced by new agreements. According to L. B. Krause, for a second time in the 
twentieth century, the international trade was dominated by a new region:  “Just as the United 
States eclipsed Great Britain as the world’s largest trading nation in the early part of the 
century, so is the European Economic Community outpacing the United States today.”241   
By the 1960s, the exports and imports of the Common Market accounted for 24 
percent of world trade (including intra-Community trade) while the U.S. percentage 
represented only 16 percent. There was also evidence that Western Europe adopted a 
collective position in trade negotiations with the United States. For example, in 1961 the 
fifth, or Dillon round, of periodic trade negotiations within the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) and the first round that the European Economic Community participated 
as a unit had essentially completed, however, Secretary of Agriculture, Orville Freeman, 
urged President John F. Kennedy not to accept the outcome of the Dillon Round. His reason 
 
                                                          
239 Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant (Butterfield) to the President's Assistant for National 
Security Affairs (Kissinger), Foreign Relations of the United States (Hereafter cited as FRUS), 1969-1976, 
Volume I, Foundation of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972, Document 20, viewed on March 26, < 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d20>. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Krause, LB 1963, ‘European Economic Integration and the United States’, American Economic Review, Vol. 
53, No. 2, p.185. 
- 120 - 
 
was that the European Economic Community was establishing a Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) “that is protectionist not only in effect but also in objective.”242 As a major 
exporter of wheat, corn and other agricultural products, the United States had a lot to lose 
from the CAP and needed to assert its rights - and power - before it was too late. As a result, 
the Dillon Round concluded without an agreement on agriculture. Furthermore, the Kennedy 
Round of 1963-1966 witnessed the creation of a substantive trade diplomacy for the 
European Economic Community “which enabled the Europeans to resist U.S. pressure on 
various fronts, especially agricultural trade.”243 Thus, the United States was particularly 
concerned about the European Economic Community’s protectionist policies which restricted 
U.S. access to this market of 250 million people. 
With the United States in relative decline, the increasing economic competition and 
protectionist measures for U.S. goods from the European Economic Community made 
Washington more sceptical about the benefits of their involvement in Western Europe. As a 
result, the Nixon administration re-examined whether the U.S. policy of supporting Western 
European integration was beneficial or detrimental to the national interests. The view Nixon 
and Kissinger held was that action needed to be taken “to screw the Europeans before they 
screw us.”244 Thus, the United States adopted polices to meet its domestic-economic 
requirements such as unilaterally terminating the dollar’s convertibility into gold and 
reducing commitments to Western Europe, disregarding the consequences for its Western 
allies. 
The late 1960s and early 1970s were a time of profound change to the economic 
status of the United States. It was the time that the global economy witnessed the rise of new 
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economic powers and the relative decline of the United States hegemony. Western Europe 
emerged as one of the economic powerhouses that challenged the United States. The rising of 
Western European in particular showed the United States economy was not without 
weaknesses. It seemed that the American Century started to finish after a mere thirty years. 
The task to manage economic recession in the United States and to restore the country’s 
predominant position in the world fell to the Nixon administration. It was the recognition of 
this reality that led to reorientations in Nixon’s foreign policy. The president with Kissinger 
saw that rebalancing U.S. relations with both its friends and foes was vital to cope with the 
recession in the United States. It was implied that the United States needed to adjust to be one 
power among many. Ultimately, the relative decline of the United States led to the Nixon 
administration’s reconsideration of U.S. policy to Western Europe.  
 
The Nixon Administration’s Decision to End the Bretton Woods System and the 
Impacts on European Monetary Integration 
In this section it is argued that the United States relative decline made the Nixon 
administration to re-evaluate its policy towards Europe. President Nixon showed that he had 
to protect the U.S. national interests and he became less enthusiastic about the European 
integration project. Thus, his administration decided to put an end to the Bretton Woods 
System to save the United States economy and currency. This decision had an adverse impact 
on the on-going European Monetary Integration.  
 
The Nixon Administration’s Decision to End the Bretton Woods System 
In order to reconstruct the international economic system devastated by the Second 
World War, 730 delegates from all 44 Allied nations assembled in Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire, for the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference. The delegates 
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discussed and concluded on the Bretton Woods Agreements during the first three weeks of 
July 1944. Under the Bretton Woods Agreements, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the precursor of the modern 
World Bank, were created. The goal of the Bretton Woods System was to make the United 
States the world’s economic centre.  
  In principle, institutions of the Bretton Woods System served as “the conservators of 
the rules, conventions and understandings that structured” international economic and 
financial relations among sovereign states.245 In practice, the operation of the Bretton Woods 
System mainly depended upon the preferences and policies of its most powerful member, the 
United States. The Bretton Woods System enabled Western European economies to quickly 
recover by accumulating U.S. dollars as a result of market exchanges - including the Marshall 
Plan aid - which could then be pegged to gold at the rate of $35 an ounce and guaranteed by 
the U.S. Treasury.246 The Bretton Woods System shaped the post-war international economic 
order indeed. Such a world economy, built on “a unique blend of laissez-faire and 
internationalism - of liberal multilateralism and the welfare state,” enabled the Western 
European and U.S. economies to thrive.247  
During his presidency, President Nixon was more preoccupied with international 
political and strategic policy than economic; his administration appeared uninterested in 
foreign economic issues. Yet President Nixon and his administration acknowledged the close 
interactions between economics and politics. Internal and external economic developments 
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could profoundly affect political goals and vice versa. Especially as the legacy the Johnson 
administration left the Nixon administration was a serious U.S. balance-of-payments deficit 
which was threatening to destabilize the world’s economic system. It was under these 
circumstances the Nixon administration intensively re-evaluated U.S. monetary and trade 
policies.  
On January 21, 1969, President Nixon directed the establishment of a permanent 
Working Group to help the National Security Council with recommendations on U.S. 
international monetary policy and implementation of policy decisions. The Working Group 
was chaired by the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs, Paul A. Volcker. 
The very first task of the Volcker group was to prepare a paper on U.S. international 
monetary policy which aimed to consider the functioning of the Bretton Woods System and 
possible U.S. responses. The Volcker group paper entitled “Long-term aspects of U.S. 
international monetary and exchange policies” pointed out that:  
the system of fixed exchange rates has come to place too much pressure on 
deficit countries to conform to rates of growth and rates of costs and price 
inflation in the rest of the world. … because the pressure to conform is 
markedly stronger in deficit than in surplus countries, the latter have an 
exaggerated weight in determining the rate of growth of aggregate demand in 
the world as a whole, and, consequently, the rate of economic progress.248  
 
As the United States was in the position of a deficit country, Volcker and his team suggested 
that “Perhaps one of the most important long-term problems facing the U.S. is how to move 
out of this commitment in a graceful manner without causing undue disturbance to the 
monetary system and with a fair measure of international approbation.”249 They also added 
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that “the breaking of the link between the dollars and gold might have to come in the context 
of some currency crisis and a threatened run on the dollar.”250  
Following the recommendation put forth by Volcker on considering a major overhaul 
in regard to the Bretton Woods system and to set the dollar free from the burden it carried, 
President Nixon, in his trip to Western Europe in February 1969, told the Western Europeans 
that his administration’s major goal was to bring inflation in the United States under control 
and responsible improvement had to be made in the international monetary system. He also 
added that “On most of these we have no final view. I would be glad to hear what is in your 
mind.”251  
Despite expressing his interest in Western European views on the functioning of the 
international monetary system, the leaders of the United Sates held a clear view of the 
international monetary issues and a possible approach to improving international monetary 
arrangements. The Nixon administration realized that if there were no positive changes in the 
international monetary and payments system there would be a serious strain in the 
international monetary relationships in the next few years to come. This would be reflected in 
heavy reserve losses for the United States through the pegging of dollars to gold by foreign 
monetary authorities. The Volcker group pointed out that “Our strategy therefore calls for 
either (a) negotiating substantial but evolutionary changes in present monetary arrangements, 
or (b) suspending the present type of gold convertibility and following this with an attempt to 
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negotiate a new system, in which the United States would undertake a more limited and less 
exposed form of convertibility of the dollar.”252  
In 1971, three years after the Nixon administration came to office, there had been no 
positive changes in the international monetary system. An August 13, 1971, Memorandum 
from the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Julius Katz, to Secretary 
of State, William Rogers, underlined that the dollar was suffering severe pressure in Western 
European and Japanese financial centres. The dollar lost its value in comparison to such 
floating currencies as the German Mark, Dutch Guilder and Canadian Dollar. Large amounts 
of dollars were being bought by central banks in other financial centres to go along with the 
International Monetary Fund rules of maintaining parity relationships between their 
currencies and the dollar.253 
The main reasons for the weakness of the dollar were the same as those in 1969 and 
1970. It was because U.S. balance-of-payments deficits were persistent, the U.S. trade 
account was slipping deeper into deficit and the U.S. gold reserve was shrinking as described 
in the Information Memorandum from Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff 
to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs on August 13, 1971. It was also 
stressed in the Memorandum that “Throughout 1971 there has been an erosion of European 
confidence in the stability of the dollar.”254  
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By this logic, the weakening of the dollar adversely affected U.S. trading positions 
and the United States had to struggle to preserve its international credibility by avoiding 
devaluation.255 However, considerable growth in domestic spending on President Johnson’s 
Great Society programs and an increase in military spending caused by the Vietnam War 
made the overvaluation of the dollar more serious. Two proposals were put forth. The first 
one called for major European nations to agree on the International Monetary Fund’s plan of 
Special Drawing Rights. The other one called for flexible exchange rates. The Nixon 
administration officials tried to get individual countries, particularly in Western Europe, to 
revalue or even devalue their currencies and agree upon the ground rules governing monetary 
and commercial relations. Together these solutions could help to prevent a world financial 
crisis and boost international trade. Yet the Europeans did not agree on currency revaluation.  
The distressed foreign exchange markets of 1971 were recalled in the memoirs of John 
Connally, Secretary of the Treasury:  “I had no sooner taken office than we had to confront a 
very hostile international monetary system. … Throughout 1971, the U.S. economy was in 
such distress, and the world monetary picture so volatile, that comparisons were being made 
to 1933.”256 President Nixon had seen the need to overhaul the international monetary system 
since he came to office in 1969, for political and technical reasons, though, he had been 
reluctant to resort to the devaluation of the dollar despite the fact that he had been getting 
such recommendations from his economic advisers and many in Europe. In 1971, President 
Nixon knew that he had to act: “this is not going to be comfortable for other people, but it 
might be very damn helpful for us.”257 During a 9 p.m. television address on Sunday August 
15, 1971, President Nixon announced the New Economic Policy, a lethal injection to the 
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Breton Woods system. In his personal message to the Chancellor of Western Germany, Willy 
Brandt, President Nixon had written: 
I am tonight announcing a comprehensive program to curb inflation, increase 
employment, restore strength and confidence in the United States dollar, and 
improve the international monetary system. This major action is necessary to 
preserve confidence in the dollar and to maintain an international monetary 
system which will serve the world's needs. It was our responsibility to act and 
we have done so. 
     I am imposing a 90-day freeze on wages and prices in the United States. I 
am cutting certain taxes to stimulate consumption and employment and I am 
sharply curtailing U.S. Government expenditures. I am also levying temporary 
surcharge on all dutiable imports not already subject to quantitative limitations 
by the United States, and I have directed that the convertibility of the dollar into 
gold or other reserve assets be suspended.258 
 
The end of the Bretton Woods System was an initial expression of the relative decline 
of the United States. The United States had played a key role in the Bretton Woods System, 
through it Washington had shaped the design and evolution of international economic 
regimes. Implicitly, on August 15, 1971, the Nixon administration declared an end to the 
central role of the dollar and thus the U.S. role in international trade. In other words, the 
United States officially showed that it could no longer act as a benevolent hegemon and that 
its allies needed to be more responsible for their own development. 
 
Impacts on European Monetary Integration 
In fact the Western Europeans had lost their confidence in U.S. dollar as well as the 
U.S. promise to drive European integration. They had reasons for that: the end of the Bretton 
Woods System and the decision of the Nixon administration to float the dollar caused major 
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economic, social and political upheavals in the world capitalist economy in the period 
immediately following. The wave of instability on foreign exchanges which raised the 
question of the parities between the European currencies brought an abrupt halt to the 
European Economic and Monetary Union project. 
After the Second World War, most Western European currencies were bound to the 
U.S. dollar under the gold standard in the Breton Woods System. The supremacy of U.S. 
currency and forced devaluations of some Western European currencies made Western 
European leaders search for a way to strengthen the value of their currencies through 
monetary integration. However, the idea of European Monetary Union was taken seriously 
only when, in 1969, a new generation of leaders arose in France and West Germany. In 
France, Georges Pompidou succeeded Charles de Gaulle and in Western Germany, Willy 
Brandt replaced Konrad Adenauer. Brandt and Pompidou both emphasized the importance of 
European integration. Pompidou called for “a meeting by the end of the year in The Hague of 
conference of heads of state or government, with a view to examining the problems arising 
for the Community, principally in the matter of its completion, its consolidation and its 
enlargement.”259 The summit took place in The Hague in the Netherlands over December 1-2, 
1969, and “promised to be an epochal event in the history of the EC.”260 
At The Hague summit, the European Community’s leaders endorsed Pompidou’s 
catchphrase “completion, deepening, enlargement”. The European Community’s leaders 
reached an agreement that monetary policy was one of the areas in which member states 
could deepen European integration: “within the Council on the basis of the memorandum 
presented by the Commission on 12 February 1969, and in close collaboration with the latter, 
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a plan in stages will be worked out during 1970 with a view to the creation of an economic 
and monetary union.”261  
The Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of the Luxembourg Government, Pierre 
Werner, was in charge of preparing a report on the Economic and Monetary Union. On 
October 8, 1970, Werner presented to the Council and the Commission a report on the stages 
to realize the Economic and Monetary Union in the Community. This report was also known 
as Werner Plan.262  
Werner  highlighted the significance of such a union: “Economic and monetary union 
will make it possible to realize an area within which goods and services, people and capital 
will circulate freely and without competitive distortions, without thereby giving rise to 
structural or regional disequilibrium.”263 He also showed that the European Community could 
achieve this through the means of institutional reform and stronger political cooperation. At 
The Hague summit and in the Werner Report, the European Community’s leaders hardly 
mentioned their aim to redress the imbalance between the de facto supremacy U.S. dollar and 
the forced devaluation of European currencies.  
However, on April 5, 1971, in his address to the Council on Foreign Policy in New 
York the President of the Commission of the European Communities, Franco Maria Malfatti, 
said that the European Community’s leaders decided to transform the Community into an 
economic and monetary union because they needed to protect the Common Market from 
monetary storms and they desired to optimize the effects of a single, enlarged market.264 He 
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added that “Fixed exchange rates between European currencies are the objective. This 
postulates a gradual integration and harmonization of economic, budgetary, and tax policies, 
in parallel, the elimination of the main imbalances between industries and regions.”265  
At first the Werner Report was carried out with the enhancement of the co-ordination 
of economic and budgetary policies among member states. Yet this initial monetary and 
economic union on European soil was disrupted by President Nixon’s decision to cease the 
relationship between the dollar and gold which consequently led to the demise of the whole 
Bretton Wood System. The European Community’s desire to achieve the European Monetary 
Union in a course of ten years was not realized as the Bretton Woods System collapsed. The 
Nixon administration’s new economic policy announced on August 15, 1971, had adversely 
affected the deepening of European integration. The Nixon administration’s policy decision 
reflected Washington’s dissatisfaction with Western European indifference to U.S. economic 
difficulty and that the United States considered the European Community as a rival rather 
than a partner as John Connally, Nixon’s Secretary of Treasury, revealed: 
I believe we must realize there is a strong element of thinking within Europe 
that would take advantage of weakness or clumsiness on our part to promote 
the Common Market not as a partner but as a rival economic bloc, competing 
vigorously with the dollar and reducing or shutting out, as best as it can, U.S. 
economic influence from a considerable portion of the world.266  
 
 According to Hubert Zimmermann, Professor for International Relations at Philipps-
Universität Marburg, “a quick implementation of the Werner Plan would have been a logical 
step in this situation, but the Europeans had wasted precious time during the 1960s.”267 
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Though President de Gaulle had prevented any move towards a supranational management of 
European currencies, the fact that Western European economies were rapidly developing 
provided the European Community ample space to form a united position in the monetary 
discussion with Washington.268  
The international economic and monetary situation in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
was complicated and challenging to both the Nixon administration and the European 
Community’s leaders. The United States and the European Community had experienced 
currency crises worsened by both sides’ divergences regarding the management of such 
crises. From 1969 to 1971, the European Community’s efforts to deepen its integration 
process were remarkable. The Hague summit and the Werner Report illustrated Western 
European desire to achieve their goal of a true European union. The currency crises on both 
sides of the Atlantic following the Nixon administration’s decision to suspend the 
convertibility of the dollars into gold plays a significant role in explaining why the European 
Community’s idea of pooling of national sovereignty in monetary matters was not realized. 
The failure of the European Monetary Union plan in the 1970s showed the link between U.S. 
and Western European economies and currencies. The Nixon administration had to look after 
U.S. national interests, therefore, it implemented a new economic policy which it knew 
would be detrimental to the European Monetary Union plan, a plan to deepen European 
integration. It could be said that the circumstances for the creation of European Monetary 
Union were not yet right but the European monetary integration itself was starting to 
materialize. The European Community’s leaders had envisaged a far-reaching form of 
economic and monetary integration that would make the Western European states a 
prosperous and strong family. The Nixon administration’s mortal blow to the Bretton Woods 
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System and its disruption of the European Monetary Union plan were important events in the 
history of U.S. policy towards European integration. It underlined the significance of U.S. 
support for the success of the European integration process. Without U.S. support, the 
European Community’s efforts to inject renewed enthusiasm into the integration project were 
likely to fail. It also underlined that U.S. support for European integration process was 
motivated by U.S. national interest. Any moves towards supranationality in Western Europe, 
from a U.S. perspective, were not allowed to jeopardize the hegemonic position of the United 
States.  
 
The Nixon Administration’s Shift in Foreign Policy Priorities and European Political 
Cooperation 
 
The Nixon Administration’s Shift in Foreign Policy Priorities 
 
In his article entitled “Asia after Vietnam” published in Foreign Affairs in October 
1967, Richard Nixon expressed his idea of focusing U.S. foreign policy on Asia to build a 
Pacific community in that part of the world. This implied a change in the priorities of U.S 
foreign policy, moving the focus from the West to the East: 
Out of the wreckage of two world wars we forged a concept of an Atlantic 
community, within which a ravaged Europe was rebuilt and the westward 
advance of the Soviets contained. If tensions now strain that community, these 
are themselves a by-product of success. But history has its rhythms, and now 
the focus of both crisis and change is shifting. Without turning our backs on 
Europe, we have now to reach out westward to the East, and to fashion the 
sinews of a Pacific community.269  
 
After the 1968 presidential election resulted in Nixon’s ascendancy to the White 
House, the new president showed the same foreign policy priorities in pursuing his foreign 
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policy agenda. The rhythm of history, in the newly-elected President’s view, had to be played 
in the East. In his inaugural address on January 20, 1969, President Richard Nixon sent an 
important message, the United States was prepared to embark on “an era of negotiation” with 
the communist world. This declaration signalled a change in emphasis in U.S. foreign policy. 
The Nixon administration desired to focus on the relaxation in its relations with the Soviet 
Union and China. In order to fulfil their promise to shift the Cold War landscape from an “era 
of confrontation” to an “era of negotiations”, President Nixon and Kissinger set up a back 
channel for direct communication with the Soviet Union and later with China as the President 
believed that this rapprochement “should be done privately and should under no 
circumstances get into the public prints from this direction.”270 This new channel also ignored 
the traditional diplomacy which was regularly carried out through the foreign services and 
overseas embassies.  
That the United States was dancing with both the Soviet Union and China reflected 
the multi-polar reality and U.S. adjustment to its relative decline. Even though everyone had 
no doubt that the United States still retained considerable power, even at its nadir in the early 
1970s, the trend of relaxing in the United States’ foreign policies towards the two communist 
nation-states was the result of its relative decline. Nixon and Kissinger had no desire to place 
as much emphasis on the friendship with Western Europe as the previous administrations had 
done. These U.S. leaders looked to the East and supposed that China and the Soviet Union 
would have a significant role in helping the United States to cope with economic slowdown 
because they all had large developing markets. More importantly, the United States was 
seeking to escape the Vietnam War which was too costly to the United States. The 
relationship with China and the Soviet Union, both of which had important influence in North 
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Vietnam, would somewhat help the United States to solve the problem of Vietnam War. 
Building relations with these Communist countries became a milestone in the Nixon 
administration’s foreign policy. This rebalancing of foreign relations reinforced that U.S. 
support for European integration was not as high profile in the Nixon administration as it had 
been previously. In other words, the détente with the Soviet Union and later the opening to 
China contributed to the reshaping of U.S. policy to European unity.  
Though there was evident rivalry between the Soviet Union and China after 1960, 
both President Kennedy and President Johnson had held to the previous policy stance and 
attitudes towards China. They still believed that the Sino-Soviet relationship was built and 
developed on essentials and thus hostile to the United States and the capitalist world. 
Washington’s anti-China policy was mainly expressed in their non-recognition and trade 
restrictions. However, the Nixon administration considered it essential to bring China into the 
diplomatic constellation as Nixon noted: “We simply cannot afford to leave China outside the 
family of nations.”271 Nixon saw the need to engage with China as an important piece of an 
Asian chessboard: “any American policy toward Asia must come urgently to grips with the 
reality of China.”272 In his memoirs, Nixon wrote: “I was fully aware of the profound 
ideological and political differences between our countries. … But I believed also that in this 
era we could not afford to be cut off from a quarter of the world’s population. We had an 
obligation to try to establish contact … and perhaps move on to greater understanding.”273 
After coming into office in 1969, President Nixon directed that a study be prepared on 
U.S. policy towards China.274 The Nixon administration also soon sent China signals about 
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improving Sino-U.S. relations.275 The Nixon administration began its plan to approach China 
by allowing U.S. citizens to buy Chinese commodities without special permission, validating 
passports from 1970 for travelling in China, and approving, after April 1970, the export of 
certain nonstrategic U.S. goods to China. 276 One important signal from President Nixon to 
improve the relationship with China was his usage of Beijing’s official title, the People’s 
Republic of China during his stop in Romania in October 1970. The Nixon administration’s 
new attitudes and perceptions were positively responded by Beijing. China welcomed 
Washington’s move towards the normalization of U.S.-Sino relationship and expressed its 
interest in face-to-face discussions. It was noted that China had employed what was known as 
“ping-pong diplomacy” in a graceful manner. In April 1971, the Chinese ping-pong team 
invited the U.S. team competing for the world’s championship in Nagoya, Japan, to visit 
China. In his address to the U.S ping-pong team, Chinese leader, Zhou Enlai, said, “with your 
acceptance of our invitation, you have opened a new page in the relations of the Chinese and 
American people. I am confident that this beginning again of our friendship will certainly 
meet with the majority support of our two peoples.”277 After a pause he then asked the 
Americans, “Don’t you agree with me?” and the Americans showed their agreement with 
large applause.278  
Zhou informed Washington that “the Chinese Government reaffirms its willingness to 
receive publicly in Beijing a special envoy of the President of the U.S. (for instance, 
Kissinger) or the U.S. Secretary of State or even the President of the United States himself for 
a direct meeting and discussions.”279 On July 15, 1971, President Nixon announced to the 
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U.S. public that Kissinger and Zhou were to hold private talks in Beijing before the U.S. 
ping-pong team came to China. Also, that Zhou had invited President Nixon to visit China 
and his invitation had been accepted. Both the U.S. and Chinese leaders expressed the desire 
to clear away mutual misperceptions and to define the real nature of some of the more 
outstanding issues and problems impeding improved Sino-American relations. Indeed, the 
United States made significant progress in the rapprochement with China during the Nixon 
administration. 
On February 21, 1972, President Nixon arrived in Beijing and paid a seven-day 
historic visit to China. This was seen as the most obvious manifestation of the Nixon 
administration’s opening to China. President Nixon publicly shook hands with Chairman 
Mao Zedong and was toasted by Zhou in the Great Hall of the People. Nixon’s trip to China 
ended with a Joint Communiqué in Shanghai (also referred to as the Shanghai Communiqué) 
on February 28, 1972, in which the leaders of the United States and China agreed to 
temporarily put aside the major question hindering the normalization of relations, the political 
status of Taiwan, and open trade and other contacts. Opening to China would, Washington 
hoped, be a prerequisite to ease the strained relations with the Soviet Union. The prospect of 
improved relations between the United States and China caused concern in Moscow, thus, it 
motivated the Kremlin to be “more conciliatory on such prominent and substantial issues as 
arms control of offensive and defensive strategic missiles.”280 For the United States the 
opening to China was a strategy to exploit the rivalry between Beijing and the Moscow. The 
implied message to the latter was that Soviet obstinacy would compel the United States to 
align itself more closely with China. To the Soviet Union such alignment would be a 
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nightmare. After the historic visit to China in February 1972, the President travelled to 
Moscow on May 22, 1972, and met with leading Soviet officials.  
The willingness of the United States to follow a policy of easing of Cold War tensions 
was met with approval by Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist 
Party. This was officially shown in a note from the Soviet leadership to President Nixon: 
On our part, we believe, as before, that both sides should have to work for 
better Soviet-American relations and to prepare ourselves for the summit 
meeting accordingly. With all the existing differences which are viewed by 
both sides with open eyes, we duly appraise the significance that the meeting 
may have, proceeding from the responsibility of our countries for the 
preservation of peace and from the assumption that it is desirable to use their 
possibilities for influencing the general international situation. Relaxation of 
international tensions and improvement of relations between the USSR and the 
U.S. would be, we are confident, in the interests of our peoples and other 
peoples of the world. Such is our firm line and we are consistently following 
it.281 
 
At the Moscow summit in March 1972, Nixon and Brezhnev reached an agreement on 
“mutually acceptable” limits for the nuclear capabilities of their countries, an issue which had 
been under negotiation since November 17, 1969. This ultimately resulted in the signing of 
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I agreement in May 1972.282 Noticeably, 
negotiations on SALT II also began in 1972. Importantly, that Leonid Brezhnev paid a visit 
to the United States for the Washington summit in June 1973 marked the highest point in the 
era of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union. During the two days of the 
Washington summit they inked four pacts for cooperation in oceanography, transportation, 
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cultural exchange and agriculture.283 Afterwards, discussions were held on nuclear 
disarmament and troop reductions in Central Europe. They also considered their subsequent 
pact, to avoid nuclear war, as the major success of the Washington summit. The issue of a 20-
page communiqué calling for further relaxation in the relations between the United States and 
the Soviet Union was welcomed by the peoples of both countries. According to Phil 
Williams, Nixon considered détente as a “means of disciplining Soviet power” to contain the 
wild Soviets in the international arena. As for the Soviet Union, Kremlin considered the main 
benefit and their aim of détente as “offering new opportunities for exercising power” to avoid 
an all-out war or nuclear war.284 
In light of such achievements, the Washington summit in 1973 showed that both 
Nixon and Brezhnev knew the risks and costs of the long-lasting rivalry and the advantages 
of stabilization of the Washington-Moscow relationship. However, the Soviet leaders 
remained stuck in their ideological differences with the West and President Nixon was unable 
to convince some in his administration of the necessity to be friendly with the Soviet Union 
as these people held that Moscow presented an immediate threat to the United States.  
The relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union was one of the focuses of President 
Nixon’s foreign policy goals. His administration had reasons for wanting to improve its 
relations with China and the Soviet Union. First, the Nixon administration desired to extricate 
the United States from the Vietnam conflict without suffering a humiliating defeat. This, 
President Nixon believed, could be achieved by isolating North Vietnam from its two main 
sources of supply and support, the Soviet Union and China. Another reason lay in Nixon’s 
assumption that détente with the Soviet Union would help finalise a SALT agreement 
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limiting the size of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and, thus, restraining the Soviet strategic build-
up. Also, the new approach to Moscow and Beijing brought the United States economic 
benefits. U.S. foreign trade was in need of a boost to eliminate a billion-dollar deficit in the 
balance of payments, détente could help the United States to access expanded markets. For 
instance, U.S. corporations like Pepsi-Cola and Chase Manhattan Bank began operations in 
the Soviet Union and U.S. businesses rushed to Asia in a revival of the great China market 
dream  
To cope with its relative decline, the United States sought to improve relations with 
the Soviet Union and China. The lessening of tensions with the Soviet Union was what the 
leaders of the EEC wanted to see because this détente would help reduce socio-political 
tensions in Europe and prevent the likelihood of another war. Similarly, they also welcomed 
the improvement in the Sino-U.S. relations and hoped that it would pave the way for them to 
enter a large market. That the United States was focusing on détente with China and the 
Soviet Union partly explained why its support for European integration was not as high as it 
used to be in Washington’s foreign policy agenda. 
 
Impacts of the Shift on European Political Cooperation 
By late 1969, the European integration project was strengthened by the European 
Community’s leaders demand for speaking in one voice in the world affairs. The Six 
considered that relations with the United States, their ally, partner and sometimes competitor, 
represented problems for them. They understood the significance of the United States in the 
political, economic and security fields and, especially, the interdependence of the United 
States’ and Western European economies. This realization became the European 
Community’s argument in their efforts to develop a plan for European Political Cooperation. 
The need for the Europeans to speak with one voice in its relations with the United States 
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constituted the major reasons for deepening European integration in the area of political and 
foreign affairs. Like the Six’s desire to build a European monetary union, their efforts to 
develop political and foreign policy cooperation aimed at building an equal and dependence-
free relationship with the United States. The leaders of the European Community believed 
that European political and foreign policy cooperation would help complete European 
integration. Their ideas of increasing European integration on political and foreign policy 
reflected the Western European endeavour to become a player in international affairs and 
illustrated its increasing assertiveness in the Atlantic alliance. In the context of reduced 
tensions in international relations, particularly between the United States and the Communist 
world, the European Community’s leaders had to unite to face potential challenges that the 
Nixon administration’s shift from the age of confrontation to the age of negotiation might 
pose to their Community. 
The Truman Doctrine had offered protection to the free nations of the world from 
communism: “The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their 
freedoms. If we falter in our relationship, we may endanger the peace of the world. And we 
shall surely endanger the welfare of this nation.”285 In contrast, the Nixon Doctrine set out by 
President Nixon on July 25, 1969, pointed out that the United States would make new 
diplomatic efforts to open negotiations and to clear away obstacles to negotiations with the 
Communist states, even if it was at expense of U.S. close allies.286 The changes in the Nixon 
administration’s policy towards the Soviet Union and China became a stimulus for the 
European Community’s leaders to re-examine the re-launch of the European integration 
project. Western Europe recognized the importance of unification in the changing world 
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order. In December 1969, four months after the declaration of the Nixon Doctrine, the heads 
of the Six convened at The Hague Summit to show their determination for an ever closer 
union. In the final communiqué of The Hague Summit, it was highlighted that the European 
Community attempted to achieve European Political Cooperation and endeavoured to parallel 
the European Community’s economic increasing strength with an increasing role in the 
world’s great political issues. The heads of the Six instructed “the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs to study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification, 
within the context of enlargement.”287 They expected the Ministers’ report would be 
completed before the end of July 1970.  
The Belgian Political Director, Vicomte Davignon, was tasked by the six foreign 
ministers in early 1970 with preparing a report based on which a new system of foreign 
policy cooperation might be formed. Davignon and his counterparts from the other five 
foreign ministries could not manage to produce the report by the end of July 1970. The report 
was completed and presented at the Luxembourg Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Six 
European Community countries in Luxembourg on October 27, 1970. It was endorsed by the 
foreign ministers and known as the “Davignon Report”. The spirit of the “Davignon Report” 
could be seen as one of the Six’s responses to the new age of negotiations opened by the 
Nixon administration. As for Western Europe, they wanted to see a slowdown in the arms 
race between the United States and Soviet Union and the Sino-U.S normalization. However, 
they were concerned about how their political and strategic interests could be jeopardized 
when President Nixon “attached major importance to the improvement of relations.”288 To 
make sure that the European Community’s interests at home and abroad were secure and 
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safe, the leaders recognized that they needed to gradually develop an appropriate method of, 
and instruments for, joint political action: “The present development of the European 
Communities requires Member States to intensify their political co-operation and provide in 
an initial phase the mechanism for harmonizing their views regarding international affairs. 
Thus, the Ministers felt that efforts ought first to concentrate specifically on the co-ordination 
of foreign policies in order to show the whole world that Europe has a political mission.”289  
The European Economic Cooperation aimed to prepare the European Community to 
effectively act on the world stage: “Europe must prepare itself to carry out the responsibilities 
which, because of its greater cohesion and its growing role, it has the duty and necessity to 
assume in the world.”290 The leaders of the Six showed their wish to cooperate in developing 
a foreign policy for Europe that “corresponds to its tradition and its mission.”291 This mission 
included preventing armed conflicts on the continent, promoting democracy, freedom and a 
market economy. Broadly speaking, the European Community wanted to see the relaxation in 
relations between East Europe and West Europe, in Asia they desired to trade and do business 
with the Chinese.  
The Davignon Committee established after the approval of the Heads of State and 
Government of the Member States of the European Community was in charge of crafting a 
European common political stance in global affairs. This Committee had been successful in 
raising a Western European unified position in security discussions as reflected in the May, 
1970, NATO Rome Communiqué: 
Allied Governments would continue and intensify their contacts, discussions or 
negotiations through all appropriate channels, bilateral or multilateral, and that 
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they remained receptive to signs of willingness on the part of the Soviet Union 
and other Eastern European countries to engage in such discussions. Progress, 
they said, in these discussions and negotiations would help to ensure the 
success of any eventual conference, in which of course, the North American 
members of the Alliance would participate, to discuss and negotiate substantial 
problems of cooperation and security in Europe.292  
 
The Rome Communiqué was evidence, alongside the Davignon Committee, that the 
Six managed to speak in one voice about their position on European security which was 
prerequisite for the success of the European integration project. In addition, the Six’s 
Davignon Committee was able to convince the NATO members to include the ultimate goal 
of the European integration process in the Rome Communiqué as it was observed that NATO 
was in favour of “the development of international relations with a view to contributing to the 
freer movement of people, ideas, and information, and to developing cooperation in the 
cultural, economic, technical, and scientific fields as well as in the field of human 
environment.”293 
Having created an institutional basis for adopting a unified policy stance, the Six was 
able to insist on multilateral negotiations with Washington and showed their political 
assertiveness in world affairs. This of course made the Nixon administration frustrated. 
President Nixon did not want a European Community, whose weight was increased, first by 
its economic integration and then its political cooperation, to modify Washington’s foreign 
policy and security agenda on European terms and conditions. For the Nixon administration, 
the increasing reaffirmation of the Six was unacceptable and Kissinger vowed to “kill the 
Davignon Committee.”294  
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Having focused on the opening to China and détente with the Soviet Union, and 
having seen the Six’s attempts to deepen and complete their integration project through the 
European Political Cooperation, President Nixon and his administration recognized that 
Washington’s policy to reduce tensions in international relations had pushed the European 
Community to be closer. President Nixon understood that the continuity of cooperation 
among the member states of the European Community was necessary, as underlined by John 
Foster Dulles: “We are engaged in a global struggle, as in World War II. We cannot expect 
success if we so scatter our efforts that we are ineffectual everywhere. We have made the 
recovery of Western Europe our major initial goal, but it must not be our sole concern. As 
quickly as possible, we need to turn elsewhere. To do that safely requires increased unity in 
Europe.”295 As an experienced politician and leader, President Nixon knew that before his 
administration could turn to somewhere else, he had to ensure that European unity would not 
be detrimental to his foreign policy goals. Especially as by the late 1960s the U.S. National 
Intelligence Estimate noted, “Western Europe today is more prosperous, more democratic, 
and more secure than at any time in modern history.”296  
As the European Community’s economic strength was increased its leaders 
endeavoured to raise its voice in international affairs. The dilemma that the Nixon 
administration had was that how to realize its policy of reducing tensions with the 
Communist world while preventing any cartel move in Western Europe which might 
adversely affected Washington’s strategic interests. This led to the adaptation of U.S. policy 
towards European integration which could be described as “a form of wary containment.”297 
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The European Community’s plan for political cooperation constituted a source of worry for 
the Nixon administration. It is noted, though, that the European declaration on political 
cooperation basically did not result in substantive change in U.S. policy to reduce tensions 
with the Soviet Union and normalization with China. However, the developments of détente 
with the Soviets and opening to China on the Nixon administration’s side and the dynamics 
of political cooperation on the European Community revealed that the United States needed 
Western Europe as much as the Western Europe needed them. The European integration 
process was mainly driven by the Europeans as response to their alleged challenges. It was 
also apparent that the course of European integration, to a certain extent, had been and would 
be affected by the Nixon administration’s policy changes as the U.S. National Intelligence 
underlined: 
Although the policies of the European states and the pace and extent of 
integration will be determined by the Europeans themselves, they will also be 
influenced by the attitudes and policies of the U.S.. For the past 25 years, the 
U.S. has been the single most important political, economic, and military 
factor in Western Europe. In these circumstances, periodic tension and strain 
between the U.S. and various nations over specific issues or general concepts 
is both natural and unavoidable. The U.S. has been the guarantor of West 
European security, the principal sponsor of Germany’s political rehabilitation, 
the major source of technological progress, and the mainstay of economic and 
financial stability. As such, it has been the target of criticism by some but of 
courtship by all.298 
 
In summary, the Nixon administration’s shift from the age of confrontation to the age 
of negotiation had repainted the picture of the international environment. President Nixon and 
his team had placed détente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China as the first 
priorities on their foreign policy agenda. This implied that Western European integration was 
 
                                                          
298 National Intelligence Estimate, FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe, NATO, 1969-1972, 
Document 27, viewed on March 10, 2015, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-
76v41/d27#fn1>. 
- 146 - 
 
downplayed in the Nixon presidential years. U.S. policy makers knew that this shift in 
international relations was crucial to protect and promote their national interests. Reducing 
tensions between the West and the Communist World was welcomed by the European 
Community’s leaders as they saw opportunities to avoid an all-out or nuclear war between the 
two world’s great power whose main battlefields would be in Europe. Also, the European 
Community’s leaders, who had been pursuing the enhancement of the European Community’ 
material strength, wanted to penetrate into China’s massive market. There was a link between 
the Nixon administration’s policy to the Soviet Union and China and the European 
integration project. This link has been ignored in the academic research. The Nixon 
administration’s policy on the Soviet Union and China was one of the driving forces behind 
the European Community’s attempt to establish European political cooperation, as Mike 
Smith observed: “the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy conducted between the late 1960s and 
the mid-1970s played a crucial catalytic role.”299 The plan for European political cooperation, 
from the Nixon administration’s view, might be promoted by Western European efforts to 
challenge the United States’ leadership in the free world. Thus, the Nixon administration’s 
posture towards European integration in general was not as favourable as it used to be in the 
previous administrations. President Nixon and his administration saw “the European 
integration as much more of a problem than a solution.”300  
 
A Synthesis: The Nixon Administration, the New Age and European Integration 
President Nixon’s trip to European capitals in February 1969 was seen as a signal of 
bringing the relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean to a new height. 
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Western Europe expected that the new president would do something to renew U.S. relations 
with the Europeans as he had announced at his inauguration. Nixon’s promise was not 
realized as his administration sought to employ unilateralism in monetary matters and 
implement the diplomacy of great power politics with the Soviet Union and China. The 
European Community’s leaders soon realized that their hope for having a central place in the 
Nixon administration’s foreign policy was illusionary. President Nixon did not intend to 
make major diplomatic efforts to strengthen the partnership with Western Europe. He did not 
want the United States to be involved in a more interdependent Atlantic alliance. His core 
diplomatic goals were to regain for Washington its freedom to act and freedom to pursue its 
strategic interests. The Nixon administration wanted the United States to be seen as an 
ordinary nation. Implicitly, the Nixon administration sought to free the United States from 
unnecessary responsibilities to pursue great power diplomacy and Western Europe was 
expected to solve its own internal problems.  
After a long time supporting and promoting European integration as a means towards 
a peaceful and prosperous Europe, the United States under the Nixon administration had to 
review its foreign relations and realized the country needed to reframe its focus of the global 
chessboard. Western Europe constituted just one of various elements in the system of great 
power politics and thus the concentration on building a partnership with Western Europe was, 
in Nixon’s view, out dated in a new era. Thus, the Nixon administration’s policies and 
position in changing international order were not in favour of Western Europe and its 
integration process. Since Kennedy’s time the support of the monetary system had been 
portrayed by U.S. governments and the Congress as a burden they were assuming for the 
benefit of the Western Europe. The consequence of the Nixon administration’s new economic 
policy, which aimed to put an end to the Bretton Woods System, was that this support was to 
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be ceased and if the Western Europeans encountered a problem with the resulting dollar glut 
it was their responsibility to develop remedies.  
From monetary to political fields, the Nixon administration exercised its hegemonic 
power with Western Europe and ignored negotiations as a diplomatic means of settling 
conflicts. This naturally led to more assertiveness and reaffirmation from the European 
Community in its relations with the United States. The main step that illustrated the European 
Community’s assertiveness and reaffirmation was the Pompidou government’s proposal for a 
meeting of the European Community heads of states in December 1969, in The Hague, where 
the plan for monetary integration was approved. This was a realistic move to deepen 
European integration. The Werner Report, produced in 1971, outlined the stages to achieve 
the goal of creating a European monetary union and was welcomed by the Six’ leaders as 
Western European had been experiencing problems with the U.S. dollar and wished to have 
their own currency which was able to stand against the dollar. However, their efforts to 
reassert themselves in the monetary field were adversely affected by President Nixon’s 
decision to cease the conversion of the dollar into gold. The Nixon administration’s monetary 
policy demonstrated that the United States was dissatisfied with the multilateral negotiations 
in the framework of the Bretton Woods System. The European Community, in Nixon’s view, 
was ganged together to protect its own interests and did not care that for a long time the 
United States had been assuming the responsibility for the European integration efforts. His 
administration, therefore, decided not to support the European effort to integrate in the money 
field. The Nixon administration’s concern about the European Community’s reaffirmation in 
monetary field was real, however, President Nixon and his team did not intend to negotiate a 
solution with the Western Europeans. President Nixon reminded German Chancellor Brandt 
“that the continuation of Germany’s present policy of holding dollars and not buying gold is 
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absolutely fundamental to U.S.-FRG relations.”301 This delicate recommendation was made 
after the Nixon administration had already decided to suspend the conversion of the dollar 
into gold though this decision was not yet published: “If things come to the pass of a U.S. 
suspension of gold sales and purchases, we should do all we can - both substantively and 
cosmetically - to make it appear that other governments have forced the action on us. We 
want to portray suspension as a last resort and to present a public image of a cool-headed 
government responding to ill-conceived, self-defeating actions of others.”302  
The passing of the U.S. suspension of gold sales and purchases came three months 
later on August 15, 1971, when the Nixon administration unilaterally announced its new 
economic policy shutting down the dollar-gold-window. Without being consulted, the 
European Community was shocked, they could not do anything to save the transatlantic 
monetary system. The plan for European monetary integration was halted abruptly. This was 
inevitable as the European Community’s leaders could not speak in one voice to force the 
Nixon administration to reconsider its policy. The collapse of the Bretton Woods System and 
the abrupt halt of the European integration plan in the monetary field pointed out the 
significance of U.S. support for European moves towards deeper integration. It also showed 
that there was still an absence of strong political will and cooperation among the member 
states of the European Community to realize their dream of a European currency and 
independence from U.S. economic and monetary policies. Alan W. Ertl once pointed out, 
“Although the dollar crisis was the apparent cause of the failure of the Werner Plan’s first 
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stage of economic and monetary union, the crisis highlighted the different structures and 
policies of the member states and their varying capacities to resist external pressures.”303  
The new age that the Nixon administration opened was characterized by U.S. détente 
with the Soviet Union and China. This shift from confrontation to negation with its enemies 
was seen as a major goal to achieve in President Nixon’s foreign policy agenda. During this 
time, the European Community also embarked on its long road to political integration which 
was somehow seen to be driven by President Nixon’s new policy stance on the Communist 
World. The move towards European political cooperation reflected that the EC wanted to 
have a common stance on great political issues in world affairs. In other words, the European 
Community desired to be a giant in not only economic but also political fields. This again 
showed European reaffirmation and assertiveness in its relations with the United States.  
Seeing a materially fast growing Europe the Nixon administration had reason to 
worry. The European Community was about to challenge the United States on the economic 
front while the United States was preoccupied with great power politics. Instead of pursuing 
policy in favour of U.S. economic prosperity the European Community was positioned, in 
Nixon’s view, to become a protectionist bloc that might not only include the Six but also 
African and Asian nations.304 The Nixon administration recognized that the United States had 
invested many material and political resources into Western Europe and underestimated the 
importance of the Soviet Union and China in their comprehensive foreign policy. Despite 
receiving many privileges from the United States, the European Community had not been a 
reliable partner to Washington. Put simply, the Nixon administration knew that it was time 
for the United States to re-examine its foreign policy and rebalance its international relations. 
Thus, in parallel with its view of an emerging new world order, was the intention of reducing 
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tensions with the Communist World. The Nixon administration’s diplomacy of great power 
politics started with détente with the Soviets and opening to the Chinese. This policy to 
rebalance Washington’s external relations, which aimed to shift focus from Europe to Asia, 
was embraced by the European Community’s leaders who expected to subsequently avoid 
potential armed conflicts in Europe and discover China’s massive market.  
While President Nixon was preoccupied with diplomatic activities with the Soviet 
Union and China, the European Community’s leaders were preparing to deepen European 
integration with the creation of the EPC as a forum for coordinating the member states’ 
foreign policy on an intergovernmental basis.305 The Davignon Report, approved by the 
Foreign Ministers of the Six in Luxembourg in October 1970, was the starting point of the 
EPC. The implementation of this Report intensified a growing sense that a common European 
political and foreign policy was taking shape and it outlined the institutional structure for 
such European common policy to be realized. Despite showing its enthusiasm to the 
European endorsement of the Davignon Report, the Nixon administration knew from the 
outset that the EPC might become a challenge to the United States as it used the collective 
power of the Six to raise its concern about great issues in world affairs. In his memorandum 
to President Nixon, entitled “West European Political Cooperation and U.S.-European 
Community Relations”, Kissinger wrote that “we should encourage the new European 
consultation initiative, which is consistent with our support for European unity. It could lead 
to greater European interest in problems outside the NATO area. We will want to stay in 
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close touch with this development, which could, of course, yield more coherent European 
views that diverge from our own on certain questions.”306 
This synthesis shows that the evolution of the Nixon administration’s policies in a 
new international environment, one that included a new economic policy, détente with the 
Soviet Union and opening to China, can be seen as constructive forces to Western European 
integration. In the wake of U.S. policy changes, the European Community’s leaders had to 
develop their own polices to respond effectively. The Werner Report and the Davignon 
Report were produced and implemented by the European Community to establish common 
European policies monetary and political areas respectively. Also, it can be seen that the 
Nixon administration’s economic and security policy changes were destructive forces to 
Western European integration. Due to President Nixon’s unilateral action to close the dollar-
gold-window and rebalance U.S. foreign relations, the EC’s plans to build a European 
monetary union and European Political Cooperation did not become reality. President Nixon 
was a key figure who had significant impact on the emerging shape of European integration. 
His stance and position changed in light of international and domestic pressures but they 
remained firmly within the U.S. foreign policy framework which assumed the perpetual 
national interests of the Americans. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the changes in the economic and political power of the United 
States caused by the transformation of the global economic situation and the impact of such 
changes on the Nixon administration’s policy approach to the European Community and 
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European integration process. The United States enjoyed economic prosperity following the 
end of the Second World as a superpower with unparalleled might. This period in U.S. 
economic history, often recalled as the Golden Age, seemingly came to an end by late 1960s 
when the European Community emerged from the ash of the Second World War and sought 
to compete with the United States. Facing economic challenges from its friends and allies 
made the Nixon administration realize that the United States was now embarking on a new 
era in which a multi-polar international system was taking shape. The Nixon administration 
saw the need to shift it foreign policy priorities from the West to the East. It started 
negotiations with the two communist giants and this led to changes in the U.S. policy towards 
the Soviet Union and China. Instead of claiming these nations to be U.S. enemies, the Nixon 
administration shook hands with the leaders of these nations and invited cooperation to 
achieve peace: “We have always made it clear that we have no permanent enemies and that 
we will judge other countries, including Communist countries, and specifically countries like 
Communist China, on the basis of their actions and not on the basis of their domestic 
ideology.”307  
This shift in foreign policy focus from the West to the East was in parallel with 
Washington’s wish to be seen as an ordinary nation, not as a superpower in world affairs. 
This implied that the Nixon administration needed to incorporate new elements in its policy 
design towards the European Community and European integration process. The United 
States could no longer enthusiastically support any moves towards European integration. The 
United States had to act as an ordinary nation. President Nixon had to look after his nation’s 
interests. This led to his decision to suspend the conversion of the dollar into gold, a lethal 
injection to the Bretton Woods System which was the foundation of transatlantic economic 
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and monetary relations. The demise of the Bretton Woods System disrupted the European 
plan for monetary integration. In addition, the Nixon administration’s policy to seek détente 
with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China could be seen as one of the driving 
forces behind the creation of European Political Cooperation. The European Community’s 
leaders endeavoured to build an institutional foundation for their unified positions on world 
affairs. This collective strength would be useful in protecting the European Community’s 
strategic interests in political discussions with the United States. Though embracing the birth 
of the European Political Cooperation, the Nixon administration knew that the European 
Community was becoming assertive politically. Seeing a united Europe emerging as an 
economic competitor and a political challenger, President Nixon and his administration had 
to craft a new policy towards European integration. The Nixon administration’s foreign 
policy could be seen as Washington’s response to the slippage of the United States in terms 
of economic and geopolitical power. In addition to a new economic policy and a shift in 
foreign policy priorities, the Nixon administration had launched initiatives on Europe which 
ultimately reflected Washington’s new approach to European integration. This will be the 
focus of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
The Nixon Administration’s Initiatives in Europe and the European Integration Process 
It’s time for America to look after its own interests … they [Western Europe] have got to 
know that I supported the Marshall Plan, I was on the Herter Committee, I supported 
reciprocal trade, I’ve been supporting the damn foreign aid. I believe in world responsibility. 
… My point is, that right now, we are in a period, where the United States, the people of this 
country, could very well turn isolationist unless their President was looking after their 
interests. And we must not let this happen.  
President Richard Nixon, 1971.  
 
You simply cannot expect the U.S. to defend an economic competitor. … You simply cannot 
expect this to go on indefinitely.  
Henry Kissinger, 1972. 
 
Introduction 
Since President Nixon arrived at the White House his administration was engaged in a 
slow but steady review of the U.S. relations with Western Europe. Sceptics questioned 
whether the traditional partnership with the European Community was really helpful in 
dealing with contemporary challenges, namely the serious deterioration in U.S. trade 
accounts, while supporters argued that it continued to advance U.S. interests and remained a 
crucial component of a stable world order.  
With the enthusiastic support and promotion of U.S. administrations since the end of 
the Second World War European integration had advanced in steps unmatched in world 
history. Yet Western European governments still sought to avoid assuming the political 
responsibilities that had to accompany their growing economic capacities. The Nixon 
administration, therefore, believed that it was time for the United States began to rethink and 
re-evaluate U.S. policy towards European integration. U.S. policy changes towards European 
integration were mainly expressed in the Nixon administration’s initiatives in Europe which 
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included Reducing Free Riding on the United States, A Responsible European Community 
and A European Community in the Atlantic Framework.  
Firstly, the idea of Reducing Free Riding on the United States was expressed in the 
Nixon administration’s efforts to implement a program for the Reduction of Costs in Europe 
(REDCOSTE) as well as to negotiate an offset agreement with the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) to “offset” the cost of U.S. military presence in Germany. Secondly, the idea 
of A Responsible European Community was indicated in the Nixon Doctrine and the new 
strategy to NATO. Lastly, the idea of A European Community in the Atlantic Framework 
was manifested in the Nixon administration’s launch of the Year of Europe in 1973. These 
initiatives together showed that the Nixon administration desired to carry out a new 
diplomacy which aimed to look after U.S. national interests and leave the internal evolution 
of the European integration process to the Europeans.  
This chapter thus begins with analysis of the Nixon administration’s initiative on 
Reducing Free Riding on the United States before examining his idea of A Responsible 
Europe. Then it will explore the Nixon administration’s establishment of an Atlantic Charter 
for the United States and the European Community which focused on building A European 
Community in the Atlantic Framework. The combination of these initiatives on Europe in the 
Nixon presidential years demonstrates how the United States adjusted its policy towards 
European integration. It will be concluded in this chapter that the Nixon administration was 
sceptical of previous U.S. administrations’ assumptions of European integration. This 
ambivalence made the Nixon administration cast a wary eye on the European moves towards 
unity and insist on extending U.S. strategic interests.  
 
Initiatives for Reducing Free Riding on the United States: REDCOSTE Program and 
Offset Agreements  
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In its first months the Nixon administration demonstrated its efforts towards 
reviewing U.S. policy towards the European Community. The new President was particularly 
concerned with the serious deterioration in the nation’s trade accounts. His administration 
sought to solve this problem by conducting the unilateral reduction program with the 
acronym REDCOSTE (Reductions of Costs in Europe). The program aimed to tighten 
logistics and redeploy U.S. miscellaneous support functions in Europe and negotiated an 
agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to “offset” the cost of stationing 
troops in Germany. U.S. military spending overseas (apart from issues related to Vietnam) 
were seen by many members of Congress in 1969 as a significant factor leading to the 
balance of payments problems in the United States.  
 
REDCOSTE Program 
On March 26, 1969, Robert E. Osgood of the National Security Council Staff sent a 
memorandum to Henry Kissinger named the “Briefs for Secretary of State” for the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee which underlined the needs of discussing a new offset 
agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany and implementing the REDCOSTE 
program to reduce administrative logistics and support costs in Europe. Congressional 
pressures for reducing U.S. troops deployed in Europe had been based on the justification that 
the United States was overstretched and shouldering a substantial proportion of the collective 
defence burden in Europe.308 Congress put forth an argument that the balance of payments 
problems were caused by maintaining the U.S. military presence in Europe. These 
Congressional pressures were demonstrated in Senator Mansfield’s Resolution of 1966 and 
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1967 proposing considerable reductions in U.S. forces overseas and by the Symington 
Amendment which did not approve Executive funds for more than 50,000 troops in Europe 
after December 31, 1968.309 That the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia had reduced the 
Congressional pressures for withdrawing U.S. troops from Europe, yet “they could well 
revive if projected European defense contributions are not forthcoming and the offset 
problem is not resolved.”310  
On May 26, 1969, the Under Secretaries Committee completed its study of the 
REDCOSTE proposals which aimed to streamline selected headquarters and withdrew some 
units from Europe. These REDCOSTE proposals, according to the Committee, took into 
consideration the Nixon administration’s wish to get U.S. European allies to enhance their 
defence efforts and not to reduce the fighting strength of the United States. The Committee 
proposed to cut down on U.S. personnel and facilities in Spain and Turkey, reduce activities 
at Athens International Airport in Greece, reduce the Southern European Task Force and 
withdraw the Army Sergeant Missile Unit from Italy.311  
REDCOSTE implementation was political in nature. While REDCOSTE might be a 
short-term issue, at its core were the troop levels that the United States maintained in Europe. 
Were the REDCOSTE program fully conducted, a total of 26,000 troops, almost ten percent 
of U.S. forces would be withdrawn from Europe.312 Though many of these reductions would 
be mainly from non-fighting forces, the withdrawal of some fighting and fighting-support 
forces would be necessary. A reduction of this scale would lead the Europeans to question 
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U.S. capacity to participate in European defence and U.S. willingness to meet the NATO 
commitments.313 The Europeans would be suspicious especially of statements about U.S. 
troops in Europe made by President Nixon in his 8-day visit to Europe in early 1969.314 With 
such calculations in mind, four options for the implementation of REDCOSTE were proposed 
by National Security Council: 
1. Halt further implementation of REDCOSTE in place by stopping further 
reductions (without reversing actions already completed). 
2. Proceed only with those REDCOSTE items already agreed to or under 
discussion with Allies and not consider any further cutbacks for the near term. 
3. Proceed with entire REDCOSTE package. 
4. Direct State and Defense to examine deferred REDCOSTE items based on 
additional guidance and make a recommendation on each.315 
 
On April 14, 1969, President Nixon determined how the REDCOSTE proposals should be 
implemented:  
Items previously agreed should proceed. Items agreed in principle but subject 
to negotiation and items deferred should be examined on a case-by-case basis 
and we should proceed selectively. The examination should take into account 
our desire not to undercut our efforts to get our allies to increase their defense 
efforts as well as our desire not to reduce our combat capability. Those items 
which are approved should not be presented as a single package and we should 
avoid any step which would give a signal of any general reduction of U.S. 
forces.316  
 
 In response to this decision from President Nixon, the Chairman of the National 
Security Council Under Secretaries Committee, Elliot L. Richardson, sent a report on 
REDCOSTE to Nixon on May 26, 1969, which outlined various scenarios for reductions of 
troop levels, budget savings, balance of payments, and the impact of such reductions on U.S. 
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fighting capacity. Essentially, the NSC Under Secretaries Committee recommended that it 
would be possible to reduce around 27,400 U.S. military personnel, 1,800 U.S. civilians and 
7,100 foreign national personnel.317 This would result in an annual budget savings after the 
fiscal year 1972 of $355 million and $128 million in the balance of payments.318 The NSC 
Under Secretaries Committee also pointed out that those reductions would exert some effects 
on U.S. military operations but they would be minor. Eventually, the reductions were 




Along with the approval of the REDCOSTE program recommended by the National 
Security Council Under Secretaries Committee, President Nixon sought to establish a new 
type of agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany to compensate the U.S. balance of 
payments costs for maintaining U.S. troops in Germany. President Nixon desired to proceed 
with offset negotiations with the FRG in his first year in office. The April 7, 1969, 
Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Hillenbrand to 
Secretary of State Rogers stated the U.S. position on the issue of offset negotiations with the 
FRG clearly. The United States asked for cooperation from the FRG to reduce the balance of 
payments costs of maintaining U.S. troops in Germany for Germany’s security. Three options 
were proposed in the NSC paper: 
1. Push for a ‘hard’ agreement, seeking offset of foreign exchange losses 
through military purchases, FRG assumption of local support costs of our 
troops, and possibly non-military purchases clearly additional to those that 
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would otherwise occur, but excluding measures such as loans and bond 
purchases. 
2. Accept a ‘softer’ agreement, settling for an offset which included non-
military and financial measures as well as military purchases. 
3. Replace military offset concept with one of German cooperation on broader 
international monetary matters.319 
 
  The domestic situation had shown the Nixon administration that U.S. resources were 
finite and it could no longer take ever expanding responsibility globally. The offset 
negotiations signalled to the Germans that they would have to shoulder more of the burden 
for Western Europe as well as for their own defence. The Nixon administration made it clear 
that the United States would never abandon the Federal Republic of Germany but expected 
that the Germans would take more responsibilities. The Nixon administration’s determination 
to rearrange troop deployments in the FRG and reduce their accompanying costs expressed 
that the United States wanted to disengage itself from some global obligations and 
commitments in order to solve its own economic problems.  
The need to negotiate a new off-set agreement with the Germans was indicated in the 
March 24, 1969, Memorandum from C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff 
to Kissinger. U.S. military expenditures in Germany were about $1 billion per year which in 
the NSC’s view negatively impacted on the U.S. balance of payments. As the U.S. balance of 
payments were the underlining concern of the Congress, the NSC recommended to Kissinger 
that the United States seek a “good agreement” to avoid pressure from the Senate for troop 
withdrawals and worsening of the balance of payments deficits. This was embraced by the 
Treasury, Defense and State people who thought that these problems could be solved by 
asking Germany “to spend in the U.S. roughly equivalent amounts of money, linked as 
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closely as possible to military items (purchases of U.S. military equipment, training of 
German military personnel in the U.S., support costs for U.S. military expenditures in 
Germany, etc.).”320 
The Nixon administration’s idea of “a good agreement” was that the German off-set 
package would provide additional real support for U.S. balance of payments. This was what 
the Nixon administration was really concerned about when it insisted on a new off-set 
agreement with the Germans. The Nixon administration saw that U.S. increased balance of 
payments deficit under the current international monetary system would lead to serious 
economic and foreign policy problems for the United States. The German government had 
offered a two-year offset package which was likely to offset up to 75 percent (around $700 
million each year) of the cost of the U.S. troop presence in Germany.321 This would consist of 
“$350 million of military procurement, about $70 million of non-military procurement, and 
about $300 million of loans of various types.”322  
Yet the Nixon administration was not satisfied with this offer as President Nixon and 
his administration saw “no additional balance of payments benefits” from it.323 With the aim 
of connecting the new off-set agreement with U.S. international monetary policy, the Nixon 
administration indicated to Bonn that cooperation in monetary policy would have an impact 
on U.S. position on the offset agreement. Towards that end, the NSC suggested that the 
United States had better agree with the German offset offer for only one year and 
demonstrate to the German government that the United States would not insist on military 
offsets if the Germans up-valued their currency which meant cooperation with the United 
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States on international monetary matters.324 According to the NSC, the Germans might not 
accept up-valuing their currency and only offer military procurement, non-military 
procurement and loans to the United States. These offers did not help to reduce the domestic 
pressures nor deal with the monetary crisis that the Nixon administration was facing. In this 
case, the United States would adopt a tougher line with the Germans as suggested in the 
Memorandum: “We should thus change our offset policy to (a) reduce the political and 
security problems caused by demands for support costs and (b) to pursue positively our major 
international monetary objectives.”325  
During the April 14, 1969, NSC meeting, President Nixon directed the Under 
Secretaries Committee to make preparations for the United States to embark on offset 
negotiations and take into consideration the possible effect on the political situation in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. President Nixon’s decision on a new offset agreement with the 
Germans affirmed that the Nixon administration desired to proceed with offset negotiations 
and move them into a wider context of international monetary system: 
We should proceed with offset negotiations, for this year, taking fully into 
account their possible impact on the political situation in the Federal Republic 
of Germany. The subject of support costs should not be raised and we should 
not seek any substantial increase in the currently anticipated level of German 
military procurement and should not press the issue to the point of risking a 
possible row with the FRG. At the same time, we should seek to improve the 
value to us of other measures to be included in the package. We should 
indicate to the Germans our willingness to explore a broadening of the 
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That the Nixon administration sought to link the Mark revaluation with an offset 
settlement would leave the Germans “baffled”.327 However, the new offset agreement with 
Germany was finally signed on July 9, 1969. From the Nixon administration’s view, this 
offset agreement was much better than the two previous ones.328 The main features of this 
new offset agreement included: 
1. More than half the offset will be through German military purchases in the 
United States, compared with 10–15 percent in the last two agreements. 
2. The German loans to us have maturities of 8–10 years compared with a 
maximum of 4½ years in the past. 
3. The loans carry concessional interest rates of 3½–4 percent compared with 
market rates in all past agreements, which would be at least 6 percent now. 
4. The agreement is for two years, for the first time since Erhard fell. 
5. The total agreement exceeds $1.5 billion.329 
 
These features were what the Nixon administration expected and President Nixon was 
able to show Congress how well his administration had done in protecting U.S. interests in 
relations with Germany particularly and European nations generally. 
The second offset agreement that the Nixon administration signed with the Federal 
Republic of Germany was on December 10, 1971. This was another two-year offset 
agreement for the fiscal years 1972 and 1973 in which the FRG agreed to pay up to DM 3950 
million for procurement of U.S. defence goods and defence services and DM 600 million “for 
services and deliveries for the modernization, construction and improvement of barracks, 
accommodations, housing and troop facilities” of U.S. forces in the Federal Republic of 
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Germany.330 The negotiation process was hard for the Nixon administration as the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the United States had stood far from each other on these issues. 
The Federal Republic of Germany had offered a total of $1,730.3 million for offset.331 
However, the United States had not agreed on this offer as they argued the German proposal 
“did not contain sufficient balance-of-payments benefit.”332 After months of difficult 
negotiations, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany finally reached a new 
offset agreement for two years 1972 and 1973. This second offset agreement with the FRG 
showed that the Nixon administration’s major concern remained the impact of U.S military 
spending in Europe on the U.S balance of payments. President Nixon and his administration 
hoped that this new offset agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany would help to 
alleviate the U.S balance of payments. By the same logic, the third offset agreement that the 
Nixon administration signed with the FRG on April 25, 1974, aimed to provide more 
substantial economic benefits to the United States. The dollar value of the agreement was 
roughly $2.22 billion for the fiscal years 1974 and 1975.333 
As in the cases of the previous offset agreement the Nixon administration signed with 
the Federal Republic of Germany, this one not only helped to cover the cost of U.S. military 
forces in the Federal Republic of Germany but also contributed to the alleviation of U.S. 
balance of payment deficit. The three bilateral offset agreements with the FRG represented 
the Nixon administration’s efforts to show the European allies that the United States was an 
ordinary nation, thus the United States needed its European allies to contribute a larger share 
 
                                                          
330 Telegram from Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State, FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume III, Foreign 
Economic Policy, International Monetary Policy, 1969-1972, Document 86, viewed on February 20, 2015, 
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v03/d86>. 
331 Paper Prepared in the Department of State, FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 
International Monetary Policy, 1969-1972, Document 86, viewed on February 20, 
2015,<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v03/d68>. 
332 Ibid. 
333 Message to the Congress Reporting on Balance of Payments Deficit Incurred Under the Atlantic Treaty, May 
16 1974, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon, 1974. 
- 166 - 
 
for the common security. This underlined policy approach to European allies illustrated that 
the Nixon administration could not give the Germans and other Western Europeans a free 
ride from the United States. It especially emphasized the Nixon administration’s scepticism 
of European integration process. President Nixon and his administration did not want to see a 
growing European bloc which was not willing to pay for its own defence. The United States 
under the Nixon presidential years made it clear to the Europeans that their security was not 
for free. Thus the Nixon administration had been connecting the cutting cost in Europe with 
the balance of payment deficit and international monetary matters. In other words, 
unconditional commitment to defending Europe was no longer accepted politically and 
economically by the Nixon administration. Wealthy European nations had to collectively do 
something about their own security which was essential to achieve the goals of European 
integration. 
The changes brought by President Nixon and Kissinger in reducing the number of U.S. 
forces reflected changes in U.S. policy towards European integration. The Nixon 
administration knew that the nation’s external and domestic situations had been altered and 
therefore it was reluctant to bear the burden of commitments in the Federal Republic of 
Germany or elsewhere. The REDCOSTE program and offset negotiations with the Federal 
Republic of Germany corresponded to these changes. The implications included: (i) 
increasing pressure on the Western European allies of the United States in general, and on the 
Federal Republic of Germany in particular, to provide for their own defence; (ii) reducing 
active U.S. participation in Western European situation; (iii) diminishing Western European 
reliance on U.S. resources, and (iv) improving U.S. economy and thus consolidating U.S. 
global dominance which had been the main objective of U.S. foreign policy. Arguably, the 
new policy approach to reduce U.S. military cost in Europe through the REDCOSTE 
program and offset negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany did not mean the 
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Nixon administration’s abandonment of support to European integration. Rather, President 
Nixon sent the Europeans a message that European integration was no longer a high priority 
on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. The Western Europeans needed to be responsible for the 
evolving of this integrative process through providing greater aid to the U.S. defence 
commitment in Europe. 
 
Initiatives for a Responsible European Community: Nixon Doctrine and a New Strategy 
for NATO 
 
That the Nixon administration was preoccupied with Vietnam War, the rapprochement 
with China, détente with the Soviet Union and domestic economic issues did not mean that 
President Nixon ignored building the partnership with the European Community. This 
partnership still received much attention from the highest levels of the Nixon administration. 
In the midst of changes occurring in the international environment, President Nixon 
reaffirmed his commitments to supporting progress in the European integration process as 
stated in his first report to Congress on U.S. foreign policy in the 1970s:  
Intra-European institutions are in flux. We favor a definition by Western 
Europe of a distinct identity, for the sake of its own continued vitality and 
independence of spirit. Our support for the strengthening and broadening of 
the European Community has not diminished. We recognize that our interests 
will necessarily be affected by Europe's evolution, and we may have to make 
sacrifices in the common interest. We consider that the possible economic 
price of a truly unified Europe is outweighed by the gain in the political 
vitality of the West as a whole. 
     The structure of Western Europe itself and the organization of its unity-is 
fundamentally the concern of the Europeans. We cannot unify Europe and we 
do not believe that there is only one road to that goal. When the United States 
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in previous Administrations turned into an ardent advocate, it harmed rather 
than helped progress.334 
Along with the promise to broaden and deepen the partnership with the European 
Community and support the current evolvement of the European integration, the Nixon 
administration renewed the United States’ policy stance on European integration. New 
elements in the Nixon administration’s policy on European integration were underlined in the 
announcement of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969 and a new strategy for NATO, two significant 
initiatives of the Nixon administration on the European Community which together aimed to 
make the European Community become more responsible in the defence of itself and the free 
world. 
 
The Nixon Doctrine 
Doctrines, in the broadest meaning, are “systematic statements on foreign policy … 
that have hardened with acceptance.”335 These statements provide the “guiding principles” for 
the administrations that establish them.336 The Nixon Doctrine was declared by President 
Nixon in a press conference in Guam in July 1969. He announced that the United States 
would provide arms but not military forces to its allies in Asia and elsewhere. This meant that 
the Nixon administration had turned to the idea, first presented by Professor Denis Brogan in 
the midst of the Korean War in 1950, that the power of the United States was not unlimited. 
According to Brogan, a U.S. attitude of “what Lola wants, Lola gets” was detrimental to the 
goals of U.S. foreign policy.337 Though the United States had emerged as a nation with the 
greatest navy, army and the most enormous economy after the Second World War, it did not 
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mean that it could be successful in every corner of the globe. The Nixon administration 
decided to adjust U.S. commitments to match U.S. resources. 
The United States could not roll back the expansion of communism at all cost. 
Applying this to U.S. alliances, it was clear that the Nixon administration expected its allies 
to take more responsibility for their own military defence. The message of the Nixon 
Doctrine was spelled out again in his first annual report to the Congress on United States 
foreign policy on February 18, 1970: 
First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments; Second, we 
shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation 
allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security; 
Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military 
and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty 
commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume 
the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.338 
 
For the European continent, the Nixon Doctrine implied that the United States’ 
European allies would have to do much more to protect themselves and contribute much 
more towards the costs of alliance. This policy stance had an important implication for 
European integration. It meant that Western Europe was no longer able to rely on the United 
States for European defence and security. The Nixon Doctrine was seen as a great effort to 
re-examine the United States’ global policy and to lower the U.S. profile abroad. President 
Nixon called for shifting the European defence burden to Western Europe. The Nixon 
administration stressed that the nations around the world had to assume responsibility for 
their own well-being. In his 1971 radio address, President Nixon reconfirmed that “today our 
allies and friends have gained new strength and self-confidence. They are now able to 
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participate much more fully not only in their own defense but in adding their moral and 
spiritual strength to the creation of a stable world order.”339  
The Nixon Doctrine showed the change in the Nixon administration’s foreign policy 
in relation to the European Community. From the vantage point of European integrationists, 
the Nixon Doctrine had played an important role in the development of U.S. policy toward 
the European Community. The Nixon Doctrine would lead to tension between the United 
States and the European Community in the context of the Atlantic alliance, even President 
Nixon maintained that his administration supported the conceptual and institutional evolving 
of European integration. This implied that the Nixon administration would continue to supply 
military and even economic aid to its European allies; this eventually helped the Europeans to 
realize their project of a European family. However, the Nixon administration insisted that 
the European Community’s situation was currently good enough to share the burden of 
insuring stability and security across the Atlantic area. After saying that “Europe must be the 
cornerstone of the structure for a durable peace” the Nixon administration scheduled to divide 
the burden of protecting the non-Communist world with the European Community: “America 
cannot - and will not - conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the 
decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it 
makes a real difference and is considered in our interest.”340  
The Nixon Doctrine aimed to reduce U.S. military power in Western Europe in order 
to push the European Community to make fairer contributions both in terms of dollars and 
manpower to their defence. In spite of the Nixon administration’s assurance of instant re-
deployment of U.S. forces to Western Europe in case of emergency, the European 
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Community was worried about their security as this was the prerequisite for its economic 
prosperity and stability. Furthermore, the Nixon Doctrine made the European Community 
worry about the possibility of all U.S. troops withdrawing from Europe. With the Nixon 
Doctrine, President Nixon had showed the European Community that the United States could 
no longer sacrifice its national interests to the European Community as well as European 
integration.  
With the introduction of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969, the European Community had 
more reasons to become assertive politically. The growing community wanted to be a single 
power, henceforth it would not have to depend on the United States. However, “the 
subcommittees of Eurogroup - Eurotraining, Europmed, or Eurostructure - helped to support 
a European Defence Improvement Program in the 1970s but did not conceal a continuing 
painful dependence on the United States.”341 The European Community had accumulated 
significant gains in economic integration but its member states were divergent in defence 
area. The European Community was not prepared to take on the responsibility that the United 
States had assumed since the Atlantic alliance was created. The Nixon administration was not 
against the European integration project when it applied the Nixon Doctrine to the European 
Community. Yet President Nixon and his team had to be careful with a growing community 
on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.  
The Nixon administration’s fear of “nurturing a Frankenstein’s monster that would 
run amok as soon as it was created” led to the application of the Nixon administration’s 
attention not only to Asia but also to Europe.342 The emphasis on the realignment of foreign 
policy goals to resources in the Nixon doctrine reaffirmed the Nixon administration’s image 
of a changing world in which the United States had to adjust to sustain its global dominance. 
 
                                                          
341 Kaplan, LS 1999, The Long Entanglement, Praeger, London, p.159. 
342 Ibid. 
- 172 - 
 
 
A New Strategy for NATO 
NATO was an obvious indication of the U.S. commitment to partnership with the 
Europeans. Stationing U.S. troops on European soil was considered by U.S. governments as 
an appropriate option to assist Europe in defending itself not only physically but also 
materially and morally. President Dwight D. Eisenhower once commented: 
From the beginning, people who really studied foreign and military problems 
have considered that the stationing of American forces abroad was a 
temporary expedient. … [T]he basic purpose of so stationing American troops 
was to produce among our friends morale, confidence, economic and military 
strength, in order that they would be able to hold vital areas with indigenous 
troops until American help could arrive.343 
 
Eisenhower meant the threat the Soviet Union might pose to Europe was merely one 
reason that made U.S. military presence on Europe soil necessary. Behind the Truman 
administration’s rationale for creating NATO was also economics-related burden-sharing. 
The increasing cost of maintaining NATO was the central objective in the Nixon 
administration’s push for defence contribution from the European allies. President Nixon 
expressed his special concern about U.S. policy on NATO by directing a review of U.S. 
policy towards NATO on his very first day in office on January 21, 1969. The Nixon 
administration saw a particular need to re-evaluate the roles of NATO and the U.S. in the 
international system and in reshaping East and West relations. The review, as underlined by 
President Nixon in a Memorandum to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the 
Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, had to consider alternatives with reference to policy in general and to such 
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specific issues as U.S. troop levels in Europe and U.S. attitudes towards intra-European 
defence cooperation. The NSC Interdepartmental Group for Europe was responsible for 
conducting this review.344 
In addition to the review of U.S. policy on NATO, a NATO checklist prepared by the 
U.S. Mission to NATO was sent to President Nixon in January 1969. According to this, the 
new administration would see “NATO’s main business as a complex transatlantic bargain.” It 
was also indicated that “The United States (which has two-thirds of NATO’s GNP, 
contributes about half of the direct costs of NATO’s defense, and provides the nuclear shield) 
is at the center of the bargain - that is, each of the other members thinks of itself as bargaining 
primarily with us.”345 With this central role in the transatlantic bargain the U.S. Mission to 
NATO recommended to President Nixon that “By committing our resources and sharing our 
discretion in limited ways, we try to get our allies not only to do as much as possible for the 
common defense, but also to support our efforts to build a workable world order, especially 
by making sensible security arrangements with the Soviet Union.”346 The U.S. Mission to 
NATO also highlighted that the Nixon administration had better maintain U.S. traditional 
support for any expression of European integration which did not run against U.S. interests to 
the wider framework of Atlantic partnership.347 It was noted that the Europeans were able to 
reach agreements among themselves on military procurement, international responsibility and 
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logistical arrangements for support of U.S. troops redeploying in Europe.348 This policy 
approach to NATO reconfirmed the U.S. commitment to partnership with Western Europe.  
In a meeting between the Secretary of Defence, Melvin Laird, with the Secretary 
General of NATO, Manlio Brosio, on February 14, 1969, Laird underscored the significance 
that the Nixon administration was going to attach to the NATO alliance. The Nixon 
administration would focus on not only defence but also economic ties. This showed 
Washington’s concern about what kind of commitment the European members would make 
to the NATO alliance “in the real terms of manpower, of budgets, of dollars and cents.”349 
Noticeably, at the beginning of his administration President Nixon and his team had thought 
of the commitment that the United States as well as the European members had to make to 
the NATO alliance. Secretary of Defense Laird made it clear to Secretary General Brosio that 
the Nixon administration had a feeling that the Europeans had not done enough and any help 
from the Europeans would be able to provide “there would be all to the good.”350 He added, 
“So far as dollars and cents are concerned, there has not been that much of a response.” In 
response to the issues about the European share and responsibility in NATO raised by Laird 
in the meeting, Brosio said that the European members hoped that U.S. troop levels would 
not be reduced. They both reach an agreement that “we should all try to convince the 
European countries to do more.”351  
Under Congressional pressure for a cut down on military expenditure and the balance 
of payment problem, the Nixon administration had to reduce U.S. force commitment to 
NATO. In the October 14, 1969, Memorandum to President Nixon, Kissinger showed clearly 
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the three separate but interdependent developments in U.S. efforts to reduce force 
commitments to NATO: 
1. There have been some reductions in reserve forces, primarily naval, that we 
would commit to NATO on mobilization. 
2. Additional reductions in NATO-committed forces, again primarily in naval 
units, are in process as a result of defense budget cuts. 
3. Further reductions in Army readiness or force levels may be necessary if 
redeployments from Vietnam do not accord with present budget forecasts. 
NATO is unaware of this.352 
 
Kissinger even stressed that the question of possible further reductions had to be stated 
as a real possibility though these reductions were not from forces in Europe but in reserve 
forces. These U.S. reductions of force commitments in Europe would make the Europeans 
believe the reductions would not lead “to substantial cuts of ground forces in Europe.”353 The 
United States had to look at a new strategy for NATO: “Our primary interest should not be 
directed simply to covering costs of our own forces but rather to assuring that there is a 
mutual sharing of responsibility for the defense of Europe.”354 
On March 2, 1970, in the Memorandum written to the Assistant to the President, H. R. 
Haldeman, President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs, John Ehrlichman, and President’s 
Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, President Nixon expressed his 
special concern about NATO and Western Europe:  
In the realm of foreign policy, this administration paid attention to policy 
toward Western Europe, but only where NATO is affected and where major 
countries (Britain, Germany, and France) are affected. The only minor 
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countries in Europe, which I want to pay attention to in the foreseeable future, 
will be Spain, Italy, and Greece. I do not want to see any papers on any of the 
other countries, unless their problems are directly related to NATO.355  
 
Earlier in his political career President Nixon had supported the Marshall Plan to 
reconstruct Western Europe and believed that European integration would lead to a more 
united and prosperous Europe. Such a Europe was arguably in U.S. interest. He knew that the 
European integration process was crucial in Europe where the two World Wars broke out. A 
European family would make wars impossible in Europe. With its leadership role in NATO, 
the United States could exert certain influence on NATO in particular, and the European 
integration process in general. Henceforth, he held the view that the U.S. alliance with 
Western European countries in NATO had to be altered or renewed when the European 
Community was becoming more independent and assertive in the realm of economic as well 
as foreign policy by the late 1960s. 
The Nixon administration held the view that previous U.S. administrations had failed 
to set up an appropriate consultation mechanism with Western Europe, especially on matters 
about NATO and defence. After a review of U.S. military posture, the Nixon administration 
realized that it was time for Western Europe to shoulder a greater share of its defence 
burdens. Furthermore, the Nixon administration realized that it was time for the U.S. and 
other NATO members to remake NATO’s principal reason for being. President Nixon 
presumed that he should be the U.S. leader to take on this responsibility as he was a member 
of the Herter Committee in 1947 which supported the Marshall Plan to aid the Europeans. 
President Nixon and his administration knew that conditions in Europe, in the United States 
and all over the world had changed. Post-war reconstruction had been completed in Western 
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Europe. In that part of the world, a strong and united economic community had emerged and 
was competing with the United States which had been spending its resources on this 
community’s security. It was estimated that in the late 1960s the United States was spending 
around 10 percent of its GNP on defence while Western Europe devoted only about 5 
percent.356 The U.S. Congress expressed increasing dissatisfaction with Europe’s failure to do 
more to bridge the gap of defence costs and to help the United Sates solve the U.S. balance of 
payments deficit of its military account caused by its military presence in Europe. The Nixon 
administration recognized that the United States was unable to continue to pay such a large 
share of the defence burden for Western Europe. The Nixon administration saw the 
immediate need for the United States to reformulate U.S. policy on NATO. Though President 
Nixon publically claimed U.S. commitment to Western Europe, his administration held that 
“it is possible to envisage alternatives to NATO that entail its disappearance or its being 
supplanted by new institutional arrangements.”357  
Given the climate of détente, the Nixon administration looked to the possibility of 
reducing tensions between the West and East relations by undertaking a new approach to 
NATO which would place more emphasis on conventional forces than on a nuclear 
guarantee. In the November 25, 1970, National Security Decision Memorandum on U.S. 
Strategy and Forces for NATO, President Nixon decided that a credible conventional defence 
posture was crucial, as he once pointed out, “The need for maintaining adequate conventional 
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forces may be infinitely greater than ten years ago.”358 Thus, U.S. policy on NATO was 
based on the following guidelines: 
-Increased emphasis should be given to defense by conventional forces.  
-Accordingly, Allied forces, including U.S. forces in Europe and 
reinforcements from the U. S., must be capable of a strong and credible initial 
conventional defense against a full-scale attack, assuming a period of warning 
and of mobilization by both sides. The immediate combat capability of NATO 
forces, both U.S. and Allied, should also be enhanced to provide greater 
assurance of defending against attacks made after the Pact gains a lead in 
mobilization.359  
 
Yet Western Europe, which was still very much worried of the communist threat from the 
East, expected to remain a powerful U.S. nuclear deterrent:  
There are some Europeans, of course, who continue to believe that the best 
defense is the threat of an immediate nuclear response to almost any 
aggression. Having a substantial conventional option makes that threat less 
credible, in their eyes, and is therefore undesirable.360 
  
The Europeans considered U.S. intention to focus on conventional forces as a 
declination to take advantage of nuclear might to defend Western Europe from attacks. 
Contrary to European desire, the Nixon administration believed that all NATO member 
countries needed to pay their full share to the efforts required to maintain an effective 
collective defence system and that the United States was contributing a disproportionate share 
of the burden: “Our primary interest should not be directed simply to covering costs of our 
own forces but rather to assuring that there is a mutual sharing of responsibility for the 
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defense of Europe.”361 The Nixon administration also stated its basic and long-term 
preference:  
Taking a long view, rather than having members of the NATO Alliance in 
effect subsidize U.S. forces in Europe, the President would welcome having 
the funds used to shore up and build up the local strength of the member 
countries' armed forces. The President was confident that as far as the U.S. 
public is concerned, were the NATO partners to do more in their own defense 
that would be quite decisive in firming up U.S. support for making our present 
contribution to the Alliance.362  
 
The Nixon administration decided to make no sacrifice to the long-term need for a viable 
strategy:  
The easy way of dealing with the problem is to let the Europeans give us 
money in return for our keeping our forces in Europe. I am concerned that we 
do get all the financial help that we can, but most important is the 
development of a viable strategy; and that requires more adequate forces from 
the Europeans.363  
 
That the Nixon administration renewed the U.S. policy stance towards NATO yet 
refused to pay a lion’s part of European defence fractured its alliance with Western Europe. 
President Nixon was fully aware that his administration’s new approach to NATO was 
disappointing the Europeans. While he assured the European alliance that his administration 
would not reverse the previous U.S. administration’s policy of defending Europe physically, 
he could not deny that a satisfactory contribution to the cost of maintaining NATO was a 
necessary condition for the United States to keep its commitment to partnership with the 
European Community. As an experienced politician, President Nixon still wanted to assure a 
dominant U.S. role in NATO. Even in the case that the European partners were willing to 
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share the burden, it did not mean that the Nixon administration would have a passive role in 
NATO: “We must avoid getting in a position of saying that if they will contribute more to us 
we won’t reduce our forces - that would simply mean that we would be accepting their 
view.”364 
With serious efforts to renew its policy approach to NATO, the Nixon administration 
had gained some achievements. The Declaration of Brussels released by NATO International 
Staff outlined the main tasks of alliance defence system for the 1970s. Items 11 and 12 of the 
Declaration were in favour of the Nixon administration’s new strategy for NATO.365 Item 11 
reaffirmed the paramount significance of a close collaboration among all member states to 
establish the most effective collective security system. It highlighted the equal significance of 
the burden of maintaining the necessary combat capability and that this burden had to be 
cooperatively shouldered by member states.366 Item 12 stressed the political and military 
necessity of the U.S. commitment to deploying substantial forces in Europe for deterring and 
defending. Especially, it was asserted in this item that the replacement of U.S. forces by 
European forces would not constitute a solution. Thus, ten of the European member states 
had reached an agreement on how they were going to individually and collectively “make a 
more substantial contribution to the overall defence of the treaty area.”367 These ten European 
member states agreed to carry out a special European defence improvement programme 
which was seen as “going well beyond previously existing plans” and created to enhance 
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alliance military strength “in specific fields identified as of particular importance.”368 This 
program was to include: 
(A) An additional collective contribution, in the order of $420 million over 
five years, to NATO common infrastructure to accelerate work on the NATO 
integrated communications system and on aircraft survival measures; 
(B) Numerous important additions and improvements to national forces, 
costing at least $450–500 million over the next five years plus very substantial 
further amounts thereafter; the forces concerned will all be committed to 
NATO; 
(C) Other significant financial measures to improve collective defence 
capability, costing $79 million over the next two years.369 
 
The Nixon administration, of course, welcomed this program and considered it a 
positive response from the European member states to Washington’s push for a fairer share of 
the burden of the treaty. In the Memorandum from Secretary of State Rogers to President 
Nixon about the December 2-4, 1970, NATO Ministerial Meeting, Rogers informed Nixon of 
“a new degree of Allied unity. … The decision by most European members of the Alliance 
on a long-term burden-sharing program reflected a recognition by our European allies of their 
responsibility to do more. Indeed, I sensed at the meeting an enhanced degree of 
understanding with us.”370  
Although publicly the European member states agreed with President Nixon’s policy 
stance of reducing U.S. forces in Europe and even designed a special European defence 
improvement program to improve NATO defence capability, the Nixon administration’s 
NATO policy still maintained that the Europeans had not done enough. President Nixon 
directed the Defense Department to carefully review U.S. non-fighting missions in Europe 
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and evaluate the manpower to implement such missions. The review aimed to examine 
specific options for eliminating several non-fighting missions and reducing personnel that 
might lead to more powerful fighting capabilities within current manpower levels.371 The 
Europeans were unsympathetic with the U.S. call for more responsibility among NATO 
member states. Secretary of Defense Laird could feel this in his trip to Europe in November 
1971: “Throughout NATO Europe, with the possible exception of Greece, Turkey and 
Portugal, the general public seems apathetic about national defense and indifferent to 
NATO’s role in preserving peace in Europe. This is particularly true in the Scandinavian 
countries. For example, Denmark sounds more and more like a nation about to resign from 
NATO.”372 That feeling did not prevent the Nixon administration from paying less for the 
alliance security because the world had embarked on a new era as highlighted in the address 
by the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Donald H. Rumsfeld, to the Board of Governors of the 
Atlantic Institute in Paris on June 2, 1973:  
I will state it simply, briefly, and bluntly: The post-World War II era is over. A 
new era which has, as yet, no name and no special defining characteristics, is 
beginning. We do not know, as yet, what it will mean to mankind - what 
demands it will make, what benefits it will bestow, and what opportunities it 
will present. But whatever its special character will be, it will not be 
dominated and shaped by the events of World War II and its immediate 
aftermath. They are now too far in the past to be the central experience of a 
majority of our peoples.373  
 
In summary, the alterations in the Nixon administration’s policy on NATO reflected 
Washington’s new policy towards European integration. The conditions in the United States 
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and in the European Economic Community had changed dramatically when President Nixon 
arrived at the White House. The European Economic Community by the late 1960s included 
rich democracies which were able to compete with the United States on the economic front. 
Thus, the notion that the United States continued to use its resources to defend a continent 
capable of defending itself was questioned by President Nixon, his administration and even 
the American people who were tired of the free-riding. That the Nixon administration 
required the Europeans to make greater contributions to their security did not mean that the 
United States was likely to leave Western Europe soon, a possibility which scared the leaders 
of the European Economic Community. The Europeans knew that without the U.S. military 
umbrella they could not commit all their energies to achieve the goal of building a united 
European family. Their cause for European integration would not be accomplished without 
the U.S. defence guarantee. The Nixon administration’s new approach to NATO sparked 
speculation in Western Europe that a long but final withdrawal of the U.S. forces might be 
beginning. Stirring such speculation might have been part of the Nixon administration’s plan 
which aimed to warn the leaders of the European Economic Community of the consequences 
of implementing economic projects which were against U.S. national interests. The Nixon 
administration’s defence cuts combined with plans for more emphasis on conventional forces 
were indications of growing impatience with the Europeans’ habitual reliance on the U.S. 
security umbrella. 
 
Initiatives for a Growing European Community in the Atlantic Framework: The Year 
of Europe  
The Year of Europe was an important initiative that the Nixon administration 
launched to push the Europeans to assume more responsibility in the Atlantic alliance and to 
warn the Europeans that their economic and political integration had to be developed in the 
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framework of the Atlantic Charter. This implied that the European Community had been, was 
and would be dependent on Washington’s leadership and influence. The Nixon 
administration subscribed to the view that a united Europe was about to effect new elements 
in U.S policy.  
In 1973, in terms of politics, U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and China were 
getting more complicated and the last U.S. troops were leaving Vietnam. On the European 
continent, 1973 would start with the addition of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom to 
the European Community. In terms of economics, U.S. economy was in turbulence as a 
consequence of its weakening competitiveness, the collapse of the Bretton Woods System in 
1971 and the oil embargo that the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) mounted against the U.S. support for Israel.  
The United States was in a period of relative decline while the European Community 
became much stronger. The European Community had a population of 260 million, while the 
United States had a population of 210 million.374 The European Community’s gross national 
product was now only 20 percent less than that of the United States.375 Thus, there was more 
economic competition from the European Community. The relations between the United 
States and the European Community had been tense at times as trade, monetary and other 
problems emerged and were left unresolved. The lack of productive dialogues during the 
Nixon presidential years made the relations between the United States and the European 
Community worse. Though the European Community was not seen as the first priority on the 
Nixon administration’s foreign policy agenda, the Nixon team attached importance to the U.S 
and European relations. This relationship with the European Community helped the United 
States, to some extent, achieve what the Nixon administration advocated: a balance of power. 
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In a meeting on September 21, 1972, Kissinger made a recommendation to President Nixon: 
“I think one of your first moves ought to be toward the Europeans” with the goal to achieve 
“a new European Charter of some sort.”376  
In his memoir, President Nixon reflected on his decision to make 1973 the Year of 
Europe: “as President, I sought to make 1973 the Year of Europe in order to focus the 
energies of my administration on resolving the problems which had had arisen from changing 
times.”377 The rationale for the Year of Europe was that “It is vital that we strengthen, not 
weaken, the alliance. Europe is still the geopolitical target of the Kremlin.”378 It was obvious 
that President Nixon desired to rejuvenate the U.S. relationship with the European 
Community and support the European integration process, a process that was expected to 
solidify and unify the European countries as strong allies of the United States and in order to 
confront a Soviet challenge. In his memoir, Years of Renewal: the Concluding Volume of His 
Memoirs, Kissinger recalled, “Nixon and I thought the time had come to revitalize the 
Atlantic Alliance. On behalf of the President, I put forward an initiative.”379  
The idea of establishing a new framework for U.S. policy towards the European 
Community was also mentioned in President Nixon’s conversation with French Ambassador 
to the U.S., Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, and the former Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann 
on September 29, 1972. Nixon expressed his intention to pay more attention to the European 
Community: “I want to devote more time to the European Community” and, he emphasized, 
“the bedrock of everything is the European-American alliance.”380 Similarly, in a discussion 
with British Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home in the Oval Office, Nixon said he thought 
 
                                                          
376 Nixon Tapes, OVAL 784-7, September 21, 1972, 10:15 am – 10:50 am. 
377 Nixon, R 1988, Victory without War, Simon and Schuster, New York, p.207. 
378 Ibid. 
379 Kissinger, H 1999, Years of Renewal: The Concluding Volume of His Memoirs, Simon and Schuster, New York, 
p.600. 
380 Nixon Tapes, OVAL 788-15, September 29, 1972, 4:04 pm – 5:15 pm. 
- 186 - 
 
it was very significant to establish a strong line of communication within the Alliance. He 
expressed a wish to devote some attention to that.381  
The Nixon administration’s plan to re-examine the traditional U.S. policy of 
enthusiastic promotion for European integration was expressed overtly in their official 
documents. On November 18, 1972, President Nixon directed the National Security Council 
to prepare a detailed study of U.S. relationship with Europe with a particular emphasis on the 
European Community. This study had to interrogate that goals that the United States needed 
to achieve in the four years to come (from 1972) and set up priorities to guide U.S. 
policies.382 He especially stressed that the study had to examine and predict the major issues 
that might arise in each main dimension of U.S. relations with Western Europe; political, 
economic, military, security and scientific. He expected the study would not only identify the 
issues and discuss the measures to deal with them but also examine the interrelationship of 
these issues. It was underlined that the range of options for handling these issues needed to be 
discussed in terms of advantages and disadvantages. The study aimed to establish a 
framework for the administration’s overall policy to Europe in general and the European 
Community in particular.383  
This study once again reflected that the Nixon administration wanted to add new 
elements to U.S. policy towards the European Community. President Nixon’s officials who 
had been frustrated with the European responses on economic and political fronts would also 
see the urgent need of revitalizing U.S. approach to the European Community. NSC staff 
member Robert Hormats, in his December 18, 1972, report to Kissinger on the issue of 
consultative dialogue in the relationship between the United States and the European 
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Community, indicated that “Europe is organized differently to deal with different problems. It 
speaks with one voice on trade and is endeavoring to do so on monetary policy. On political 
and security problems it speaks with nine voices but is coordinating actions to an increasingly 
greater degree.”384 In addition Helmt Sonnenfeldt, a staff member of the NSC Senior Review 
Group, made the following recommendations regarding Washington’s policy towards the 
European Community in the meeting of the NSC Senior Review Group on January 31, 1973: 
(a) Scale down our maximum program of economic objectives as required to 
preserve a long-term political-strategic relationship, but define an irreducible 
minimum of economic concessions that we must achieve in order to generate 
sufficient domestic support to preserve that relationship.  
(b) Pursue our maximum economic program, envisaging only minimal U.S. 
concessions, and keeping the Europeans on notice that if we fail to attain near 
to our maximum, we will find it difficult to maintain an undiminished political 
strategic relationship along current lines. 
(c) Make no explicit or implicit strategic linkage between what the Europeans 
do on economic issues or what we will do on long term political/security 
relations (except to define an irreducible minimum necessary to preserve the 
present political-security relationship). Pursue our economic objectives for 
maximum results, but settle for less as each issue may dictate.385 
 
President Nixon certainly recognized the problem of a growing European Community 
as well as European integration. He made it clear on the first day of February 1973 that his 
administration was about to pay more attention to the European Community: “we must now 
turn to the problem of Europe. We have been to the People’s Republic of China. We have 
been to the Soviet Union. We have been paying attention to the problems of Europe, but 
those problems will be put on the front burner.”386 According to President Nixon, both the 
United States and the European Community had to consider “what the position of the United 
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States should be and the new, broader European Community should be in this period when 
we can either become competitors in a constructive way or where we can engage in economic 
confrontation that could lead to bitterness and which would hurt us both.”387  
In the March 10, 1973, Memorandum to his Assistant for National Security Affairs, 
Kissinger, Nixon again raised his great concern about the reality that a more united and 
prosperous community was not in the interest of the U.S.: 
The way the Europeans are talking today, European unity will not be in our 
interest, certainly not from a political viewpoint or from an economic 
viewpoint. When we used to talk about European unity, we were thinking in 
terms of the men who would be at the top of Europe who would be in control. 
Those men were people that we could get along with. Today, however, when 
we talk of European unity, and when we look far ahead, we have to recognize 
the stark fact that a united Europe will be led primarily by Left-leaning or 
Socialist heads of government. I say this despite the fact that Heath is still in 
power in Britain and Pompidou probably will retain power by a narrow margin 
in France. Even in Britain and France we have situations where the media and 
the establishment pull strongly to the Left at this point, and also where the 
media and the establishment take an increasingly anti-U.S. attitude.388  
 
Needless to say, new developments in international and national environments made 
President Nixon and Kissinger believe that it was the right time for the United States to re-
evaluate relations with its closest allies. That the Nixon administration especially wanted to 
conduct a re-evaluation of U.S. relations with the European Community and alter its policy 
towards the European integration process made it declare 1973 the “Year of Europe”.  This 
was Nixon’s diplomatic initiative to refocus U.S. policy on the European Community and to 
redefine its policy stance to European integration. 
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In a speech on April 23, 1973, widely referred to as the Year of Europe speech, 
Kissinger argued for the need of a “new Atlantic Charter setting.” He confirmed that the 
United States would continue to support the unification of Europe as a component of a larger 
Atlantic partnership and outlined the main points in Nixon’s European policy:  
We will continue to support European unity. Based on the principles of 
partnership, we will make concessions to its further growth. We will expect to 
be met in a spirit of reciprocity; We will not disengage from our solemn 
commitments to our allies. We will maintain our forces and not withdraw from 
Europe unilaterally. In turn, we expect from each ally a fair share of the 
common effort for the common defense; We will never consciously injure the 
interests of our friends in Europe. ... We expect in return that their policies will 
take seriously our interests and our responsibilities.389 
 
The Year of Europe speech revealed that U.S. policy towards European integration 
during the late 1960s and the early 1970s could be described as “a form of wary 
containment.”390 In terms of security, as stated in the Nixon Doctrine, the United States did 
not deny its commitments to Western Europe, however, the burden was too heavy to bear by 
itself. Thus, it demanded its allies to shoulder more of the burden of their own defence. More 
important, because of the loss of dynamism in U.S. economy and the views that Western 
Europe had reaped from U.S. economic and military aid without playing their full part in 
return, the United States reaffirmed that the United States was an “ordinary nation” and, 
therefore, it needed to protect its own national economic interests and to safeguard itself 
against those who intended to take advantage of the liberal market international economy.391 
The policy stance in the Year of Europe speech restated what had been pointed out in 
the Nixon Doctrine. Nixon and Kissinger believed that Western Europe could not continue to 
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turn to the United States for unlimited economic and military support. In fact, on the 
European side, the European Community was strong enough to resist the United States 
pressures on many fronts especially agricultural trade.392 Noticeably, the Europeans preferred 
to exercise collective weight in relations with the United States. On the American side, the 
United States was deep in socio-economic turmoil because of the oil crisis and budget deficit. 
In addition, Washington was preoccupied with the relaxation in relations with its adversaries 
and searching for a solution to honourably escape from the Vietnam War. Hence, the Nixon 
administration had to place an emphasis on strategies to defend its economic interests and 
reduce military spending. The European Community was the direction that the United States 
looked to for sharing the burden of global responsibilities.  
From the Nixon administration’s viewpoint, the rivalry and competition, particularly 
on the economic front, from the European Community was unacceptable because the United 
States was providing a security umbrella for the continent:  
If [the Europeans] adopt an anti-U.S. trade policy, resulting in ‘an 
unenthusiastic’ attitude in the U.S. about Europe, they must be made to 
understand that it will carry over into the political area. NATO could blow 
apart. The idea that the Europeans can defend themselves without us is ‘bull’. 
If NATO comes apart, they will be in a position of being economic giants and 
military pygmies. … European leaders … are ‘terrified’ at that prospect.393 
 
Thus, it was argued that the “crucial year” of 1973 strongly reaffirmed the redefining of U.S. 
policy towards European integration which had actually started since the beginning of the 
Nixon administration in 1969. In his memoir, Kissinger admitted certain limitations of the 
Year of Europe initiative:  
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The Year of Europe initiative immediately ran up against the reality that, in 
the early 1970s, our European allies were far more preoccupied with European 
integration than with Atlantic cohesion. And Europe - especially the old 
established nations such as Britain and France - found the transition to 
supranationalism traumatic. The more complicated the process of European 
integration became, the less its supporters were willing to brook any 
interruption or dilution of it by American schemes promoting broader Atlantic 
cooperation, however well intentioned. In this context, our initiative for 
enhanced consultations between the European Community and the United 
States came to be viewed - mostly in France, but not only there - as an 
American stratagem to thwart the re-emergence of a specifically European 
identity and institutions.394 
 
Though the Nixon administration sought to refocus its attention on the European Community 
and the integration process occurring, its plan to build up a common consultative dialogue 
with the whole Community was unlikely to be fulfilled. That the responses from the member 
states of the European Community to the Year of Europe initiative were diverging again 
showed that the U.S. goal of attaining a common voice from the European Community 
seemed hard to be achieved. What Kissinger wondered, “Who do I call if I want to speak to 
Europe?” was still left unanswered. This was because of the reality that the European 
Community hardly had convergent views on political and security issues, whereas on trade 
matters with the United States they really did speak with one voice. 
Evidently, the Year of Europe speech demonstrated crucial changes in the Nixon 
administration’s policy towards European integration. Nixon and Kissinger established a 
“low profile” attitude “based on increased concern for what the Europeans want for 
themselves and a greatly improved consultative process on the major issues which affect 
Europe.”395 Thus, since 1969, in most of their statements, U.S. politicians tended to make 
clear that “We will not inject ourselves into intra-European debates on the forms, methods 
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and timing of steps toward unity.”396 President Nixon himself affirmed his view on 
supporting the development of an independent Europe in an NSC meeting in Washington on 
January 28, 1970:  
I have never been one who believes the U.S. should have control of the actions 
of Europe. It is in the interests of the United States to have a strong economic, 
political and military European community, with the United Kingdom in that 
community. I have preferred that Europe move independently, going parallel 
with the United States. A strong, healthy and independent Europe is good for 
the balance of the world. For the U.S. to play a heavy-handed role would be 
counter-productive. What we want is friendly competition with the United 
States.397 
 
Despite its pursuit of a “low profile”, the Nixon administration tried to control the 
course of European integration process. Architects of U.S. foreign policy understood that 
active U.S. involvement in European affairs was essential to guarantee the Atlantic 
orientation of Western Europe. The idea of European integration and its implementation gave 
rise to a European Community. The success of the European integration project in the 
economic sphere was phenomenal. The failure of the European Defence Community Plan in 
1954, the abrupt halt of the European Monetary Integration Plan in 1971 and the delay of the 
European Political Cooperation Plan in the early 1970s were severe blows to the European 
Community. However, it would be unwise to infer from these events that European 
integration had failed or even the movement towards a united Europe had been halted. On the 
contrary, particularly in the economic field, outstanding successes had been gained. The 
economic integration had an important impact on the unification of Europe. The favourable 
economic conditions allowed the European Community to compete with the United States 
and even express its annoyance with the U.S. leadership in the Atlantic alliance. The Nixon 
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administration certainly did not oppose European unity even “unity for expansion” as Vice-
President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, Albert Coppe, 
had put forth in April 1956.398 Yet such expansion of a new Europe in the Nixon 
administration’s view was not allowed to jeopardize U.S. national interests. Henceforth, the 
Year of Europe was launched by the Nixon administration to orientate U.S. policy towards 
the European Community and European integration. The United States itself could not roll 
back the expansion of Communism. The United States itself could not handle the cost of 
protecting the non-Communist world and could not manage the challenges posed by the 
multi-polar world order as the Nixon administration had envisaged. Furthermore, the Nixon 
administration, like the previous administrations, was concerned about how to maintain a 
globally dominant U.S. position. With all of these calculations, the United States still needed 
the European Community as reliable allies in Europe and in the world. The United States 
could not abandon its partnership with the European Community but would not give the 
European Community a free ride to become a competitor to the United States. To adapt to the 
new European Community, growing and expanding through its economic integration, the 
Nixon administration insisted on introduction of a new Atlantic Charter in the partnership 
between the United States and the European Community. 
 
The Nixon Administration’s Policy towards European Integration: Images and 
Responses  
 
Startling changes were taking place in the European Community in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. The Nixon administration had clear images of such changes in the European 
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Community and its strategic responses were no less dramatic. The Europeans had managed to 
achieve initial successes in the European integration project and thus the European 
Community’s power was increasing. This changing political and economic situation in the 
European Community had affected the way the Nixon administration looked at the world and 
thus altered the Nixon administration’s general policy approach to the European Community 
and European integration. The changing images of the European integration resulted in policy 
adaption that the Nixon administration had to make in response to what was occurring in the 
European Community. In other words, the U.S. foreign policy agenda had to be changed 
because the world in general, and the European Community in particular, was changing. The 
Nixon administration had to add new elements to its policy on European integration because 
the European Community was, from Washington’s perspective, becoming a cartel capable of 
challenging U.S. primacy. 
The prospect of the European integration project had aroused great enthusiasm in the 
United States. However, the challenges posed to the United States through the realization of 
this project had generated lots of frustrations. It was not unusual for the Nixon administration, 
after costly efforts made by the previous U.S. administrations, to notice that the moment of 
crisis had come, that President Nixon and his team had to either change the strategy to 
European integration or abandon not only support for integration but possibly for Europe as 
well. The Nixon administration had to revise U.S. policy approach to the European 
integration process to protect its interests in a multi-polar world which was emerging. There 
are two main reasons for the redefining of U.S. policy towards European integration during 
the period of time from 1969 to 1974. 
 Firstly, the common belief of the previous U.S. administrations of U.S. influence in 
the course of European integration was shaken during the Nixon administration. President 
Nixon and Kissinger assumed that the previous policy makers had overestimated the impacts 
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Washington could exercise on European integration and supposed that the future of a united 
Europe was dependent more upon the developments and decisions in London, Paris and Bonn 
than from Washington. The Nixon administration was sceptical of the prospect of 
Washington’s influence and leadership in Europe when the European Community became 
more integrated and united. Western European nations were followers of U.S. leadership, 
however, when they were closely integrated in a European community their stances and 
policies could easily be far differing from those of the United States. President Nixon overtly 
indicated the ambivalence of his administration regarding U.S. leadership in Europe in the 
annual report to the Congress. In the 1940s and 1950s, Western Europe was struggling 
politically, economically and militarily. The United States, a predominant global player, had 
only just shifted its foreign policy from non-entanglement to entanglement in world affairs: 
“In this environment, our allies shifted the responsibility for major decisions to us. In their 
eyes, the overriding purpose of the new arrangements - for defense, economic policy, and 
foreign policy - was to link us to Europe in tangible ways on a long term peacetime basis.”399 
Thus, President Nixon explained, U.S. allies turned to the United States for instruction and 
expected the United States to take the lead even in shaping the European integration process. 
Nixon further pointed out that “Cooperation came so easily that it was widely assumed for 
years in the United States that a strong and united Europe would readily take up a large part 
of the American burden, while still accepting American leadership.”400  
However, the easy cooperation between the United States and Western Europe, and 
the view held by previous U.S. administrations that the unification of Europe would be 
conducive to both the European and American peoples, was questioned by the Nixon 
administration when problems in economic and political realms arose in the late 1960s and 
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early1970s. President Nixon bitterly admitted that as Western European economies 
completely recovered and prospered, Western European social cohesion and institutions 
rebuilt, the European Community was becoming more and more self-confident and 
independent in the world affairs. He added that “The United States continued to lead in 
tutelary fashion, however, looking for allied endorsement of U.S. prescriptions.”401  
Nixon’s statement implied that when the European Community fostered its unification 
it implemented policies to protect its own special interests. That the European Community 
was conducting economic regionalism characterized by protectionism policies, especially in 
agriculture, and pursuing preferential arrangements with third countries led to the U.S.’s 
increasing deficit in the balance of payments. Conflicting economic interests between the 
United States and the European Community posed challenges to the Nixon administration in 
designing its policy alongside the integrative process in Western Europe. Ambivalence 
towards a U.S. leading role in this region increased when the European positions and actions 
in the political arena was also not in accordance with the political directions from 
Washington.  
Secondly, the Nixon administration was cynical of the fundamental assumption 
highlighted in earlier policy that the United States and Western Europe had the same basic 
interests, goals and values based on a common heritage: “We assumed, perhaps too 
uncritically, that our basic interests would be assured by our long history of cooperation, by 
our common cultures and our political similarities.”402 When the European Community 
issued the Declaration of European Identity on December 14, 1973, its member states 
expressed their political will to have a genuinely European foreign policy and their 
determination to co-operate with the United States on the basis of equality and in a spirit of 
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friendship. The tenets of the Declaration were somewhat conflicting with Washington’s 
aspiration because the United States had preferred to keep the European Community in a 
subordinate relationship. A united Europe and a stronger Europe in socio-economic and 
political fronts might not adopt policies that the United States favoured. This was clearly 
stated in Nixon’s 1971 foreign policy report to Congress: “For years … it was believed 
uncritically that a united Western Europe would automatically lift burdens from the shoulders 
of the United States. The truth is not so simple. … For our closest friends are now developing 
a collective identity and collective policies separate from us.”403 
The changes in the Nixon administration’s policy approach to European integration 
could be seen in its main initiatives on Europe. The first were the REDCOSTE program and 
the new offset agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany. The REDCOSTE program 
aimed to streamline U.S. logistics and personnel in Europe while the new offset agreements 
were to push the Germans to pay for the cost of U.S. forces on their soil. The Nixon 
administration maintained that there was much free riding on the United States and wanted to 
reduce this by trying to cut costs in Europe through the REDCOSTE program and the offset 
agreements. The second included the Nixon Doctrine and the new strategy for NATO both of 
which were designed to make the European Community more responsible for its own defence 
and the collective defence of the treaty area. It could be noticed that there was confusion in 
the expectation of U.S. leaders about European integration, particularly with regard to the 
responsibility the EC was supposed to assume. All evidence seemed to indicate that the 
prevailing sentiment in the United States was that U.S. administrations desired to take the 
lead in NATO. The Nixon administration was not an exception. President Nixon and his team 
sought to renew U.S. strategy for NATO but there was no serious desire for withdrawing 
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from NATO. The Nixon administration’s new policy on NATO aimed to drastically curb 
U.S. financial contributions to this organization. This could be accomplished by requiring the 
European member states to contribute more to NATO. Once this initial requirement had been 
fulfilled, the Nixon administration believed the United States could reduce much of its 
military spending and convince Congress of the need to support further integration of the 
European states. Integration was the best means for the Europeans to become more secure 
and wealthier. This eventually produced a more responsible European Community in the 
Atlantic alliance. The last initiative was the Year of Europe. It was an example of the tactics 
the Nixon administration undertook to adapt to a growing European Community. President 
Nixon and his team insisted that the European Community needed to defend itself because 
the United States was an ordinary nation and could not use American taxes to pay for the 
Europeans. The United States had its own national interests to care about. Furthermore, the 
Nixon administration reaffirmed in 1973, the Year of Europe, that the European Community 
be involved in the Atlantic Charter which linked the Europeans to the obligations and rights 
of the Atlantic partnership with the United States. 
The Nixon administration’s images and responses to the European Community and 
European integration process reflected the dilemma that the United States had encountered in 
the realization of this process. On the one hand, the Nixon administration wanted to promote 
further European integration. On the other hand, it endeavoured to limit U.S. commitments to 
satisfy Congressional lawmakers and protect U.S. hegemony.  
In 1951, President Harry S. Truman achieved Congressional agreement to sign the 
Mutual Security Act which provided almost $7.5 billion, out of a GDP of around $340 
billion, for military, economic and technical aid to free peoples and which was mainly 
distributed to U.S. allies in Western Europe. One of the goals of The Mutual Security Act of 
1951 was “to further encourage the economic unification and the political federation of 
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Europe.”404 However, the general wisdom of U.S. policy towards European integration and 
its capacity for a long-sustained cooperation with the Europeans was continually questioned 
in the Nixon presidential years. The Nixon administration seriously doubted that European 
integration was beneficial to the United States. It was the lack of rationality and continuity in 
the European Community’s reactions in world affairs that was disconcerting to President 
Nixon and his team and certain events were apt to aggravate the Nixon administration’s 
concern about the European Community’s intentions and capacities. The expectations of 
European integration achieving a European Community as a reliable and responsible partner 
with the United States that Washington cherished prior to 1969 were questioned by the Nixon 
administration. The reorientation of U.S. policy on European integration under the Nixon 
administration was in parallel with changing economic and political situations in the 
European Community.  
The United States would naturally continue to play a tremendous role in the future 
evolvement of the European integration project. The circumstances and constraints of the 
emerging multipolar world envisaged by the Nixon administration itself would allow no other 
course. No doubt the Nixon administration had every right to expect from the European 
Community a fairer contribution to the defence of the non-Communist world.  
Yet the Europeans were not always acting in the way the Nixon administration told 
them to do. For instance, the Nixon administration could not compel the European 
Community to support Washington’s view of the Yom Kippur War. The Nixon 
administration found it was challenging to negotiate the offset agreements with the Germans 
and especially difficult to call for the European Community to be more cooperative in the 
economic sphere. This was mainly because of the divergent views on both sides of the 
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Atlantic Ocean on the nature of the Atlantic partnership. The divergence in views might be 
deeply rooted in their “way of life” as French philosopher, Gabriel Marcel, summarized in a 
remark widely embraced in Europe: 
Even if in the present conflict we have to place ourselves on the side of the 
United States … still that does not authorize us to say in a simple and 
straightforward way that the United States is the champion of Christian 
civilization; for after all, from many points of view, the ‘way of life’ practised 
across the Atlantic is very far from conformity to the demands of the Gospels. 
All that one can say ... is that on the American side freedom, in spite of 
everything, does retain opportunities which in the other camp, for an indefinite 
period, appear to be completely lost.405 
 
Nevertheless, a united Europe remained a dream, and it could be realized only when 
the Europeans were not threatened by Soviet communism. The Nixon administration 
recognized this and linked the development of European integration to a greater world. It 
would be unwise for the Nixon administration to consider European integration in isolation 
from the broader context of the international environment. With a new image of European 
integration, the Nixon administration launched specific initiatives to create a new spirit and 
add new strength to the Atlantic partnership. Such strategic responses illustrated that the 
Nixon administration agreed to carry forward the cause of European integration only when 
the Europeans helped the United States perpetuate its national interests and solve the 
fundamental problems of the free world.  
 
Conclusion  
In conclusion, the changes in the Nixon administration’s policy towards European 
integration took place in a tumultuous time when U.S. intervention in the Vietnam War was 
 
                                                          
405 Marcel, G 1953, Man Against Mass Society, Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, p. 243. 
- 201 - 
 
about to end, the long détente that led to the normalization of relations between the United 
States and China commenced, and the confrontation with the Soviet Union was reduced by 
agreements. An examination of U.S. policy on European integration under the Nixon 
administration reveals that Washington was ambivalent about the emergence of the European 
Community as an autonomous actor in foreign and defence policy. Due to economic and 
political factors, the collapse of the Bretton Woods System, the oil embargo and the détente 
with China and the Soviet Union, the United States sought to develop an active burden-
sharing arrangement with the European Community. In addition, Nixon and Kissinger did 
want the European Community to have a subordinate part in the relationship with the United 
States. Clearly, they did not expect that the development of a united Europe was outside an 
Atlantic framework. The idea of a united Europe closely linked to an Atlantic framework 
mainly established by Washington was, however, frustrating to many Europeans. 
Washington’s policy on European integration reflected the complicated interaction of 
political, economic and security forces. The formal rationale was a call for sharing of global 
interests and responsibility. The real rationale was to help the United States overcome its 
socio-political and economic turbulence and to keep the course of European integration in 
U.S. control. The changes in U.S. policy towards European integration was specifically 
expressed in the Nixon administration’s decisions to implement the REDCOSTE program in 
Europe, settle new offset agreements with the Germany, renew U.S. policy on NATO, apply 
the Nixon Doctrine to Europe and implement the Year of Europe.  
Generally speaking, the Nixon administration’s policy towards the European 
integration process seemed equivocal. President Nixon sought to contain some specific 
ambitions of the European Community’s leaders (economic competition and political 
reaffirmation) and steer the European integration process in a desirable direction while he 
encouraged deepening European integration and enlarging the European Community. This 
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chapter has offered an explanation of the Nixon administration’s policy towards European 
integration by analysing the initiatives that Washington implemented in the European region 
in general which eventually exerted impacts on European integration. The changes in the 
Nixon administration’s policy approach would certainly affect the relations between the 
United States and the European Community. Washington’s relations with the European 
Community were characterized by cooperation and confrontation, the weight of confrontation 
seemed to be much more than that of cooperation in the Nixon presidential years. This is the 
focus of the following chapter which explores U.S.-European Community relations between 
the years 1969 and 1974.  
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Chapter 5 
The U.S.-EC Relations, 1969-1974: Cooperation and Confrontation 
The real problem is that some Europeans want to organize unity against the U.S. Perhaps, 
this is based on the idea that they must oppose someone in order to achieve this unity. 
 
Henry Kissinger, 1973 
 
I don’t think the '70s were a turning point in European-American relations. I think they were 
an important pivot in international relations in general. So a lot of decisions had to be made 
by the Atlantic alliance that didn't have to be made before. 
 




Power relationships have been characterized by a continuous state of mobility. The 
Americans by late 1960s and early 1970s realized that the game had changed. President 
Richard Nixon and his advisers acknowledged that in order to win on the global chessboard, 
the United States could not always command the nations in the international system to do 
what it wanted, it sometimes needed to convince them to follow its leadership: “Allies as well 
as adversaries will be speaking more boldly and more bluntly, whether the United States likes 
it or not. The United States cannot compete more intensively with stronger allies and still 
receive quite the same deference it once enjoyed. It will have to convince more than it can 
command.”406 Cooperation and confrontation, therefore, became a prominent feature in the 
U.S.-EC relations under the Nixon administration. 
The relationship between the United States and the European Community underwent 
significant change during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Post 1945 cooperation, dependence 
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and direction increasingly gave way to antagonism, economic competition and division over 
military and foreign policies. The United States economy declining substantially, coupled 
with a concentration on détente made the Nixon administration adopt policies that directly 
posed economic and security challenges to Europe. When economic and political disputes 
emerged between the United States and the European Community it eroded their trust in each 
other and this, consequently, led to increasing tensions in their relations. Henry Kissinger 
clearly stated that “The Alliance is basic to our policy but the American defence of Europe 
cannot continue so that Europe is free to pursue anti-American policies.”407 Yet this was also 
the time when the U.S.-EC relationship experienced rejuvenation. The leaders of both sides 
understood that they needed each other, thus they sought to enhance cooperation and 
coordination to defend and advance their economic and strategic interests. Though the men in 
Washington outlined new foreign policy priorities for the United States focusing on the 
Soviet Union, China and Asia as a whole, they still wanted to ensure that U.S. traditional 
relations with the European Community would not be damaged. The Nixon administration 
tried to manage economic and political disputes with the Western Europeans which could be 
seen in its efforts to coexist with the European Community. Also, the European Community 
knew that they could not deter aggression and defend their territory without U.S. military 
might. The smart choice for them was to stay under the U.S. military umbrella. This meant 
they had to accept to a considerable degree the U.S. economic and political position. An 
uneasy partnership resulted from the “condescending and hegemonic attitude of the U.S. … 
along with [EEC] members’ unease with U.S. leadership” could be perceived.408 Hence, this 
chapter will begin by examining the erosion of trust between the United States and the 
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European Community which was reflected mainly in their economic and political disputes. 
Then it will illustrate that the Americans and Western Europeans were tied by their own 
national interests, thus their relations were marked by both cooperation and confrontation. 
The chapter will conclude that the U.S.-EC relations during the Nixon presidential years had 
been on a downward course.  
 
A Problem of Trust  
As Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. Schwartz wrote, “The history of the 1970s 
reinforces a lesson often overlooked: there was never a golden age in the Atlantic alliance, a 
time when the United States and Europe cooperated in an atmosphere of complete mutual 
trust and harmony.”409 The economic conflicts and political disputes between the two sides of 
the Atlantic Ocean in the Nixon presidential years put the Western alliance in deep trouble. 
Kissinger observed, “for the first time since the war, there exists an open challenge not just to 
the technical implementation of American plans but to the validity of American 
conceptions.”410 Nixon took possession of the White House in January 1969 believing that it 
was time for the United States to build up a relationship of trust and cooperation with the 
European Community, thus, he paid a visit to Europe to foster dialogues with the European 
Community’s state-members. He even criticized President Lyndon B. Johnson for bruising 
the mutual trust and confidence in the Western alliance and not mentioning Europe in his 
1968 State of the Union address. 
Despite President Nixon’s good intentions, the years between 1969 and 1974 did not 
witness an easy phase of United States-European Community relationship. The European 
Community grew frustrated with the Nixon administration’s unilateral and realist approach to 
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international affairs and even made “criticisms to American hegemony in the Atlantic 
alliance.”411 Meanwhile, the Nixon administration appeared highly sensitive to any sign that 
Western European governments were ganging up on the United States. The European attempt 
to compete with the United States economically and the European political approach to shield 
themselves from the 1973 Arab-Israel War and the oil crisis strained United States-European 
Community relations. The Nixon administration had reasons to cast doubt on the traditional 
U.S. policy of promoting European integration regardless of the economic cost. Put simply, 
there was a problem of trust between the Americans and the Western Europeans in the Nixon 




By the time Nixon took possession of the White House, the multilateral, market-
oriented economy that allowed the United States to spend as much as it wanted at home and 
abroad had been in a deep crisis marked by the payments deficit, or the net loss suffered by 
the United States from its commercial and financial exchanges with the rest of the world. 
President Nixon had to accept that U.S. power had its limits. Troubles came from the 
successful U.S. leadership of the global economic recovery from the Second World War. The 
United States overvalued its dollars to make its allies’ exports more attractive. As the 
Western European economy became strong, U.S. overseas trade and payments balances were 
deteriorating. By 1969, the European Community had become an effective trade competitor 
and protectionist. The Nixon administration considered economic competition from the 
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European Community to be serious as the European Community tended towards becoming an 
inward-looking trade bloc likely to close the door to the U.S. exporters. U.S. leaders even 
accused the European Community of maximizing its economic potential regardless of the 
cost to the United States and the Atlantic system.412 They pointed out that “it is true that so 
far the Europeans seem bent on doing so almost exclusively by economic and commercial 
devices, which are discriminatory in nature and are bound to bring them into conflict with 
those responsible for our economic affairs and with potent U.S. economic interest groups.”413 
This economic behaviour from the European Community intensified the burden on 
the U.S. economy and made President Nixon worried. His administration’s Treasury 
Secretary clearly stated, “no longer can considerations of friendship, or need, or capacity 
justify the United States carrying so heavy a share of the common burdens. And, to be 
perfectly frank, no longer will the American people permit their government to engage in 
international actions in which the true long-run interests of the U.S. are not just as clearly 
recognised as those of the nations with which we deal.”414 Commenting on this statement, 
Kissinger, who normally used tough, realistic words in talking with allies, underlined “such 
language had not been heard since the formation of our alliances. It shook the crockery of our 
bureaucracy almost as much as it did the comfortable assumption of our allies that the 
doctrine of consultation gave them a veto over unilateral American actions.”415  
It was undeniable that the United States was still the European Community’s best 
single customer. In 1968, the United States bought 16 percent of the EC’s $35.5 million-
worth export goods, $5.8 billion-worth and 30 percent more than in 1967. From 1960 to 
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1968, the European Community exports to the United States increased by about 157 percent, 
nearly doubled as fast as the rest of the world, which increased to 67 percent.416 The 
European Community’s good record of export to the U.S. market made the Nixon 
administration worried; especially when U.S. exports to the Common Market were 
constrained by the European Community’s protectionist trend. For example, the European 
Community’s proposed consumption tax on oils and fats indirectly imperilled U.S. soya bean 
exports. Thus, the United States expressed opposition to any policies which would increase 
the European Community’s protection of its products from tobacco, poultry, and canned 
foods to dairy products.417 A widespread belief had existed in the Nixon administration that 
the European Community tended to adopt trade policies which were against U.S. economic 
interests. The United States claimed that the European Community’s system of taxing the 
value added to commodities at each stage of production and distribution gave European 
companies a competitive advantage over U.S. ones.418 
About 20 years after the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, proposed to place 
Franco-German production of coal and steel under a common High Authority which 
established common bases for economic development as a first step in the federation of 
Europe, the European Community by late 1969 and early 1970s had become a powerhouse 
able to challenge U.S. leadership and hegemony on the economic front. In contrast, the 
United States’ economy under the Nixon years entered a phase of stagnation. Economic 
statistics indicated the slowdown of U.S. economic dynamism. In the fourth quarter of 1969 
the real GNP of the United States decreased slightly and the index of industrial production 
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dropped by 2.8 percent from July 1969 to January 1970.419 There was much pressure on costs 
and prices. In February 1970 consumer prices increased 6.3 percent.420 The level of U.S. 
imports remained almost unchanged in the closing months of 1969. In general, the Nixon 
administration was confronting a macroeconomic international economic situation 
characterized by U.S. merchandise trade deficits and current account surpluses. The trade 
surplus fell to $0.6 billion in 1968 from $6.8 billion in 1964 and the current account balance 
had decreased, for the first time since 1959, to a $0.5 billion deficit in 1968 from a $5.8 
billion surplus.421 The trade surplus still stood at $0.6 billion in 1969 while the current 
account deficit went up to over $1.0 billion.422 Eyeing such depressing statistics, the Nixon 
administration with a clear neo-mercantilist approach sought to re-evaluate exchange rates 
with Western European countries, to oppose to the European Community’s preferential trade 
policies with Mediterranean countries and to reform the international monetary system.  
 
The First Round of United States-European Community Consultation 
The first in a series of formal U.S. consultations with the European Community was 
carried out on October 15 and 16, 1970, when a delegation from the European Community 
Commission led by Ralf Dahrendorf, Commissioner of the European Community in charge 
of Foreign Relations and Foreign Trade, and an inter-agency delegation led by the Deputy 
 
                                                          
419 Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 1970, 
The Economic Situation in the Community, viewed 11 December 2014, 
<http://aei.pitt.edu/47961/1/A7857.pdf>. 
420 Ibid. 
421 Editorial note, Foreign Relations of the United States (Hereafter cited as FRUS), 1969-1976, Volume III, 
Foreign Economic Policy, International Monetary Policy, 1969-1072, Document 2, viewed  January 19 2015, 
<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v03/d2>. 
422 Ibid. 
- 210 - 
 
Under Secretary of State, Nat Samuels, met in Washington to discuss U.S. trade legislation 
and the European Community’s policy on both agriculture and preferential trading areas.423 
The European Community’s delegation was confident in their arguments against U.S. 
trade policy as Dahrendorf made it clear that the U.S.’s trade policy would lead to an 
acceleration of protectionist measures all over the word. This would consequently create 
disarray in the international exchange of commodities and capital. He even warned Deputy 
Under Secretary of State Samuels that it would not be wise for the United States to think that 
the European Community was unlikely to take common action in response to serious damage 
to the economic interests of its member states caused by U.S. protectionism. For instance, 
Dahrendorf pointed out that the European Community would be adversely affected by U.S. 
quotas on shoes and would certainly have to react. The European Community delegation even 
explicitly indicated that U.S. protective measures would reinforce the practices of those 
trying to discriminate against European subsidiaries of U.S. companies. 
Deputy Under Secretary of State Samuels and the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, 
Clarence Palmby, expressed U.S. concerns about the high level of EC agricultural 
protectionism and emphasised the need to reduce the support prices for grain.424 Dahrendorf 
explained that the Commission was confronting political pressures for a rise in grain prices in 
the European Community but maintained that a reduction in grain prices was politically 
unthinkable. The most that the United States could hope for was to keep the grain price stable 
for some years. At the current levels of inflation in the European Community, keeping the 
grain prices stable would grind down the real income of farmers and thus erode their 
motivation for production while helping the U.S. exporters in terms of real prices. It was clear 
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that the European Community and U.S. delegations were unable to reach an agreement on 
agricultural policy in the first consultation and they decided to have subsequent policy-level 
discussions between the two sides on a range of agricultural trade items.425 
The U.S. delegation expressed its objection to the preferential trading arrangements 
between the European Community and Mediterranean countries which the United States 
believed violated the most-favoured-nation principle of GATT.426 Yet the European 
Community delegation defended these arrangements on a political basis and put forth that the 
preferential trading arrangements were the only instrument the Common Market could use to 
meet its responsibility to the Mediterranean. Dahrendorf stressed that the Common Market 
did not expect economic benefits from the preferential trading arrangements. He maintained 
that such preferential trading arrangements were unlikely to cause any damage to the U.S. 
economy. Samuels challenged his view by showing that the California-Arizona citrus 
industry had already made complaint of the damage. Finally, the European Community and 
the U.S. delegations agreed to take concerted action to determine the damage that United 
States claimed.427 
This first formal consultation between the United States and the European 
Community showed the friction between the United States and the European Community. 
Both sides sought to protect their domestic commercial interests. Though the friction was 
mainly confined to the economic area it was possible it would intensify and “could easily 
spill over into the political arena” as Kissinger informed President Nixon.428 
The old saying “when the United States sneeze, Western Europe catches cold” could 
be applied in this period. Though the European Community delegation showed confidence in 
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their arguments against U.S. trade policy which was alleged to cause injury to the Common 
Market and had potential to disrupt the world trading system, the Europeans were well aware 
that the health of the U.S. economy greatly influenced their own situation: 
Most of them [the Europeans] express strong recognition of a need for a 
resumption of U.S. economic growth - even the French, who because of their 
monetary and nationalistic investment concerns, have not generally felt this 
way in the past. There is great worry, particularly in financial circles, about the 
other side of the balance - the possibility of a resumed U.S. inflation - but the 
greater stress by officials with broader concerns is clearly on the need for an 
up-turn in the American economy.429 
 
In the paper which outlined Nixon’s international economic strategy for the 1970s, the 
Department of State placed emphasis on analysing the problems in the U.S. economic 
relations with the European Community and put forth both an interim program and a new 
international economic initiative for improving the relationship. It was clearly stated that the 
United States-European Community economic relations were in tension. The European 
Community and the United States had disputes over textiles, agriculture and monetary issues. 
The United States had problems in reconciling its national policies which could affect the 
European economies, U.S. investments and international trade as well. The paper indicated 
that U.S. industry was in need of import restrictions on a range of products and that U.S. 
farmers had concern over penetrating the European Common Market. Also, it showed that the 
Europeans were concerned about the U.S. balance of payment deficit. The United States 
recognized that the economic cooperation between Washington and Western European 
capitals was significant. If such cooperation deteriorated there would be serious political 
disagreement. The United States could not expect cooperation on political and security 
 
                                                          
429 Information Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to 
President Nixon, Foreign Attitudes Toward U.S. Economic Policies, viewed February 21, 
2015,<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v03/d51#fn2>. 
- 213 - 
 
matters from Western Europe when the two sides had quarrels about economic issues. In 
addition, while U.S. economic situation was declining the Nixon administration was unlikely 
to gain public support at home for its international security policies. What the United States 
had to do was to establish a framework among the United States and the European 
Community to deal with these existing problems. The United States and the European 
Community needed to become more cooperative in all areas by building trade relations which 
aimed to increase liberal access to markets and allow more flexibility in monetary exchange 
rates. The Department of State highlighted in the paper that an interim program needed to be 
implemented to deal with the immediate pressures before an official program, which would 
require thorough preparation at home and intensive consultation abroad, was developed.430 
The interim program proposed by the Department of State underlined the need for 
action on certain agricultural products with the European Community: “we should press 
forward to resolve several highly politicized agricultural problems with the EC - citrus, 
tobacco, poultry, and lard - and should seek to avoid an increase in EC corn prices.”431 It was 
stated clearly in the paper of the Department of State that it was hard to solve these problems: 
“We have been trying to deal with trade problems one by one for years with no positive 
results. In this context governments find it difficult politically to stand up to particular 
interests.”432  
  After reviewing the principal problems in commercial relations with the European 
Community and outlining an approach to solving these problems, the paper recommended an 
initiative to cover the economic issues of the early 1970s. In respect to the relationship with 
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the European Community, the paper stressed that agriculture, non-agricultural trade, foreign 
investment and international finance remained the areas of most concern.  
Regarding agriculture, the paper pointed out that Western European governments had 
adopted a wide range of domestic subsidy programs and trade restrictions to support their 
farmers. The United States suffered from these agricultural policies of the Common Market. 
As an efficient agricultural producer, employing measures to place agricultural trade on a 
more liberal basis would be in U.S.’s interests.433  
Concerning non-agricultural trade, the United States wanted to bring about the 
reduction of industrial tariffs as the enlargement of the European Community to include the 
United Kingdom was likely to affect the competitiveness of U.S. exports. Bringing down the 
common external tariff of the European Community would help solve this problem.434  
With regard to foreign investment, the United States recognized that investment issues 
with the EC were a combination of political assertion and economic content. The Europeans 
were afraid of losing control over the direction of their domestic economies when decision-
making for large firms was in the hands of Americans. Thus, in its international economic 
strategy with the EC, the United States saw the need to “a) to depoliticize the subject, b) to 
assure that no nation's major goals are seriously eroded by the international mobility of firms, 
c) to avoid conflicting jurisdictions over multinational firms, and d) to assure equitable 
treatment for the firms.”435  
Lastly, regarding international finance, the United States was facing continuing deficit 
caused mostly by interest rate disparities between the United States and Western Europe and 
the resulting large short-term capital flows. Additionally, the Europeans became more 
concerned with the U.S. deficit as the academic circle in the United States expressed support 
 




- 215 - 
 
for a “passive” policy or U.S. “benign neglect” of its balance of payments.436 There were four 
things the United States needed to achieve to sustain exchange rate flexibility and U.S. 
leadership in international finance:  
- Creation of an amount of SDR's [Special Drawing Rights] in 1973 and after 
that will assure a continuation of the system. 
- Stronger programs to control short-term capital flows, preferably through 
U.S. unilateral action but perhaps on a joint basis with other countries. 
- A clear recognition of responsibilities by both surplus and deficit countries, 
including the relationship of more flexible exchange rates to the adjustment 
process. 
- Better coordination of the domestic monetary policies of the major 
countries.437 
 
The view expressed in this paper guided the Nixon administrator’s international 
economic strategy for the 1970s. According to the European Community’s leaders, this was 
indication of U.S. dissatisfaction with reduced Europeans cooperation and the U.S.’s attempt 
to make them take certain remedial action instead of seeking to figure out with them an 
adequate solution for both the Americans and Europeans. 
 
The Fifth Round of United States-European Community Consultation 
 The fifth round of United States-European Community Consultation took place on 
October 5 and 6, 1972, nearly one year after the first one and was seen from a U.S. standpoint 
as  the most straightforward and detailed discussion since the initiation of the United States-
European Community Consultation. The European Community delegation was again led by 
Commissioner Dahrendorf and the U.S. delegation by the Deputy Secretary of State, John N. 
Irwin. The U.S. delegation expressed their concern over the European Community’s internal 
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development of common agricultural, industrial and monetary policies as well as the 
European Community’s continued proliferation of preferential trading arrangements with 
non-European Community member states. That the Europeans turned a blind eye to the 
difficulties which their action had caused for the United States could have serious political 
implications. Economic and trading issues remained the focus of the fifth United States-
European Community Consultation. The United States was unhappy with the Commission’s 
proposed Mediterranean policy which would, from a U.S. perspective, negatively affect U.S. 
economic interests. Thus, the U.S. delegation put forth that the Europeans needed to work out 
a cooperative solution to the economic and trade disputes with the United States in a larger 
political and security context. Put simply, what the United States wanted to see from the 
Europeans was their willingness to “work with the United States in reordering economic 
relations through multilateral negotiations on monetary reform and trade liberalization.”438 
 At this Consultation round, the United States again expressed its expectation that 
liberalization of agricultural trade would be achieved. Also, according to U.S. delegates, it 
was the European Community’s actions on agriculture that made it hard for the United States 
to hold the line against its own protectionist pressures and move towards a negotiation on 
trade liberalizing. Concerning the European Community’s industrial policy, the United States 
continued to complain about the European Community’s plans to restructure its aviation 
industry in a way which was likely to damage a significant U.S. export. The European 
Community delegation claimed that they were forced to combine their strengths to compete 
with the U.S. aircraft industry. 
 Like the first formal United States-European Community Consultation in October 
1971, the fifth round in October 1972 placed emphasis on U.S.-EC economic and trade 
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relations. The Nixon administration insisted on working towards a more effective economic 
relationship with the European Community. President Nixon expected that the friction in the 
U.S.-EC economic relations, mainly caused by the European Community’s increasing 
competitiveness and the U.S. declining economic position, would be dealt with through 
consultation. Yet it seemed to be hard for both sides to reach a consensus. The European 
Community appeared to ignore U.S. calls for a flexible position on exchange rates, non-
proliferation of the European Community’s preferential trade arrangement and a cooperative 
attitude towards reforming the international monetary system. Though the European 
Community insisted that its policy aimed to further political interests common to both the 
Europeans and the Americans, the United States accused the European Community of 
seeking to form a large preferential bloc around the EC and, subsequently, hurt the United 
States economically. Obviously, that the united EC became an effective economic competitor 
with the United States and lacked concern regarding the difficulties of the U.S. economy was 
something the Nixon administration could not accept. President Nixon was determined to 
deal with the trade imbalances that were weakening U.S. economic dynamism and leadership 
amongst its allies. He was willing to adopt a tough line to prevent the Europeans from hurting 
the United States both symbolically and practically: “The American positions were based on 
the decision, … to keep maximum pressure on the Community in respect to U.S. economic 
interests, short of creating an irresolvable confrontation.”439 For instance, the Nixon 
administration decided that it had to reach a meaningful agreement with the European 
Community in the broader areas of monetary and trade reforms. It tried to work out solutions 
to the two main problems: the Common Agricultural Policy and the European Community’s 
growing number of Preference Agreements with non-member states. The Nixon 
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administration was determined that the European Community would not allow extending 
preferences to additional countries. Regarding the preferences already offered to developed 
countries, mostly European, the Nixon administration, which had seen the EC as a horse 
largely out of the barn, made it clear that its policy would be to “(a) in the short run, get 
special tariff relief where an existing U.S. industry is hurt, such as our wood products 
industry, whose $600 million of annual exports to the Community are in danger, and (b) in 
the long run, reduce industrial tariffs multilaterally so that the tariff preferences are 
ineffective against U.S. exports.”440 Regarding the European Community’s preferences for 
developing countries, these were able to be incorporated in a multilateral program of 
generalized preferences which the United States was backing.  
In the area of agriculture, the United States insisted that the European Community had 
to express a willingness to cut their subsidies to agricultural exports to third markets and 
lessen their protection against agricultural imports into the Community. These, rather than a 
Common Agricultural Policy, were the United States’ primary objectives and the Nixon 
administration believed that they could possibly be achievable.  
The approach the Nixon administration handled the trade disputes with the European 
Community made the Europeans unhappy and disappointed. For example, the report of the 
EC-U.S. trade relations issued by Brussels in August after President Nixon declared his 
administration new economic foreign policy on August 15, 1971, underlined that the 10 
percent surtax on U.S. imports adversely affected the principal aspects of the trade relations 
between the Community and the United States. The report concluded that: 
The American government has said that some 50 percent of imports are 
subject to the 10 percent surtax. But because of the structure of Community 
exports to the United States not 50 percent but more than 80 percent of the 
$6.570 billion in Community exports are affected by American measure. 
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Among the sectors particularly affected are: automobiles, chemicals, 
machinery, steel, shoes and foodstuffs including wine.441  
 
On April 21, 1972, Deputy Director of the European Community Information Service, 
Guy Vanhaeverbeke, gave an address to the Missouri Bar Association in which he stressed 
that the emerging European Community was not against anyone and certainly not against 
Washington. He affirmed that the European Community’s primary goal was to prevent the 
Common Agriculture Policy and customs union from disintegrating. The European 
Community acknowledged that monetary and trade policies were closely intertwined and that 
cooperation among governments for a better functioning of the international monetary system 
contributed to the success of the future negotiations in the field of trade policy.442 
Vanhaeverbeke claimed that the European Community was the United States’ loyal friend 
when the Community refrained from retaliation after the tough measures taken by President 
Nixon on August 15, 1971:  
- they accepted adjustments in their exchange rates last December, imposing a 
heavy competitive handicap on their own economies, whereas their trade 
balance with the United States showed a massive deficit; 
- they agreed on a number of unilateral trade concessions vis-à-vis the United 
States at the beginning of February 1972; 
- they committed themselves to a new round of extensive trade negotiations 
which would aim at: a) the lowering or elimination of remaining customs 
duties, as well as non-tariff barriers; b) the exploration of reasonable avenues 
of conciliation between conflicting interests in the agricultural area, namely 
through international commodity agreements; c) giving utmost consideration 
to the interest of developing countries.443 
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From a European point of view, the United States and the European Community as the 
first and the second economic and commercial powers in the world were bound to have 
disputes. Nevertheless, the Americans and the Europeans had to prevent these disputes from 
developing into “a full-fledged crisis where we speak lightly of trade wars as if they 
amounted to little more than a Saturday afternoon touch-football game.”444  
 
Political Disputes 
The problem of trust between the United States and the European Community was 
especially indicated in their divergent views on energy policies and their responses to the 
1973 Arab-Israeli War which led to the Arab oil-exporting countries’ embargo. Together 
these had long-term implications for the United States-European Community relationship as 
M. Smith pointed out, the 1980s “European image as an adversarial partner” was, in 
significant ways, “formed during the 1970s.”445 The Nixon administration’s attempt to deal 
with the energy issues was met by European antagonism and scepticism. The European 
Community found themselves in the uncomfortable position of needing Washington’s aid in 
securing energy sources while they were trying to distance them from President Nixon’s 
policy on the Middle East. Political differences in tackling the oil crisis further eroded the 
trust between the United States and the European Community and, thus, quickly strained their 
relationship. According to Kissinger, the Atlantic Alliance was in a perplexing and 
disquieting situation: “there is no real negotiation, since the Europeans state their position, we 
state ours, and then the Europeans go away to work out their response after which the whole 
process is repeated. Thus, whereas we had hoped that the Common Market would lead to 
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better relations with the U.S., we are now forced into a type of consultation that is worse than 
we have with any other country.”446  
 
Different Views on Energy 
Regarding its energy policy, the United States was confident that it had important 
leverage and the European Community needed its cooperation. U.S. leverage relating to 
energy came from three main factors; (i) the United States had great political and economic 
influence on Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two richest oil countries; (ii) the United States was 
the world’s leading country in the fields of energy-related technology; and (iii) the United 
States had large domestic resources which could reduce its future demand for oil import. This 
leverage did not mean, though, that the United States could develop an energy policy without 
considering the views of its allies, particularly the European Community. In his special 
message to the Congress on energy policy, President Nixon indicated that the United States 
was interested in developing “an arrangement for sharing oil in times of acute shortages.”447 
According to Nixon, the European Economic Community also saw the need for cooperative 
efforts and wanted to develop a Community energy policy. He stressed that the United States 
desired to work together with the European Community in this effort.  
Regarding the European Community’s stance on energy, the Commission of the 
European Community had been seeking to formulate a common energy policy for a long 
time, however, such a policy did not presently exist. The Commission had to take the national 
policies of the major member states into consideration as they each had decisive roles on 
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energy matters. The Commission was in favour of cooperation among oil consuming and 
producing states. It was also interested in specific consumer cooperative measures which 
aimed to deal with security and stock building, encourage more rational use of energy 
resources and develop alternative sources of energy. The Commission had no intention of 
developing a policy to build a consumer-country bloc of a “cartel” type. This was because the 
formation of a consumer country organization might lead to intensifying a common front by 
the producers. Also, the Commission did not want to see the development of bilateral 
relations between consumer and producer countries. However, the Commission of the 
European Community proposed much closer future collaboration on and tighter joint 
management of energy among European nations which was designed to counter its fear that 
the United States unilaterally sought assured oil supplies. Naturally, the United States was 
disturbed by the European position on energy matters: “The Europeans are talking about 
sharing all continental oil, avoiding competitive bidding and other things that we [The United 
States] don’t like.”448   
In addition, the United States was concerned with the European intention to make 
special arrangements with the oil producers in the Middle East: “They [the European 
Community] are talking of special arrangements with the Middle Eastern producers. We want 
to watch this and make sure it comes out right for us,”449  The United States wanted to make 
sure that its position would be made clear at the June 6 to 8, 1973, meeting of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) High Level Group of the 
Oil Committee. Energy was “another opportunity for enhanced U.S./Allied cooperation that 
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should be pursued to revitalize relations in the broader context of the President’s Year of 
Europe.”450 
Though the United States expressed a desire to see closer cooperation with the 
European Community it became apparent that their relations were worsening in the Nixon 
administration. The Central Intelligence Agency even foresaw that “Intensified rivalry among 
the U.S., the West European countries … for (1) oil, (2) extended export markets to pay for 
oil and (3) investments from oil producers will run serious risk of causing deteriorating terms 
of trade for all consumers and also of embittering political relations among major industrial 
countries. And bad political relations would in turn intensify economic rivalry.”451  
 
Different Stances on the 1973 Arab-Israeli War 
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War broke out on October 6, 1973, when the Egyptians and the 
Syrians conducted an attack on Israeli forces in the Sinai and the Golan Heights.452 The 
Europeans refused to cooperate with U.S. efforts to resupply Israel from U.S. stocks in 
Europe. They did not even permit U.S. transport planes to fly over their territory. The 
European Community often complained about inadequate consultations between the 
Americans and the Europeans, however the “real trouble” as Kissinger stressed, “was a clash 
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in political perspectives that no amount of consultation” could help remove.453 Obviously, 
Kissinger felt the European Community’s complaint about the lack of consultation to be 
disingenuous. 
The Washington Special Actions Group held the first meeting on war-related issues at 
9 a.m. on October 6, 1973. It was agreed at the meeting that Saudi Arabia was “the key to the 
oil problem,” and that relations between the United States and the European Community 
would become tense in the event of an embargo.454 In their discussion on the possibilities of 
an Arab oil cut-off on October 15, 1973, the Washington Special Actions Group reached a 
consensus that there were two possibilities. First, it was a cut-off of Arab oil supplies to the 
United States alone. In this case the United States supposed that it could tackle this with 
albeit with some strain. Second, it was a total cut-off of Arab oil to all major oil consuming 
countries. In this case the United States would seek to equalize the burden by shipping oil to 
Western Europe. However, the Washington Special Actions Group was concerned about the 
striking economic impact on the United States. Also, even if the United States did take action 
to help its allies, the Western European attitude towards the 1973 Arab-Israeli War was clear: 
“They expect the U.S. to carry the entire burden.”455 Kissinger bitterly criticised Western 
Europe for not lifting a finger to help Washington with the Arabs: “And they have been 
goddamned unhelpful in the diplomacy.”456 Considering the relationship with the Europeans 
he added: “we pay the same price if we do a lot as if we do a little.” He did realize that the 
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United States had troubles with the Europeans who were behaving “like jackals” because 
they “did everything to egg on the Arabs.”457  
Kissinger saw the Europeans’ behaviour as “a total disgrace” and, thus, saw the need 
to assess just where the United States’ relationship with its European allies was going.458 This 
need was even said directly to French Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet at the United Nations 
by Kissinger on October 25, 1973. Kissinger said that he recently ordered a complete re-
evaluation of U.S. relations with the Europeans. Europe, he elaborated, insisted on unity in 
issues related to European defence but refuses to cooperate on other matters.459 He thought 
that “there had to be an end to this kind of conduct.”460 Though he did not want his country to 
be in an open confrontation with the European Community, he needed to outline a 
contingency plan for the United States to win in case the oil embargo was announced and the 
Europeans did not stand on the side of the United States and Israel: “We have some real 
problems. The events of this summer have led to a belief all around the world that our 
authority has been weakened. If we get into a confrontation, we have to show that we are a 
giant! We have to win! I don’t expect us to get into a confrontation, but we should look at 
everything we could do if we did.”461 
On October 16, 1973, the Arab members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) officially announced an embargo against the United States in retaliation 
for the U.S. decision to airlift re-supplies to the Israel military.462 This embargo also affected 
U.S. allies, particularly Western Europe, which heavily depended on oil supplies from the 
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Arab countries. The United States observed that West Europe could not do much in the 
immediate future to get their oil deliveries back to strength. The Western Europeans would 
naturally continue to stay far from the United States’ present Middle Eastern policy in their 
“speeches, in UN votes, and in the denial of overflight and refuelling rights for U.S. military 
aircraft.”463 The European Community’s leaders knew that such a response would not make 
the United States rethink its policy stance on Middle East or save the Western Europeans 
from the impacts of the oil embargo. Put simply, the Western Europeans were suffering from 
the shortage of oil supply and they had to turn to the United States for help.  
The United States realized that if such oil shortages became more severe the 
Europeans would take action against U.S. interests. For instance, the Western European 
countries would unilaterally seek to keep all the oil they could get for their people by 
reducing or eliminating their exports of refined oil to the United States:  
There is some inconsistency between the European desire to minimize 
association with U.S. political policy in the Middle East crisis and European 
awareness that some form of cooperation arrangement for coping with oil 
shortage must necessarily involve U.S.-European conversation. This 
inconsistency is both real and apparent. The Europeans will try to resolve it 
insofar as they can, by working for quiet talks within OECD forum on oil 
matters, while avoiding political initiatives unless and until the time seems 
ripe for a mediation role that would not alienate the Arabs.464 
 
The Western European response to the Arab’s cut down on oil production was not 
favourable to the United States and Washington was aware that there would be more strain in 
the relationship between the European Community and the United States because of the 
differences in their strategies to deal with the Arab oil embargo: 
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The prospects for Europe look even worse. If the embargo continues after the 
end of November and is increased by an additional 5% or more, the Europeans 
will have to take drastic measures. Since this is daily becoming more apparent 
to the Europeans, we can expect reactions soon. If the EC nations initiate an 
internal EC sharing arrangement, the Arab producers will almost certainly react 
against those who attempt to cut across the lines of the Arab selective 
embargoes. At some point, the Europeans will probably decide that they must 
act together to seek their peace with the Arabs. Thus, the prospects for 
additional strains between the U.S. and Europe appear to be growing.465 
 
In the November 3, 1973, Memorandum to Secretary of State Kissinger, Under 
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, William J. Casey, accused the Western Europeans of 
selfishness: “The disarray of the Europeans and the general scramble to appease the Arabs 
and take care of themselves has made the oil weapon more successful than anything else.”466 
In a similar vein, Kissinger reflected that “we were not helped by the Europeans.”467 
Explicitly, the United States was dissatisfied with the European Community’s 
response after the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War on October 6, 1973. The Europeans 
defined themselves in opposition to the United States. That the European Community 
rejected U.S. policy during the war, refused landing rights for U.S. resupply planes to Israel 
and embraced the Arab position in the war led to the most serious crisis in transatlantic 
relations since the creation of the NATO. The European Community had not given the United 
States a helping hand to achieve a peace settlement for the Middle Eastern region in the way 
Washington expected. The Western European behaviour was going against Washington’s 
wish to organise a peace conference to be chaired by the Secretary General of the United 
Nations and held under U.S. and Soviet auspices. Secretary of State Kissinger showed clearly 
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the U.S. position that the Americans could arrange a peace settlement for the Arabs while the 
Europeans were almost unhelpful: 
Our position is that we will not be driven by pressure from one point to 
another. This is a game we could not win and it would be disastrous for us to 
try to compete with the Europeans. … Our line with the Arabs is that the 
Soviets can give you weapons but only we can get you a settlement. The 
Europeans can give you rhetoric but only we can give you performance. We 
may promise less but we deliver on our promises.468 
 
Kissinger made it clear that the European Community might choose to disassociate 
with the United States over the Middle East crisis and implement their own policies. In these 
circumstances, he underscored, that “when their fundamental attitude was either slightly or 
openly hostile,” they could not be in a position to “insist on a right to private briefings.”469 He 
reflected this point in his book, Years of Upheaval, writing, “Europe, it emerged increasingly, 
wanted the option to conduct a policy separate from the United States and in the case of the 
Middle East objectively in conflict with us.”470 This was unacceptable to the Nixon 
administration.  The Europeans could not carry out a completely independent and indeed anti-
American policy and still expect the United States to defend them.  No U.S. government 
could accept that “America should be accorded the great privilege of defending Europe, but 
have no other role” in the European Community’s affairs.471  
That the Americans and the Europeans held divergent stances on energy policies and 
on the 1973 Arab-Israeli War implied the European Community’s desire to be independent 
from the United States. The oil embargo had effects on the U.S.-European relationship in 
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several ways. The Europeans might view Washington’s response to their requests for some 
form of energy sharing as a direct test of the meaningfulness of the relationship between the 
United States and the European Community. That the United States failed to help the 
European Community in the oil crisis caused by the oil embargo could be taken as a 
manifestation of Washington’s indifference, pushing the European Community to move 
further towards the Arabs’ position even at the expense of aggravating differences with the 
United States. However, if the United States responded more positively and helped the 
European Community out of the oil crisis, it still might not result in a dramatic reaffirmation 
of Atlantic partnership: “Even the patent demonstration of U.S.-European interdependence 
inherent in the oil problem would still leave unresolved the basic issues which stem from the 
unequal Atlantic partnership that the Middle East crisis has unbalanced still further.”472  
 
Impact of Differences 
The differences on energy policy, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and then oil crisis caused 
by the oil embargo made the Europeans more aware that the United States was seeking to cut 
its commitments to the European Community. An irreparable rift in the U.S.-European 
partnership emerged when the United States and the European Community took unilateral 
positions during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and had divergent responses to the oil crisis. 
Seemingly, the Americans and the Western Europeans became preoccupied with 
independence and self-interest. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War and then oil crisis obviously put 
the trans-Atlantic partnership under a crucial test. On one side, they indicated how much the 
United States and the European Community was interrelated. On the other, they showed the 
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new recriminations that the Americans and Europeans put forth to each other. They revealed 
the differences in U.S. and European priorities. Though the United States insisted on 
consultations between the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean, the reality showed prior 
consultations between them did not always take place. Also, though the United States 
considered a plan for oil-sharing with the Europeans, the European Community was worried 
that such indication of Atlantic solidarity might harm its relationship with the Arabs and, 
therefore, did not help to alleviate the European Community’s oil shortage. 
The Nixon administration knew that the Atlantic alliance was important and did not 
want to damage the partnership with the European Community. However, it was hard for 
President Nixon and his team to both defend the United States’ national interests and enhance 
the Atlantic solidarity at the same time. It was an uneasy process to reconcile what the United 
States wanted from the European Community and what the Europeans wanted from 
Washington. There were some sharp conflicts of interest: 
It will be difficult to enhance a sense of shared common interest among the 
U.S. and its allies. Various inducements - improved consultations, information 
exchanges, and possibly energy sharing - would help, but would not eliminate 
some sharp conflicts of interest. The allies would still be dependent on Arab 
oil. Conversely attempts to bring the Europeans and Japanese along with the 
U.S. by economic or security threats (e.g., threats to withdraw U.S. troops 
from Europe) would affect different allies differently. But they would be of 
dubious value in getting the allies to support U.S. policy in the Middle East. If 
such threats were used, they could generate reactions causing lasting damage 
to the alliance.473 
 
Though the United States had greater leverage than the European Community in 
dealing with the oil embargo, it did not mean that the Nixon administration could impose 
their stance on the Europeans. The Nixon administration acknowledged that if Western 
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Europe was thrown into a deep recession as a consequence of oil deprivation, it was certain 
that the whole delicate balance of East-West relations would be disrupted.  
In summation, the Americans and the Western Europeans had to adapt to a changing 
world in the 1970s. As the European Community was becoming steadily wealthier and more 
influential, the United States found itself struggling with a relative decline in its politico-
economic power. The Soviets had at last gained parity with the United States in the nuclear 
arms race. The OPEC countries became more prosperous and assertive. These developments 
made it necessary for the United States and the European Community to adjust their policies 
to protect their economic and political interests. On the U.S. side, a more nationalist 
economic policy was carried out and a much harder line in trade negotiations with the 
Western Europeans was adopted. In the political realm, a more pragmatic line was asserted in 
the way the United States dealt with the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the oil crisis regardless of 
Western European interests. On the Western European side, the European Community was 
seeking to advance its economic strength and translated its economic power into effective 
political influence in global affairs. The economic and political disputes between the United 
States and the European Community during the Nixon presidential years indicated the 
downward course in their relations. The process of adaptation to a changing global 
environment was not easy for either side. The European Community was seen, through 
American eyes, as a partial partner. According to Lawrence S. Kaplan, the political disputes 
between the two sides of the Atlantic illustrated the rising distrust of the Nixon administration 
towards the European Community as a reliable political partner.474 This was the moment 
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Though there had been frictions in relations between the European Community and 
the United States. Both sides recognized the need for cooperation. They coexisted 
uncomfortably to defend their basic interests in a changing world. Thus, the leaders of both 
sides still used beautiful words to describe the prospect of the Atlantic alliance and made 
efforts to avoid harming the relationship. The new developments in U.S.-EC relationship 
came at a time when Washington found itself having to adjust to fundamental new realities. 
The world was undergoing profound change. From the U.S. viewpoint, the decisive factor 
was the loss of its hegemonic position in the international arena which it had held following 
the end of the Second World War in 1945. It had encountered a problem it had not confronted 
since then. It was the danger of “global overstretch”.476 The Nixon administration’s biggest 
concern was the relative loss of power. In April 1971, President Nixon was nervously 
wondering whether the United States was going to continue to be a great nation and number 
one.477 
The change in the international political situation and the limit of U.S. power caused 
the Nixon administration to signal the European Community that the United wanted to limit 
the country’s obligations in Europe. This implied that the Europeans had to do more to 
defend themselves physically and could not easily penetrate into the massive U.S. market. 
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Though the United States had strained relations with the European Community during the 
Nixon years, it had no alternative to a policy of coexistence. It had become imperative for 
both the Americans and the Western Europeans to cooperate to overcome the challenges that 
two sides were confronted with. The United States needed to have the European allies to 
contain the Soviet communism while the European Community needed to have the 
Americans to increase its security.478 Furthermore, the economic link between the two sides 
of the Atlantic Ocean was closed, the Americans and the Western Europeans were well aware 
that they needed each other to advance their prosperity. The Nixon administration understood 
that the United States had to maintain its existing alliances. President Nixon reaffirmed that 
the United States would stand by its friends. The European Community realised that it would 
be better for them to be loyal to Washington. Accordingly, the Americans and the Western 
Europeans still lived together though they did not feel comfortable.  
 
The Ties that Bound 
In the Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff 
to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Kissinger, it was clearly indicated 
that the relationship between the United States and the European Community was in 
transition. It suggested a probable U.S.-European trade-off in which the Americans gave 
assurances in the security field while the Europeans tried to alleviate U.S. economic 
problems. The Memorandum stressed that Western Europe’s integration was greatest in the 
economic sphere, where U.S. interests are most often challenged, and least in the political and 
military area, where U.S. interests would best be served by the integration process. The 
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unevenness of development in the two spheres accounted for the ambivalence of the U.S. 
towards the European integration project.  
The stresses of U.S.-European economic and commercial issues intensified tendencies 
on both sides to take narrower positions, which undermined cooperation and cooperative 
arrangements in other fields. The Nixon administration saw that there were various 
interrelationships in U.S.-West European relations. Additionally, these interrelationships 
were asymmetrical with security and military components binding the Americans and 
Western Europeans and many economic and some political elements dividing them. It was 
apparent that the comprehensive relationship with the European Community had to be 
brought into a balance more favourable to the United States. The Nixon administration was 
unable to pursue separate tracks in security, political and economic policies. It was necessary 
for the United States to have cohesion in making its policies and coherence in their 
implementation. 
President Nixon directed that a set of principles governing the U.S. relationship with 
Atlantic partners had to be prepared. These principles had to be designed to serve as the 
foundation for U.S. relations with European Community. The Nixon administration aimed to 
tie its Western European allies to the common principles of the Atlantic nations. Thus, 
President Nixon wanted to; (i) develop a comprehensive framework, within which the 
members of the Alliance would be in pursuant of their economic, political, and security goals, 
and which would establish the fundamental principles pertaining to each element of the 
relationship - political, military and economic; (ii) form the foundation for a new consensus 
on Alliance security requirements and a rational and comprehensible strategy coupled with 
equitable and effective defence contributions to realise their common objectives; (iii) show 
continuing support for European integration; (iv) indicate support for the development of a 
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broad political approach, reciprocity and the endeavour to make mutual compromises in U.S.-
EC economic tie; and (v) maintain existing U.S. commitments in Western Europe.479 
With this set of principles, President Nixon looked forward to major progress in the 
European-American relationship. In his Memorandum to President Nixon, Kissinger 
expressed his satisfaction with the United Kingdom’s sympathy: “The British leaders are in 
strong sympathy with your initiative and are gearing up to support you in the effort to 
establish a new set of guidelines for Atlantic relations that would have significant political 
appeal on both sides of the ocean and would help override the tendency to haggle about 
technical issues.”480 These guidelines would cover all aspects of U.S.-EC relations. The 
Nixon administration aimed to set up a period of genuine creativity in adapting the U.S.-EC 
relationship to new conditions and setting the United States and the European Community on 
a course that would be difficult to reverse by successor governments both in the United States 
and in Western Europe.481 The Nixon administration held that the European Community in 
the 1970s was transforming and evolving to cohesion and greater assertion of independence 
from the United States on fundamental policy issues. All major countries in the European 
Community were aware of the basic politico-economic and diplomatic interests that they 
shared with each other but not with the United States. Yet these countries could not ignore 
the Soviet threat with which they were certainly unable to handle without Washington’s 
cooperation. The Nixon administration knew that the European Community member states 
were seeking to figure out the compromises, new institutional arrangements and defence 
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measures which would give them feasible options for eventually standing alongside their 
protector, the United States, as full equals. Thus, President Nixon had to design a new 
configuration of the U.S. relationship with the European Community. What concerned the 
Nixon administration most in relations with the European Community was how to obtain 
European support for U.S. foreign policy goals and prevent the EC from implementing an 
independent and unfriendly policy towards Washington. Indeed, the Nixon administration 
had to redefine the goals and purposes of the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean so that a 
reasonable degree of harmony and cooperation could be gained during the transitional state of 
the European Community. The Nixon administration placed certain pressures on the Western 
European governments to ensure that, even if the Western Europeans could create the 
political and military power bases which might allow them to take an independent course of 
action in international affairs, they remained subordinate to the United States. 
In the political realm, the Nixon administration was concerned about European 
political integration. Though the formal stance of the United States was promoting European 
political unity, whether or not in the framework of an Atlantic alliance, the Nixon 
administration in fact preferred to see this European political integration process taking place 
in line with U.S. national interests. In the military realm, the Nixon administration believed 
that the U.S. nuclear force and European-based U.S. ground and air forces were crucial 
elements for confronting the Soviet threat. The lack of nuclear muscle made the European 
Community bound to Washington on a wide range of political, military, and security issues. 
In the economic realm, the Nixon administration knew that the European Community had 
interest in developing the non-Communist portion of the world economy. The U.S. unilateral 
action to end the Bretton Wood System on August 15, 1971, taught the Western Europeans a 
lesson on how the European Community’s economy was interwoven with the U.S. economy. 
The U.S. decision of implementing a new economic policy on August 15, 1971, brought 
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home to the Western Europeans the serious consequences of competing with the United 
States and the manifold issues which existed regarding  trade and financial policies. The 
Nixon administration saw this weakness in the European Community’s economy and, thus, 
great efforts were directed by Washington to use Western Europe’s dependence on 
Washington as leverage to reap benefits in the economic area.  
In addition to the ties that the Nixon administration attempted to design to bind the 
European Community, the Nixon administration acknowledged that the United States was 
naturally close to Western Europe and bound to Western Europe by the strategic interests it 
was pursuing. In its re-evaluation of the United States-European Community relationship, the 
Nixon administration stressed that the structure of U.S. relations with Western Europe was 
challenged by a series of developments namely strategic parity, détente, economic problems 
and the EC’s enlargement from six to nine. It also underlined U.S. interests in sustaining their 
relationship with Western Europe. They included; (i) preventing the Soviet control or 
influence from extending westward; (ii) encouraging and supporting Western European 
prosperity and stability to enhance the Allied ability to resist Soviet aggression; (iii) 
preventing a re-emergence of European hostilities and conflicts, towards this end, supporting 
European integration; and (iv) ensuring great U.S. influence on the policies of the countries in 
the European Community.482 
Especially, the Nixon administration asserted, in an increasingly fluid international 
system the United States had a fifth interest in Western Europe: The United States had long 
been so closely committed to Western Europe that any serious decline of U.S. position and 
leadership in Western Europe would negatively affect U.S. diplomatic and strategic standing 
in the global balance. With these five major interests in Western Europe, the Nixon 
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administration considered six alternative frameworks to be envisaged for U.S. relations with 
the European Community: 
1) Atlantic Alliance. Pragmatic adaptation of the existing Atlantic system to 
mitigate, if not resolve, its political-military and political-economic problems, 
and acceptance of the limitations of working within the system to influence 
Western European policies outside of the traditional scope of the Alliance. 
2) Closer Atlantic Ties. Extension of Alliance coordination functionally and/or 
geographically. 
3) U.S. Hegemony. Hard bargaining of the U.S. security commitment to 
Europe against Western European concessions to the U.S. on economic and 
other issues, and undermining the unity of the Nine by playing them off 
against each other. 
4) Devolution. Phased transfer of part of the U.S. security burden to the Allies. 
5) Diminution. Unilateral cutback of U.S. force levels, while retaining basic 
U.S. commitments to Western European security. 
6) Disengagement. U.S. withdrawal of its military presence in Europe, perhaps 
even of its treaty commitment, and dealing with Western European states on 
an ad hoc basis without fixed, prior commitments.483 
 
Having carefully analysed these options in terms of their feasibility and their effect on 
U.S. security, hegemony and economy the following main conclusions were drawn by the 
Nixon administration:  
1) The costs in terms of security and influence of the two alternatives of 
diminution of the U.S. role or of disengagement are too great, and the 
feasibility of the third, hegemony, is too slight to pursue them as realistic 
courses. 
2) The policy most likely to meet our needs would include these elements of 
the other three options: 
a) Adapt the existing Atlantic system by working to solve its specific 
political-security and political-economic problems.  
b) Add to the existing system more intensified consultations with the 
Allies.  
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c) The possibilities of devolution should be urgently studied with the 
aim of arriving at a definite decision whether the U.S. wishes (i) to 
promote devolution, (ii) to be receptive to European proposals to that 
end if any are ever made, or (iii) to resist such a development.484 
 
 In summation, the Nixon administration realised that the Alliance system was the best 
vehicle available for the U.S. pursuit of national interests in common with the European 
Community. Though the Alliance system was not perfect, it could be improved by adaptation 
to ensure that it would function consistently with regard to U.S. interests and the new 
environment. The Nixon administration’s conclusions in framing the U.S. relationship with 
the European Community illustrated that President Nixon and his team were fully conscious 
of how the United States was bound to the European Community. The close interlink 
between the two shores of the Atlantic Ocean was the basis to formulate and implement 
foreign policies together. The Americans and the Western Europeans had to depend on each 
other to achieve their strategic objectives. They were not satisfied with each other’s policies 
or positions but they knew they had to make certain concessions to coexist in the fluid 
international environment. The Nixon administration realised that the United States had 
overextended itself with the global responsibilities it had assumed since 1945 and the costs of 
these international commitments were burdens on the U.S. economy.485 The Nixon 
administration fundamentally distrusted the European Community and its institutions which 
were seen by the Americans as baffling as “Tibetan theocracy”.486 However, the ties that 
bound the Americans and the Europeans led to the conclusion that the Nixon administration 
had to make efforts to improve the relationship with the European Community.  
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Western European Response  
In his address on November 24, 1969, to the Agricultural Committee of the Chambers 
of Commerce of Minneapolis and St. Paul and the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) Club of the Twin Cities, Pierre S. Malve, the Representative for Trade Affairs 
Liaison, Office of the Commission of the European Community in Washington, affirmed, 
“the United States and the Community must cooperate.”487 He added, “The bilateral contacts 
which tend to develop between politicians and officials in the United States and the 
Community should improve their understanding of each other’s different situations and 
points of view.”488 The Europeans, although frustrated with the Nixon administration’s 
foreign policy, had to accept the facts that they could not look inward and needed the United 
States military umbrella for their project of European integration. This was indicated by 
Kissinger in 1968: 
Thoughtful Europeans know that Europe must unite in some form if it is to 
play a major role in the long run. They are aware, too, that Europe does not 
make even approximately the defense efforts of which it is capable. But 
European unity is stymied, and domestic politics has almost everywhere 
dominated security policy. The result is a massive frustration which expresses 
itself in special testiness toward the United States.”489 
 
 The European Community knew that cooperation with the United States was crucial 
to its development. Economic and commercial relations with the United States were causing 
concern to the Western Europeans. They assumed fairly profound misconceptions were 
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current in Washington which had been trying to evaluate the results so far achieved by the 
U.S. policy of supporting European integration and to estimate its impact on economic 
relations between both sides of the Atlantic. According to the European Community, such 
misconceptions led to the tensions between the Americans and the Europeans. The Europeans 
even highlighted certain facts to correct these misconceptions. In February 1970, the 
European Community published a review of economic and trade relations between the United 
States and the Community in which ten main arguments were outlined from the Western 
European perspective to prove that the European Community had been seeking to be a good 
partner of the United States.490 
First, it was suggested that particular attention should be paid to the way the economic 
relationship between the United States and the European Community was developing. In 
general, the European Community had been given favourable conditions during this 
economic development. These conditions compared very favourably not only with the trend 
of relations between the United States and other parts of the world but also to the period prior 
to the establishment of the Community.491 
 Second, along with the confirmation of considerable growth of U.S. exports to the 
European Community, the review illustrated that the European Community lowered its tariff 
levels to create a favourable condition for international trade. This implied that the European 
Community was not inward-looking as the Americans criticized. Furthermore, it pointed out 
that the establishment of the European Community common customs tariff and the reductions 
made on this tariff in the major trade negotiations had given an impetus towards a liberal 
trade policy in the wor1d. Following a series of tariff reductions, the European Community 
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had the lowest tariff among the leading developed countries. The Europeans stressed that they 
should receive credit for that.492 
Third, the European Community was denying that it systematically replaced its tariff 
barriers by non-tariff barriers.493 
Fourth, the European Community indicated that a larger number of U.S. firms had 
found opportunities to expand their activities within the Community. It asserted that the U.S. 
economy gained profit from European integration by substantial growth in trade between the 
United States and the European Community and from a considerable increase in income from 
investments in the European Community which contributed significantly to improving the 
balance of payments in the United States.494 
Fifth, the European Community stressed that it was not implementing a protectionist 
approach in economic and trade relations with the United States. The European Community 
was the world’s largest importer from both developed and developing countries and it had a 
higher foreign trade growth rate than that of the other industrialised countries. With such 
dependence on the world trade, it was in the European Community’s interest not to be 
inward-looking.495 
Sixth, regarding EC tariff preferences for developing countries, the European 
Community underlined that it had a responsibility as the leading importer in the world to 
support the establishment of tariff preferences for exports from the manufacturers and semi-
manufacturers of developing countries. This was a responsibility agreed upon at the first 
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United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964. The Community’s tariff 
preferences would enable the developing countries to overcome competitive disadvantages.496 
Seventh, concerning U.S. criticism for the European Community’s agricultural 
policies, the Western Europeans argued that any in-depth analysis needed to include both a 
product-by-product examination and overall tendencies. The European Community had tried 
to bring surpluses in some sectors, particularly milk and milk products, under control and 
structural reforms in its agricultural area were inevitable. While the European Community 
confirmed that the growth of government expenditure on agriculture was common to every 
country, it high-lighted that the European Community remained the most important importer 
of U.S. agricultural products.497 
Eighth, the European Community realised that the international market for 
agricultural products was more often the scene of price wars between public treasuries than 
between producers. Thus, it called for greater discipline in wor1d agricultural markets.498 
Ninth, the European Community complained about U.S. measures to protect its 
agriculture which were affecting the Community. Furthermore, that Washington had 
abandoned the broadly liberal policy pursued by the United States since the end of the 
Second World War and returned to restrictive practices would lead to the beginning of a 
chain reaction detrimental to the development of the world trade.499 
Tenth, it was reaffirmed that cooperation between the United States and the European 
Community was a necessity for the future expansion of international economic relations. 
Close cooperation between the Western Europeans and the Americans would ensure the 
 





- 244 - 
 
continuity of liberal trade policy which promoted world trade considerably and, thus, the 
expansion of prosperity all over the world.500  
From the main points in this review it can be said that the European Community 
understood that the Western Europeans had to sustain U.S. interest in international affairs in 
order to maintain the Community’s welfare and security. The European Community had to 
show that an economically strong and united Western Europe would not create awkward 
cases of competition for the United States. Thus, following U.S. complaints of damaging 
Western European economic confrontations and uncooperative foreign policy in the Middle 
East crisis and oil crisis, the European Community demonstrated that it had been seeking to 
both solve its own internal problems and fulfil its regional and global responsibilities. It also 
indicated its willingness to cooperate with the United States for the common good of the 
alliance. The Western Europeans acknowledged that its internal integration process had only 
been achieved with U.S. support, thus, it had not resisted U.S. authority in the world affairs. 
In other words, the European Community wanted to show that the Western Europeans and 
Americans could cooperate for their common good and avoid confrontations which might 
hurt both sides. 
This viewpoint was clearly stated in the address “New opportunities or challenges in 
the European Communities” given by Guy VanHaeverbeke, Deputy Director of European 
Communities Information Service, in Washington at the Twenty-third annual Virginia 
conference on world trade: “Europeans realized today that it will not be possible for them to 
define their relations towards each other without also defining their relations towards the rest 
of the world.”501 He also outlined two challenges facing the European Community. Firstly, 
that the “Construction of European unity must continue internally to progress in all the 
 
                                                          
500 Ibid. 
501 Guy Vanhaeverbeke 21 October 1971, New Opportunities or Challenges in the European Communities, 
viewed October 14, 2014, <http://aei.pitt.edu/13800/1/S104.pdf>. 
- 245 - 
 
economic and political areas.”502 Implicitly, the Europeans knew that further progress in 
economic integration was dependent on progress in monetary fields. Also, monetary progress 
was associated with progress in political unity which could not be achieved without a 
minimum of consensus on questions of defence. Secondly, that European integration resulted 
in a positive contribution to trade with industrialized countries, economic and political take-
off in developing countries and to a détente with the Eastern bloc.503  
To sum up, the Western European response to U.S. policy changes towards the 
European Community indicated the EC had no intention to become rivals to the United 
States. The Western Europeans acknowledged that close political and commercial relations 
between the two shores of the Atlantic were important for the prosperity of both world trade 
and the standard of living for all nations.504 
The relationship between the United States and the European Community was at a 
turning  point in the sense that they had to adapt to a totally new  environment resulting either 
from changes taking place in the international community, or from the complications and 
characteristics of their own developments. Yet the European Community maintained that it 
would be unfavourable for the future of United States-European Community relationship if 
the Western Europeans were preoccupied with successfully achieving its goal of enlargement 
and were reluctant to assume global responsibilities. Also, the European Community held that 
it would be disappointing if the United States, which was defining its new world strategy and 
concerned about its internal politico-economic activities, was preoccupied only by its own 
national interests in the formulation of economic foreign policy. Alarmed by the deteriorating 
climate of economic and trade relations between the United States and Europe, the European 
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Community stressed that it was necessary to search constantly for favourable grounds and 
effective instruments for renewed cooperation. Such an attempt required efforts from both 
sides. Events during the Nixon administration indicated how important and urgent it was for 
both the United States and the European Community to establish conditions for authentic 
dialogue in order to reach new levels of cooperation. Government leaders, the principal 
spokespeople regarding economic and social forces, had especially heavy responsibilities for 
establishing a new cooperation which would lead to the development of fruitful economic 
and trade relations between the United States and the enlarged European Community in a 
rapidly changing world. This new cooperation would allow the Europeans and the Americans 
to think of themselves as partners or allies across the Atlantic. An attitude of working 
together towards common goals was preferred to either side being seen to manipulate the 
other as the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Secretary 
General of the Council of the European Union, Javier Solana, observed, “Most of us would 
prefer to be considered an ‘ally’ or a ‘partner’ rather than a tool.505  
 
The United States-European Community Relations: An Assessment 
That the Nixon administration reconsidered the traditional policy of U.S. support for 
European integration in light of political and economic difficulties was, as Youri Devuys 
asserted, “detrimental to rather than conducive of harmonious transatlantic relations.”506 The 
Nixon administration was accused of forming its policy based on self-interest, largely for 
domestic reasons, and thus ignoring the wider demands of the Western European unity.507 
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U.S. economic concerns and new foreign policy priorities led the Nixon administration to 
enact policies which challenged the European Community’s economic and security 
concerns.508 This led to friction between Western European countries and the United States 
over foreign policy. As an example, tensions occurred during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War 
when Washington supported Israel while many European countries were hesitant to do so. 
Understandably, the European Community depended upon the oil supply from Middle East 
more than the United States did.  
As noted by K. Kaiser in 1974, no Atlantic solidarity could erase the fact that Western 
Europe heavily depended on Arab oil and could not survive without it while the United States 
was able to do so with only some difficulty at present and with less difficulty moving 
forward.509 In addition, the core states of Western Europe, France, the United Kingdom, and 
West Germany had strong economic relations with the Arab countries.510 As the war and the 
energy issues were closely linked with both security and economic prosperity, the Western 
European policy stance on the Middle East was to call on Israel to withdraw from Arab lands 
occupied in 1967.  
Western Europe urged the United States, the only nation that could put leverage on 
Israel, to press the Israelis to reach a settlement with its neighbours. However, Nixon and 
Kissinger saw the conflict as an extension of the Cold War and “was angered at the attempts 
of the Europeans to negotiate a diplomatic modus vivendi with the Arab oil-producing 
states.”511 The United States strongly criticised Western Europe’s refusal to assist Israel in the 
1973 war, the cause of the OPEC oil embargo.  
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U.S.-European differences regarding political and economic issue-areas led to the 
European Community developing a more complicated process of cooperation with the goal of 
resisting pressure to fall in line with U.S. expectations. The Declaration on European Identity 
signed in Copenhagen by the nine member states in 1973, was considered to be the first step 
towards a tentative common European foreign policy. It called on the members of the 
European Community to make the best use of the European Political Cooperation, created in 
1970, to guarantee that foreign policy would be coordinated among member states. In other 
words, the European Community realized the strength of a collective voice in relations with 
the United States. Meanwhile, the Nixon administration still preferred bilateral relations with 
Western European states because Nixon and Kissinger saw the potential challenge to the 
United States when Western Europe exerted its collective assertiveness in political and 
economic issues.  
The United States persuaded Western Europe to agree to a clause in the new Atlantic 
Declaration, signed in June 1974, stipulating that Washington would be consulted before the 
European Community made any significant decisions which could have influence on 
transatlantic issues. In practice, however, allied relations remained strained. Western 
Europe’s confidence in the United States was shaken when enthusiasm among U.S. policy-
makers for European economic and political integration appeared to wane. Nixon’s political 
and economic policies had such a bad effect on transatlantic relations that this period was 
referred to as a dark age in the history of the diplomatic ties between the United States and 
Western Europe: “The age of U.S. patience and benevolence with regard to European 
integration and European economic competition had come to an abrupt end.”512 Indeed, as M. 
Smith points out, in the Nixon Administration the Atlantic Alliance experienced a period of 
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disengagement and drift, “one in which some of the illusions of the previous twenty years 
were to be shattered.”513 Transatlantic relations became increasingly difficult and this 
included relations within NATO.  
On one hand, Western Europe had recorded great achievements in economic growth 
and was in the midst of the long journey towards deeper integration. With assistance from the 
U.S. and enormous efforts made by the governments of Western Europe, the region was 
reconstructed and became self-sufficient. Despite having successfully built an economic 
powerbase, one area where Western Europe still relied on the United States was in the matter 
of security. On the other hand, the relative economic decline in the United States combined 
with détente with the Soviet Union and China, and the accompanying perception of a 
receding military threat from the Warsaw Pact, definitively contributed to undermining the 
Nixon Administration’s commitments to the European continent and, to some extent, to 
NATO. The Nixon administration, therefore, became increasingly sceptical about the benefits 
of America’s overriding contribution in NATO. In other words, the problem of burden-
sharing emerged in the relations among the United States and other countries in NATO. 
Nixon and Kissinger believed that in order to get Western Europe to contribute more 
to the budget of NATO two conditions needed to be met. Western Europe had to “develop its 
own perception of international relations” and be aware that the United States could not “pick 
up the tab alone any longer.”514  
According to historian Kenneth Weisbrode, Nixon and Kissinger saw the importance 
of the alliance and they believed it to be indeed essential, however “only as leverage against 
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the Soviets and to keep the Europeans compliant.”515 Western European leaders also saw the 
value of the Alliance as “the last measure of the U.S. strategic commitment to Western 
Europe” and they did worry about the possibility that the United States might withdraw 
troops from the region in reaction to domestic issues.516 Since the inception of NATO, the 
United States had contributed more than their fair share of the NATO budget and, thus, 
dominated the organization. President Nixon, in many of his speeches, talked about schedules 
for changing that situation. The Allies would take their fair share of the burden and in return 
they could have a bigger say within the alliance. However, Western Europe showed their 
unwillingness to share the burden fairly with the United States. 
On February 23, 1969, Nixon made a wide sweeping trip to Western Europe. The 
Belgian leaders shared with the Nixon Administration their view that in order for détente to 
take place, NATO had to be strong. However, they also informed Nixon about the minimal 
possibility of an increase in Belgium’s defence efforts in NATO. In Kissinger’s words, the 
Belgians “pleaded for a continued substantial U.S. troop presence in Europe.”517 On February 
24, 1969, President Nixon gave a speech in front of the North Atlantic Council and 
underlined that, with the appropriate preparation, the United States was willing to have 
negotiations with the Europeans on various issues and the United States also tried to enhance 
the alliance. It was noticeable that all the ambassadors present at the meeting stayed away 
from the issue of the European nations increasing their military effort for the organization 
while at the same time agreeing on the need for a strong U.S. presence on the continent. 
Explicitly, Western Europe was not prepared and unwilling to increase their share of the 
burden as the United States expected. 
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The burden-sharing issue became pressing in the late 1960s and early 1970s when the 
Nixon administration perceived the relative U.S. economic decline. Washington planned to 
look after its domestic economic and political interests much more so than before. It was no 
longer willing to accept unilateral disadvantages in the hope of achieving vaguely defined 
benefits in the long run.518 The economic and social challenges faced by the United States in 
the Nixon era saw the United States press the European member states of NATO harder on 
burden-sharing. Seemingly, the United States wanted to disengage from Western Europe and 
focus more attention on domestic issues. The United States considered reducing its military 
presence abroad as one of the solutions to the problem of the balance of payments and to the 
unfair burden sharing in NATO. Yet, Western Europe did not want to sacrifice their socio-
economic achievements in order to be able to narrow the huge military capability gap existing 
between the continent and the United States. Consequentially, the burden-sharing dispute 
between the United States and Western Europe emerged and strained the alliance:  
Kissinger’s proposal [for an equal share of the military burden] ... was 
destined to exert a profound influence on Western Political thinking, even 
though doomed to fall short of detailed implementation. At bottom it seemed 
to involve another application of the celebrated Nixon-Kissinger theory of 
‘linkage’ whereby any connections made by one party in one area should be 
matched by other concessions made by other parties in other areas. What the 
Presidential assistant appeared to be saying in simplest terms, was that the 
United States would continue to be helpful in Europe’s defence if Europe, on 
its side, would be more helpful to the United States in economic and 
diplomatic matters. A ‘revitalized Atlantic Partnership’ ... would evidently 
require some considerable revision of European attitudes in the direction of a 
greater ‘spirit of reciprocity’.519 
 
In summary, the relationship between the United States and the European Community 
between 1969 and 1974 undertook a downward course. It is noted that Washington needed 
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the EC as Brussels needed the United States. Disputes in economic and political areas 
emerged as the Washington and EC had implemented policies unfavourable to each other. 
They accused each other of protectionist policies which adversely affected their own 
economies. They had divergent views and responses to the 1973 Arab-Israel war and the 
consequential oil crisis. These economic and political frictions soured relations between the 
two sides but it did not mean that the Europeans and the Americans could no longer 
cooperate with each other. They were actually so interdependent that those quarrels on 
economic and political areas could not break their relationship. The United States and the EC 
had to coexist because they were fully aware that both their interests would be jeopardized if 
they did not reduce tensions between themselves or if the other side were severely weakened 
in the world stage. Though the Nixon administration focused much on burden-sharing in the 
Atlantic alliance, while the European partners were not going to meet Washington’s 
expectations, the United States nonetheless remained an active and influential partner in the 
partnership. It again illustrated that despite the U.S. great role in security, stability and 
prosperity of the European Community, something the Europeans clearly understood, it could 
not always force the European Community to do what it wanted. The United States had to 
shoulder substantial cost to sustain the Atlantic alliance and nurture the relations between the 
Americans and the Europeans. The United States however, as Kissinger said, could no longer 
lift up the tap by itself. Furthermore, the United States could no longer live in isolation, it 
needed Western Europe if it were to sustain its hegemony.  
The United States and the European Community experienced a low point in their 
relations during the Nixon presidential years. This had negatively affected the European 
integration process. Yet the Europeans remained optimistic about the future of the European 
integration process, as Jean Monnet once underscored: 
The roots of the Community are strong now, and deep in the soil of Europe. 
They have survived some hard seasons, and can survive more. On the surface, 
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appearances change. In a quarter century, naturally, new generations arise. 
With new ambitions, images of the past disappear; the balance of the world is 
altered. Yet amid this changing scenery the European idea goes on; and no one 
seeing it, and seeing how stable the Community institutions are, can doubt that 
this is a deep and powerful movement on an historic scale.520  
 
Conclusion 
Between late 1969 and 1974, it was apparent that the “American Century” no longer 
promised outright American hegemony. That thriving economic partners had emerged from 
the ashes of the Second World War was a normal course of events. Yet, President Nixon 
knew that the changes in the global economic and political landscape meant that his nation 
had to change as well. The Nixon administration sought to correct the worsening economic 
imbalances that negatively affected U.S. leadership and prestige among its allies. The United 
States turned to the EC for aide in its efforts to sustain U.S. power. However, the Nixon 
administration soon realised that its Western European allies after outstanding economic 
performance in the first two decades of the post-war era had become very economically 
competitive and politically assertive. Thus, President Nixon was determined to integrate trade 
with domestic concerns and strategic foreign policy to protect U.S. national interests. This led 
to growing differences between the United States and the European Community in economic 
and political realms. Ultimately, the two sides distrusted each other and their tensions were 
increasing. Yet the Americans and the Western Europeans could not deny their economic and 
political interdependence. It was of strategic importance for them to foster their cooperation 
and coordination. As Kissinger strongly asserted, the United States-European Community 
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alliance had to be “sustained by the hearts as well as the minds of its members.”521 An uneasy 
partnership and uncomfortable cooperation was what each side of the Atlantic both might 
perceive and need to endure during the Nixon presidential years. President Nixon’s linkage of 
trade and diplomacy, economics and politics, in dealing with the European Community’s 
economic competition and political assertiveness deteriorated United States-European 
Community relations.  
Importantly, the deterioration of the United States-European Community relations 
during the Nixon presidential years did not imply U.S. discontinuation of support for 
European prosperity and unity. The Nixon administration still made it clear to the European 
governments that “We do not seek to dominate Europe; on the contrary we want a strong 
Europe.”522 Europe was strong only when it was united. However, such deterioration of the 
United States-European Community relations did demonstrate that traditional friends might 
become foes during certain periods of time in the history of their relationship. The United 
States would not let other nations, even its presumably old and close friends, begin cutting 
into its hegemony. Hence, the relationship between the United States and the European 
Community was characterized by confrontation and cooperation. It should be noted that 
friction outweighed friendliness during this period, thus, the late 1960s and early 1970s 
witnessed a downward course in the Washington-Brussels relationship. It could also be 
concluded that Richard Nixon had not been such a big supporter of European integration 
process. He had followed the line that most U.S. presidents before him had taken, and that 
most would after him, a line of mixed blessings, a line of cooperation and confrontation. 
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Chapter 6 
U.S. Policy towards European Integration, 1969-1974:  Continuing Patterns 
It’s time we began paying Europe more attention. 
 
President Nixon, December 1968 - January 1969 
 
This President believes that our relations with Western Europe are of overriding importance 
because they are our oldest and closest allies and also because a stable world is 
inconceivable without a European contribution. The post-war alliance relationship which the 
U.S. helped build and sustain for 25 years is our greatest achievement in foreign affairs. 
 
Henry Kissinger, May 13, 1971 
 
Introduction 
Although the Nixon administration did shift its diplomatic focus to China and the 
Soviet Union, it did not mean that President Nixon downplayed its relations with Western 
Europe and opposed further attempts by the Europeans to strengthen and expand the 
European Community. His aim was a foreign policy that advocated the greater self-reliance 
of allies. The United States continued its commitment to the security umbrella in Western 
Europe and still played an important part in the first enlargement of the European Community 
in 1973. Hence, this chapter will look at the Nixon administration’s efforts to oppose the 
proposal by Congress for reducing U.S. military expenditure and troop levels in Europe and 
to cement the Atlantic partnership before examining U.S. support for British entry into the 
European Community. Then, it will argue that the U.S.-EC alliance was necessary for both 
Washington and the Western European capitals. It was also necessary for world stability. The 
main questions for the United States and the European Community were how to balance their 
mutual economic and strategic interests and how the United States and Western European 
policy-makers should coordinate and act. As it was apparent that economic and strategic 
interests were closely intertwined and substantially impacted each other, the Nixon 
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administration could not treat them separately. It will be concluded that the Nixon 
administration did not discontinue traditional support for European integration and the 
partnership between the United States and the European Community remained intimate, yet 
troubled. 
 
Committed to Keeping U.S. Commitments  
 
U.S. military commitment in Western Europe had been a matter of concern between 
U.S. administrations and Congress. There had been always disputes between them on this 
matter as U.S. administrations wanted to expand the commitment while U.S. Congress sought 
to tighten the budget. In a 1949 hearing held by the U.S. Congress on NATO Iowa Senator, 
Bourke B. Hickenlooper, asked Secretary of State Dean Acheson a direct question about the 
Truman administration’s plans for defending Western Europe: “Are we going to be expected 
to send substantial numbers of troops over there as a more or less permanent contribution to 
the development of these countries’ capacity to resist?” Acheson replied very simply: “The 
answer to that question, Senator, is a clear and absolute NO!”523 
Twenty years later, in 1969, the Nixon administration would have responded in the 
same way. This response would not mean an end to U.S. commitment to the defence of 
Western Europe. President Nixon and his administration had determined that it was essential 
to deploy a substantial number of U.S. troops in Western Europe, principally in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. From 1969 to 1974, the number of U.S. forces (including army 
personnel and air forces) in FRG was almost unchanged, a rough a total of 252,000 soldiers 
(see Appendix 9). 
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In the Nixon presidential years, Washington’s concentration on détente with the 
Soviet Union, rapprochement with China and ending the Vietnam War resulted in the Nixon 
administration spending less time on the European Community. Yet this did not imply that 
the United States was progressively disengaging from Western Europe. President Nixon held 
that the success of U.S. hegemony required U.S. leaders to guarantee Europe peace and 
prosperity. The stability of Western Europe and the ongoing economic and political 
integration process in this part of the world remained a key aspect on the U.S. foreign policy 
agenda. Furthermore, given the reality of the Cold War, the Nixon administration had no 
choice but to continue its commitment to defend Europe. The Nixon administration’s efforts 
and strategies to maintain solidarity in the Atlantic alliance, as well as oppose Congressional 
pressure to cut the budget for defence and U.S. troop levels in Europe, were strong evidence 
of U.S. support for the European Community. 
President Nixon acknowledged that there was nothing more important in the second 
half of the twentieth century than allies. Henceforth, despite economic conflicts and the high 
costs of maintaining the alliance with the European Community, the Nixon administration 
had sought to support economic and political integration in Western Europe, a process the 
U.S. viewed as able to help tie Western European countries closely and transform the region 
into a strong partner of the United States. Undeniably, the Nixon administration was 
dissatisfied with its Western European allies when they adopted trading policies deemed 
disadvantageous by the U.S. and were actively or passively unhelpful during the oil crisis. 
The Nixon administration was clearly unhappy about Western European assertiveness 
towards both political and economic issues. This dissatisfaction was exposed and accentuated 
during the Nixon presidential time. Accordingly, ambivalence about a strong and reliable 
partner on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean was increasing. However, Western Europe 
could not expand its economy and develop its political role in the international affairs when it 
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was almost powerless in the face of the Soviet Union threat and strength. U.S. uneasiness 
with potential communist expansion into Western Europe led the Nixon administration to 
accept certain costs of sustaining alliance with Western Europe and promote the integration 
process in the region. This meant that the Nixon administration did not discontinue U.S. 
substantial military presence in Western Europe. Simply put, the Nixon administration 
understood it needed to reconfirm the traditional U.S. commitment to support European 
integration.524 Provision of a military shield for the European Community was prioritized in 
Nixon’s policy on European integration. This view was reflected in National Security 
Decision Memorandum 95 in which President Nixon directed that: 
that the size and structure of U.S. ground, air, and naval forces maintained in 
support of NATO commitments, both in Europe and elsewhere, should be 
consistent with the strategy of initial conventional defense for a period of 90 
days against a full-scale Warsaw Pact attack assuming a period of warning and 
mobilization by both sides. This strategy shall apply to all aspects of U.S. 
force and resource planning.525 
 
This particularly meant that the U.S. military posture regarding NATO had to be maintained 
and enhanced in order to improve the fighting capacity of U.S. forces in Europe. Following 
this overall outlook, President Nixon directed that “the end [of fiscal year] 71 authorized 
level of U.S. forces in Western Europe (319,000) shall be maintained and the actual strength 
of these forces kept as close to this level as possible. Any proposed changes to this level 
should be referred to the President for his consideration.”526 
The Nixon administration saw that NATO was vital to sustain U.S. leadership in 
Europe and concerned that any unilateral withdrawing of substantial U.S. forces as the U.S. 
 
                                                          
524 Knudsen CL & Rasmussen M, 2009, The Road to a United Europe: Interpretations of the Process of European 
Integration, Peter Lang, Belgium, p.74. 
525 National Security Decision Memorandum 95, FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe, NATO, 1969-
1972, Document 54, viewed on May 19, 2015, < http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-
76v41/d54>. 
526 Ibid. 
- 259 - 
 
Congress had been pressing for would weaken the U.S. position in that part of the globe. Fred 
Bergsten, NSC staff, queried, “What would be the signal to the Soviets if we were to do so? It 
could only be that the U.S. had become so pitifully weak on the economic and financial front 
that we could no longer make any pretense of maintaining our defense posture around the 
world.”527 This was echoed by Kissinger in a memorandum to President Nixon:  
the very threat of U.S. troop reductions would bring about a greater defense 
effort by the united Europeans themselves. In actual fact, … Europe - though 
united it would be a Great Power - is not yet united, and Italians, Germans, 
Frenchmen, Beneluxers, and Scandinavians think of themselves as small, in 
terms of military strength, and in need of protection by the only super power 
that happens to exist in the non-Communist world: the U.S. When big brother 
even appears to falter, the little brethren will not move forward courageously - 
as we seem to think - but, on the contrary, they will anxiously take several 
steps backwards.528 
 
Kissinger subscribed to the view that U.S. military commitment in Europe was 
essential not only to prevent the Soviet expansion but also to ensure stability in Europe. The 
Nixon administration pointed out the need to control Germany, which was implementing 
Neue Ostpolitik (new eastern policy) with the German Democratic Republic, as another 
reason for maintaining U.S. military presence in Europe.529 
Committing to defending Western Europe, from the viewpoint of the Nixon 
administration, created leverage in their relationship with an economically growing European 
Community. Kissinger conveyed this view in his talk with German politician, Franz-Josef 
Strauss: “You simply cannot expect the U.S. to defend an economic competitor. … You 
 
                                                          
527 Information Memo to Kissinger, December 3, 1970, in FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. III, pp. 119- 120. 
528 Memorandum from Henry Kissinger to President Nixon, FRUS, 1969 -1976, Vol. I, viewed on May 15, 2015, 
<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01>. 
529 National Security Studies Memorandum 83: A Longer Term Perspective on Key Issues of European Security, 
November 1969, Senior Review Group Meetings, Institutional Meeting Files, Nixon Presidential Materials. 
- 260 - 
 
simply cannot expect this to go on indefinitely.”530 Yet the leverage that the Nixon 
administration mentioned as one of the reasons for strengthening U.S. forces in Europe was 
not convincing to soft realists, as Senator Mansfield put forth in a meeting with Kissinger and 
West Germany Chancellor Willy Brandt: “The fear of Germany is simply not plausible 
today.”531 
In the first years of the Nixon administration, President Nixon had concluded that 
U.S. forces had to be reduced and cheaper means employed to maintain U.S. influence in 
Europe. The implementation of the REDCOSTE program, negotiations of off-set agreements 
with FRG and calls for burden-sharing in NATO reflected this outlook. However, it should be 
noted that the Nixon administration maintained that it was vital for the United States not to 
reduce U.S. forces as substantially as the U.S. Congress requested. That the Nixon 
administration asserted its position in dealing with Congress regarding U.S. force levels in 
Europe also demonstrated that President Nixon wanted to make U.S. foreign policy at the 
White House. He wanted to make limited reductions of U.S. forces in Europe and this needed 
to be done incrementally not at once as Congress wanted. This was underlined at a meeting 
with Republican congressional leaders in February 1970: “Again to the Mansfield Resolution 
to bring home troops from Europe, if they pass the resolution to bring home two divisions, 
said the President, it would have a detrimental impact. We may do it ourselves, but we have 
to do it our way.”532 The Nixon administration held that the strongest foundation for U.S. 
military presence in Europe and U.S. contribution to NATO was the U.S. national interest. 
The Mansfield Resolutions were a difficult problem President Nixon conceded, “but if the 
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U.S. were to withdraw now under the pressure of this resolution, the whole thing (NATO) 
would unravel. On the other hand, we do have a new attitude. And we must remember we are 
there in Europe not to defend Germany or Italy or France or England, we are in Europe to 
save our own hides.”533 
In May 1971, when an amendment to the Military Selective Service Act calling for 
the administration to cut forces in Europe by 50 percent as of the end of the year was 
proposed by Senator Mansfield the Nixon administration tried its best to prevent Congress 
from passing the amendment. President Nixon considered this to be a great challenge and 
organized a lobbying campaign which received support from 24 ex-officials including senior 
diplomatic Acheson and former presidents Truman and Johnson.534 The serious efforts made 
by the Nixon administration was described by Max Frankel in his article, “Fight Over 
Mansfield Plan Viewed as One Battle in a Wider War”, as follows, “President Nixon 
appeared today to be subduing the Senate rebels who want to cut the American Army in 
Europe by half this year.”535  
In their telephone conversation on Wednesday May 12, 1971, both Secretary of State 
William Rogers and President Nixon were very much concerned about Mansfield’s proposal 
for withdrawing half the U.S. forces from Europe. With the view that the world situation was 
fundamentally changing, President Nixon asserted that Mansfield’s insistence on reducing 
troops in Western Europe would be detrimental to U.S. national interests and destabilizing to 
the world. Thus, President Nixon and Secretary of State Rogers agreed that there would not 
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be any compromise on the U.S. military presence in Western Europe and they would not let 
the Senator win.  
President Nixon: He's the most decent guy up there. And therefore I think the 
real thrust that you ought to take is that we--”I think I'd sort of say this: Look, 
as he knows, the President feels very appreciative of the fact that despite 
differences, we've kept it on the right basis. That in this case, I've got to--”that 
you want him know we've just got to fight for this, because you're going to 
NATO. We've got our whole foreign policy at stake. We've got to. It will not 
be personal. We feel that we have to do it, because it's a matter of the highest 
foreign policy deal. Sort of along those lines. And then let him to come to any 
conclusion he wants. 
Rogers: Right. Right.536 
 
President Nixon wanted Rogers to make Mansfield understand that he was in a real 
fight with the administration on the issue of reducing U.S. troops in Western Europe. The 
Nixon administration took a hard line on this. President Nixon decided to go all out on U.S. 
Congressional pressures for reducing U.S. military commitment in Western Europe. 
Mansfield had sought to cut down on U.S military spending, not only on an economic but 
also a political basis, as Rogers put it: “He had a Democratic caucus on it.” President Nixon 
had to take this into consideration. Reducing military expenditure overseas was put forth 
because it helped to save the U.S. economy from losing dollars and helped improve U.S. 
domestic politics as well.  
Nixon: Democratic caucus. Yeah, yeah. After all, when you think of how very 
nice we were on the Marshall Plan and NATO and all that. Hell, when we 
controlled the play. 
Rogers: Right. 
Nixon: Well, all right. It's all right, he's been all right. I personally think this: I 
think he's going to go on this in any event. I think it's a matter of principle 
with him. He believes it. See, the Mansfield Amendment came up, I 
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remember, even in '66, when I was out of office, he put up that damned 
amendment. He only got about--”he always got 25 to 30 votes in the Senate.537 
 
Mansfield had managed to get 38 to 40 votes in the Senate for supporting a cut down 
on U.S. military expenditure. He might have managed to get up to 44 votes, however, as 
President Nixon decreed, “But he will lose.” President Nixon argued that he had no choice on 
this matter, as he put it, “I’d simply say there just really isn't any way we can,”538 Basically, 
the United States needed to maintain a strong military posture in Europe not only to protect 
the Europeans but also to ensure the détente with the Soviet Union would be successful. 
Furthermore, the issue of U.S. troop deployment in Western Europe had to be negotiated with 
the United States’ allies and enemies, as President Nixon explained, his administration could 
not do so on the U.S. Congress floor.539 He added: 
Nixon: And it's-- if there was, I mean, we say that about ABM [antiballistic 
missiles]. God, it's ten times as true here. 
Rogers: Well, not only that, Mr. President, but we're making progress with the 
Soviet Union. They've agreed now to talk about Mutual and Balanced Force 
Reductions. 
Nixon: Well, not only are we making progress with them, but I think we 
should also say that in NATO we're making progress. They're upgrading their 
forces. 
Rogers: Right. 
Nixon: You know, we're talking about our numbers. But it's going to take 
some time. But it's a matter--”here is one matter where our goal is the same 
but we simply have to negotiate with our allies and with our opponents, and 
we can't have our negotiating card taken away from us by the Senate.540 
 
That the Nixon administration manoeuvred to rule out “any compromise in its fight to 
defeat a Senate move to halve American troop strength in Western Europe” indicated the 
 





- 264 - 
 
strong commitment by the U.S. to the defence of the European Community.541 This 
commitment was vital not only to the national interest of the United States but also to the 
development of the European Community and the success of the European integration 
process.  
In a March 16, 1973, National Security Study Memorandum to the Secretary of State, 
the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence on the U.S. military mission 
involving naval forces, President Nixon gave a clear instruction for assessing U.S. capability 
to support existing strategy in Europe against the challenge posed by the Soviet Union’s 
navy. The aims of the study included; (i) considering the present military and diplomatic 
importance of the Soviet naval threat and projecting future developments; (ii) evaluating the 
future capacity of currently planned U.S. forces to conduct missions involving naval forces; 
and (iii) considering the diplomatic value of the presence of U.S. naval force and ways of 
employing naval forces to enhance U.S. negotiating positions.542 
This directive of President Nixon was in accordance with what he had emphasized in 
the Meeting of the Senate Appropriations Committee with Senator Milton Young and Senator 
John McClellan on March 8, 1973: “if we cut our defense budget, Brezhnev is likely to roll 
over me. We have got to have that threat in our hands.”543 The prospect of the Soviet Union’s 
expansion into the Western European region, the U.S. sphere of influence, was unacceptable 
to President Nixon. He insisted on maintaining U.S. troop levels in Western Europe and this 
meant that there could not be a cut down on military expenditure as constantly requested by 
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Congress. If Congress decided to cut the defence budget unilaterally, President Nixon 
asserted, the United States would certainly be in deep trouble.544  
  On March 20, 1973, in a conversation with Republican Congressional Leaders, 
President Nixon made his argument clear: 
The argument that you’re going to hear is to take it out of Defense. At this 
point, you’ll have the argument that, first, we can cut it out of Defense and 
particularly since we are going to have - which we are - very significant arms 
talks with the Russians sometime this year. But I can assure you that in the 
event that the Congress, before those talks, cuts the Defense budget, or refuses 
to approve those items we have asked for, I will not be able to negotiate an 
arms settlement. In other words, ironically, those who are for disarmament and 
who think they are voting for it by unilaterally cutting armaments will be 
torpedoing the best chance this country’s ever had to have a real arms 
limitation. That’s what it is. And those who vote for, and what we have asked 
for in arms, will give us the chips that we need to negotiate with the Russians 
to stop their build up. Look, what is the danger in the world today and 
tomorrow? Does the United States threaten anybody? Not at all. But you look 
what the Russians are doing, their big SS–9s.2 Most of those things are 
MIRV’d. We are going to have a threat such as—It may not frighten us, but it 
will certainly, completely demoralize our allies in Europe.545 
  
For President Nixon, cutting the budget for military expenditure and the U.S. 
contribution to NATO would damage negotiations the United States had in its relations with 
the European Community and in détente with the Soviet Union. Among those negotiations 
was the chance for the limitation of arms on permanent basis which implicitly increased 
security and stability in Europe: 
Now, you take the - you take the European troop thing. I noticed [Senator] 
Herman Talmadge, a very strong man, a good national defense man, coming 
out and saying we should take maybe a 100,000 of our 300,000 out of Europe. 
Sure we should. We should take them all back. Why shouldn’t these 
Europeans defend themselves? They’re rich enough. It’s their Europe, et 
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cetera, et cetera. Why are we there? You can make those arguments. I could 
do it. All of us on Defense, you fellows have done about as good as the other 
side anymore, but more responsible. 
     But why won’t you do it now? The reason is that in the fall we are going to 
have some very important negotiations with the Warsaw Pact countries, 




Now, if the Congress before that says, “Oh, we’re going to reduce our forces 
by 200,000,” what does that mean? All incentive they have to reduce theirs is 
lost and you increase the threat of war. But more important, you increase the 
threat of blackmail on their part of their weaker Europeans. You destroy the 
balance.547 
 
President Nixon held that Washington should take responsibility for defence of the 
weaker Europeans as this was in U.S. interests. Negotiating a mutual arms reduction with the 
Soviet would help to reduce U.S. expenditure on an arm race and, thus, tensions between 
NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. This would eventually result in a more secure Europe in 
which Europeans could be somehow free from military threats and focus their resources on 
economic development. A common market in Europe, stable and thriving, would certainly be 
what the Nixon administration desired to see. This was threatened to be adversely affected by 
the Congressional request to bring U.S. troops in Europe home and to reduce the budget on 
military expenditure. As a president with a strong belief in the balance of power, the crucial 
component of realism, Richard Nixon would not allow the balance to be destroyed.548 
At the same time, the Nixon administration had sought to solidify cohesion in NATO. 
At the Fifty-first Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held in Copenhagen from 
June 14-15, 1973, the United States reiterated its pledge to maintain and improve U.S. forces 
 




- 267 - 
 
in Europe and not to reduce U.S. troop levels. Secretary of State William Rogers affirmed 
that it was more significant than ever that the North Atlantic alliance maintained its strength 
and solidarity and that the alliance was not misled by any euphoria about détente with the 
Soviet Union. From the Nixon administration’s viewpoint, this could be seen as the most 
successful NATO Ministerial in years.549 
President Nixon’s efforts to build up the cohesion and strength of the Atlantic 
Alliance was based on the argument that a close and vigorous relationship between 
Washington and other capitals in Western Europe remained vital to the security and 
prosperity of all of NATO member states during a period of profound changes in not only in 
the Atlantic Community but also in the world: “it is vital that we strengthen, not weaken, the 
alliance. Europe is still the geopolitical target of the Kremlin.”550 
Collective defence had a crucial role to play in the Atlantic alliance. It was the special 
glue binding the NATO member states. Thus, like previous administrations, the Nixon 
administration adhered to maintaining U.S. commitments to the Alliance and to contributing 
substantially to this collective defence system. Noticeably, the Nixon administration still 
expected its allies in the Atlantic Community to assume their share of the common defence 
burden and to take part in equitable arrangements to strengthen the solidarity of the Atlantic 
Community. Though the U.S. economy was confronting what the Nixon administration called 
“European economic regionalism”, the Nixon administration expressed its desire for an 
Atlantic Community coming together not only in defence but also in the economic sphere. By 
stressing the opportunity to chart, as equal partners, the common future course, to define 
common goals and to strengthen the principles of mutual understanding, the United States in 
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the Nixon presidential years wanted to show Western Europe that the United States would do 
its part and looked to its partners to join in realizing the dream of a Family of Europe within 
the Atlantic Community. 
The inaugural plenary session of the Atlantic Treaty Association meeting held in 
Brussels on September 10, 1973, under the chairmanship of former U.S. Under Secretary of 
State Eugene V. Rostow, was themed “The Atlantic Alliance, indispensable basis for security 
and détente”. This seemed to be a reassertion from the Nixon administration that the United 
States considered guaranteeing security for Western Europe as a cornerstone in its policy on 
Europe. In his address, Rostow tried to explain to the Western European leaders U.S. 
intentions and plans for a closer Atlantic Community as had been outlined in Kissinger’s 
April 23, 1973, speech “New Atlantic Charter”: 
Mr. Kissinger’s speech has been misunderstood, both in Europe and in the 
United States. It did not propose a modification of the North Atlantic Treaty, 
or a dilution of the American security guaranty to its European allies. Nor did 
it propose a confusion of security problems and economic problems. What Mr. 
Kissinger did propose was something quite different-an idea which I believe 
an overwhelming majority of the American people understand and support, 
and one which, so far as I can see, should be equally appealing to European 
opinion. The idea is simple, but not easy. It is that of shared responsibility.551 
  
Building a partnership with the European Community still attracted the Nixon 
administration’s attention, though its leaders were preoccupied with handling with domestic 
issues, China and the Soviet Union. Rostow indicated that the Nixon administration’s concern 
for the maintenance of strong and, healthy relations with Western Europe was undiminished. 
It was still at the core of President Nixon’s foreign policy. Promoting European integration 
remained a basic goal of President Nixon’s foreign policy. 
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Continued Economic Cooperation with the European Community 
 This section will argue that the economic cooperation between the United States and 
the European Community from 1969 to 1974 had been uninterrupted. Despite economic and 
trade disputes, the Nixon administration from the start saw the need for the United States to 
enhance cooperation with the European Community on economic front. The United States 
could not escape economic decline on its own. It could not maintain the position as the 
greatest economic power without adequate cooperation from the European Community. In his 
Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy on February 25, 
1971, President Nixon stated: 
Clearly, if we are to found a structure of peace on the collaboration of many 
nations, our ties with Western Europe must be its cornerstone. This is not 
simply because wars on the continent have engulfed the rest of the world twice 
in this century. It is not simply because Europe’s concentration of industrial 
might is crucial to the balance of power. Western Europe is central because its 
nations are rich in tradition and experience, strong economically, and vigorous 
in diplomacy and culture; they are in a position to take a major part in building 
a world of peace.552 
 
 Like previous administrations, the Nixon administration saw the economic link with 
Western Europe as a corner stone in its foreign policy. Economic cooperation was seen as an 
indispensable ingredient for strengthening the Atlantic alliance. For many centuries, 
diplomacy had been a political game with the economic element hidden. During the Nixon 
administration, the relationship between the European Community and the United States was 
derived considerably from their economic contacts and concerns and particularly from the 
strategies used to manage this relationship.  
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Despite trade disagreements with the European Community, the Nixon administration 
could not deny the fact that the United States had significant economic interest in Western 
Europe. When the European Community moved towards post-industrialism its demand for 
advanced U.S. technological products was strong and it had to depend on the United States to 
maintain its competitiveness. Despite the intensity of protectionism issues in agricultural 
products, the Nixon administration would expect the European Community to continue to 
develop into the richest and the most important commercial market for U.S. farm products.553 
Statistics can illustrate this point as U.S. exports to the European Community had increased 
faster than those to the rest of the world. From 1958 to 1971, U.S. exports to the European 
Community rose by 192 percent, compared with 146 percent to the world as a whole. In 
1971, the United States was in its first serious trade deficit of the twentieth century, however, 
in trade with the European Community the United States continued to have a surplus of about 
$900 million.554 
The “Agriculture in Multilateral Trade Negotiations” paper, prepared by the 
Department of Agriculture, pointed out U.S. views in dealing with economic matters in 
relations with the European Community. The Department of Agriculture was in support of 
freer trade with Western Europe. The Department held that trade in farm products as well as 
trade in non-agricultural commodities needed to be conducted under conditions in which 
competition, market orientation and comparative advantage could prevail. The United States 
expected to see all trade between the United States and the European Community move 
freely. This meant that allocation of agricultural resources would become more effective. 
Eventually, both the farmers in the United States and Western Europe would be beneficial 
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from increased utilisation of the unique natural, technological and organizational assets which 
their countries possessed. Thus, the Nixon administration kept calling for further 
liberalisation of agricultural trade. President Nixon and his team believed that real 
liberalisation of agricultural trade would help to lessen underemployment in rural areas, 
reduce living costs for domestic and foreign consumers, and produce sorely needed U.S. 
balance of trade benefits.555  
With this perspective, the Nixon administration set particular objectives in its trade 
negotiations with its partners and especially with the European Community: 
A. A traditional tariff-cutting exercise limited only by the extent and degree of 
the authority granted in the trade legislation. 
B. Elimination of all preferences, whatever their nature.  
C. Conversion of variable levies and all other pricing devices usable for 
protection at the border to fixed duties. 
D. Phased increase and eventual elimination of all quotas,  
E. Phased elimination of export subsidies,  
F. Elimination of mixing regulation, monopolies, and restrictive licensing and 
prior deposit practices. 
G. Negotiation of codes on technical barriers such as valuation and standards. 
H. Negotiation of multilateral safeguards.556 
 
 Along with new objectives set for negotiations with the European Community to 
solve trade matters, the Nixon administration also demonstrated its willingness to explore 
opportunities to improve the commercial relations with the Western Europeans. The Nixon 
administration held that agricultural policy had long been a source of conflict in the U.S. 
relationship with Western Europe. The United States had argued and negotiated for 
penetration into the Community’s market. The Europeans had designed and developed a 
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Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in order to support their domestic producers. The CAP 
represented one of the concrete achievements of the European integration process and it had 
domestic political significance for most of the nine member states. The European Community 
clearly put forth that its CAP was non-negotiable in the next General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) round. Confronting the Community’s resistance to changes in the CAP 
through traditional negotiations for the liberalization of imports and the impossibility of a 
structural change in world agricultural supply, the Nixon administration indicated a 
willingness to consider the European approach and determine what practical possibilities 
existed. The Nixon administration supposed that the United States could pursue discussions 
with its European negotiating partners formally and informally, multilaterally and bilaterally. 
Even though the European Community had the CAP and the European Commission was 
responsible for conducting that policy, it was of such domestic political sensitivity that 
informal, bilateral talks with key member states and the Commission would be crucial. J. 
Robert Schaetzel, Representative to the European Communities from 1966 to 1972, pointed 
out:  
Without a clear American policy for conducting relations with the Community 
in a framework of intimate cooperation, supported by officials who have the 
capacity to win the confidence of the Europeans, the trans-Atlantic alternative 
will be continual conflict, argument, and misunderstanding. The approach can 
go either way-cooperation or confrontation-but whichever it is, the process 
will be habit-forming. When senior agricultural officials struck the sour note, 
their subordinates quickly picked up the tune. The converse is also true. Where 
a spirit of cooperation prevailed between the environmental experts from 
Washington and people with similar responsibilities in the Commission, for 
instance, this set a pattern for a more constructive approach by other officials 
whose normal life-style was trans-Atlantic badgering.557 
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 These bilateral contacts could proceed in parallel with more formal multilateral 
discussions in GATT rounds and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). Multilateral meetings were useful in showing publicly that the United 
States was trying to deal with the world trade problem through international cooperation. Yet 
the Nixon administration believed that such meetings could not replace serious substantive 
bilateral contacts working towards agreement among the major producers and consumers.558 
It was noted that prior to the GATT negotiations in Tokyo, 1973, the United States 
decided to garner “a better idea of (a) the long-term supply/demand picture for major 
agricultural products (b) the impact of the U.S. agricultural legislation on our trade and stock 
position (c) the kind of commodity arrangements which could serve U.S. interests and (d) the 
negotiability of various types of commodity arrangements,”559 Such knowledge was expected 
to help U.S. negotiators deal satisfactorily with the Europeans. They were looking for reliable 
suppliers and the United States were seeking ongoing access to the Western European 
market. The United States understood that the multilateral GATT negotiations in Tokyo were 
an effective way to signal to the Western Europeans U.S. flexibility in trade relations with the 
European Community. If the United States tried directly to force changes in the CAP and 
refused to consider alternative solutions to agricultural problems, the likely outcome was a 
continuation of the present unsatisfactory situation. Continuing conflict in agricultural policy 
would inevitably exert adverse impacts on other aspects of U.S.-European relations.560 The 
U.S. realist approach to deal with disagreement in trade with the European Community, 
demonstrated that the Nixon administration wished for better relations with the European 
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Community by improving cooperation in the economic field in general and in agricultural 
trading in particular.  
Though the years of 1969-1974 saw disputes in trade and economic relations with the 
European Community, it was undeniable that the Nixon administration had continuously 
enhanced economic cooperation between both sides and sought to deal with the trade disputes 
cooperatively. President Nixon knew that the economies of the United States and the 
European Community had become so interdependent protectionism would be self-defeating 
in the end. Particularly, the economic difficulties of United States, such as balance-of-
payments deficit and the weakening competitiveness of U.S. industries, could be best dealt 
with through cooperation with its major trading partner, rather than with confrontation. From 
the start the Nixon administration sought new ways to help U.S. farmers, workers, investors 
and traders to adjust to competition from the European Community. The European 
Community was evolving and its economic unification was becoming firm:  
For our closest friends are now developing a collective identity and collective 
policies separate from us. And unity happens to be coming fastest in the 
economic sphere-the area of policy in which competition seems to have the 
least immediate penalty and our common interest will take the most effort to 
insure. Each of us maintains restrictions on agricultural trade which limit the 
export opportunities of the other. America's main restrictions are on dairy 
products; the European Community's common agricultural policy restrains our 
exports of grains. The Community’s preferential trading arrangements with 
Mediterranean countries are a problem for American citrus exports.561 
 
 This brought problems for the United States’ economy. Retaliation seemingly did not 
work in the Nixon administration’s perspective. Working together and negotiating was 
stressed by President Nixon. Thus, the Nixon administration kept calling for adequate 
cooperation from the European Community on the basis on mutual interests: 
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The common interest requires the prosperity of both. This means freer and 
expanded trade and restraint in protecting special interests. We must negotiate 
a reduction in our trade restrictions. We must work toward a more equitable 
worldwide trading system which is based upon most favored-nation treatment 
among all industrial nations and in which all of them accord the same tariff 
preferences to the entire developing world.562 
  
 The best way for the Americans to adjust to a growing European Community was to 
solve the economic and trade disputes with the Europeans through negotiations and 
cooperation. Both the European Community and the United States agreed that it was vital for 
them to travel from dependence to partnership. Yet, they both appreciated that it was not an 
easy journey. What was stressed the most on the uneasy road that both the United States and 
the European Community had travelled together was that continued economic cooperation 
was in fact beneficial.  
According to statistics released in Brussels on February 26, 1970, by the Commission 
of the European Communities and which were also sent to the Chief Representative of the 
U.S. Mission to the European Communities, Ambassador J. Robert Schaetzel, economic 
relations between the United States and the European Community were developing. U.S.-EC 
trade had tripled from 1958 to 1970, the totality of trade between the United States and the 
European Community had risen to $13 billion.563 This increase of trade, both in agricultural 
and industrial products, had been ongoing and had always been greater than the average for 
world trade.564 It was noted that: 
Every year from 1960 to 1967 the United States has had a large surplus - 
averaging $1.2 billion a year - in its trade account with the Community. From 
1958 to 1969, exports from the United States to the Community grew by 182 
percent, during the same period American exports to the European Free Trade 
 
                                                          
562 Ibid. 
563 European Community, 1970, A Review of Economic and Trade Relations between the United States and the 
Community, viewed on June 16, 2015, <http://aei.pitt.edu/43774/1/A7517.pdf>. 
564 Ibid. 
- 276 - 
 
Area (EFTA) countries, for example, increased by 143 percent and to the rest 
of the world by 118 percent.565  
 
Furthermore, U.S. exports to the European Community had been continuously 
growing. In 1969, U.S. exports to the European Community climbed 13.9 percent compared 
to that in 1968, while U.S. exports to the EFTA rose merely 4 percent and to the rest of the 
world 9.5 percent.566 These figures showed that continued cooperation would be 
characteristic of U.S. and EC relations in the future. The Nixon administration could not 
reverse the previous U.S. administrations’ economic cooperation policy with the European 
Community.  
This trend was also reflected in the fact that an increasing number of U.S. companies 
had developed their activities in the EC. From 1958 to 1968, U.S. companies’ direct 
investment in the European Community rose almost five-fold; their total assets reached $9 
billion in 1968 compared with $1.9 billion in 1958.567 This showed how fast direct 
investment by U.S. companies had been expanding in the EC. In 1970, it was estimated that 
U.S. companies “established in the European Community account for about one-seventh of 
all new industrial investment.”568 This demonstrated that the U.S. economy had reaped great 
benefits from the European Community and European integration. The considerable growth 
in trade relations between the United States and the European Community, and the substantial 
rise in income from direct investment in the Europe Community, significantly contributed to 
economic improvements in the period of U.S. economic decline, a period that the Nixon 
administration had struggled to overcome. The Europeans themselves gained benefits in 
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developing economic relations with the United States as it, indeed, became “the most rapidly 
growing market in the world” by early 1970s.569  
 
Continued Support for EC Enlargement  
It has been arguable that the Nixon administration was ambivalent towards European 
integration process and enlargement. President Nixon’s scepticism was rooted in the 
European policy of inward-looking and protectionist tendencies which were against U.S. 
interests. The Department of Commerce and the Treasury repeatedly made proposals for a 
revision of U.S. European policy to take into consideration the problems in the trade field 
with the European Economic Community. In November 1972, President Nixon directed the 
National Security Council to review U.S. policy on Western Europe. President Nixon wanted 
to have a detailed study of the eco-political, military, security interrelations and both 
scientific and technological issues between the United States and Western Europe in order to 
establish guidance for future relations.570  
This study regarded by President Nixon as “of prime importance” was carried out by 
the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Europe. In December 1972, the 
outcomes of the study were sent to President Nixon. It concluded that “U.S.-Western 
European relations are today unbalanced.”571 Through the European integration process, 
Western Europe had become more independent from the United States politically, financially 
and industrially, they still depended on the United States through NATO and the nuclear 
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shield of the U.S.: “military and security elements bind us; but economic and political issues 
tend to divide us.”572 With that conclusion, the National Security Council Interdepartmental 
Group for Europe suggested that the United States separate security from politico-economic 
issues in the relationship with the European Community and promoted both European 
Community enlargement and improved bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. These 
policy recommendations were framed by U.S. interests. Though allowing for certain 
repercussions with the European Community when seeking a closer cooperation with the 
Soviets and the Chinese, the United States was still in pursuit of a European policy 
supporting further integration. In the U.S. grand design for Europe, the overall significance of 
political and defence relations with Western Europe overrode the economic competition 
between U.S. and the European Community traders.  
Although the Nixon administration did shift its diplomatic focus to China and the 
Soviet Union, it did not mean that Nixon downplayed its relations with Western Europe and 
opposed further attempts to strengthen and expand the European Community by the 
Europeans. His aim was a foreign policy that promoted the greater self-reliance of allies. The 
United States still played an important part in the first enlargement of the European 
Community in 1973. In other words, the first enlargement of the European Community was 
encouraged and pushed by the United States. The Nixon administration was of the opinion 
that the United Kingdom played a significant role in European continued integration. Also, 
Nixon and Kissinger were concerned about France’s attempting to eclipse U.S. leadership in 
Western Europe, thus, the United States encouraged the United Kingdom’s participation in 
the Community to counterbalance French influence.  
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The path for the United Kingdom to become a member of the European Community 
proved a difficult one though it was supported by the United States. The United Kingdom, 
which had refused the invitation to be one of the founding members, changed its policy 
stance after witnessing the rapid economic development of the European Community and 
started to apply to be a member of the European Community in the 1960s. The United 
Kingdom’s decision to apply for European Community membership was explained by 
Edward Heath in his memoirs: “Well aware that the United Kingdom, shorn of its Empire and 
old dependencies, could no longer enjoy its former role as a world superpower … we might 
continue to play an influential world role through wholehearted participation in Europe.”573  
In 1961, the Conservative Government, headed by Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, 
decided that being a member of the EEC would be in Britain’s interests. Yet negotiations for 
the United Kingdom’s entry into the European Community proved uneasy.574 The United 
Kingdom’s negotiations were being held with representatives of West Germany, France, 
Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg, and not with the EC Commission. This 
caused difficulties for British negotiators because the six member states had to first formulate 
their common stance and after that they were “naturally reluctant to reopen matters which had 
been agreed in order to accommodate Britain.”575  
The French President Charles de Gaulle vetoed the British application to join the 
EEC. His argument was that the strong British tie to the United States and the British 
Commonwealth could hinder the British in making contribution to the EEC. In a press 
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conference at the Elysée Palace in Paris on January 14, 1963, President de Gaulle explained 
why he rejected the United Kingdom’s entry into the European Community: 
She [the United Kingdom] did it [posed her candidature] after having earlier 
refused to participate in the communities we are now building, as well as after 
creating a free trade area with six other states ... after having put some 
pressure on the Six to prevent a real beginning being made in the application 
of the Common Market. 
     [the United Kingdom] is maritime, she is linked to through her exchanges, 
her markets, her supply lines to the most diverse and often the most distance 
countries; she pursues essentially industrial and commercial activities, and 
only slight agricultural ones. 
     The means by which the people of Great Britain are fed and which are in 
fact the importation of foodstuffs bought cheaply in the two Americas and in 
the former dominions, at the same time giving, granting considerable subsidies 
to English farmers? These means are obviously incompatible with the system, 
which the Six have established quite naturally for themselves.576  
 
After this failure, the United Kingdom held the view that “Britain should maintain its 
constructive engagement with, and influence in, Europe despite de Gaulle’s veto.”577  
 In 1967, the Labour Government, headed by Prime Minister Harold Wilson applied 
for European Community membership again but the de Gaulle still said no to the United 
Kingdom. President de Gaulle’s rationale for vetoing British entry into the European 
Community in 1967 was not different from what he stated in 1963. He thought that the 
United Kingdom was too subservient to the United States and insufficiently “European”. 
Therefore, if the United Kingdom were to join the EEC it would increase U.S. influence in 
the EEC and prevent it from acting as a potential counter-weight to the United States. Two 
years later in 1969, President de Gaulle resigned. The United Kingdom’s then Prime Minister 
Edward Heath had a clear vision of European integration: “the best hope was a federal 
Europe, a ‘United States of Europe … in which states will have to give up some of their 
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national rights. … There seems to be a better view for the future if we lean towards a 
federalism that can be secured either by joining with a small national group and/or big group, 
because this seems to be the most fool proof sort of thing you can get’.”578 Thus, his 
administration was determined to try again. The third time the United Kingdom filed its 
application for European Community membership was in 1969 while the United States was 
still under the Nixon administration. With its calculations of U.S. national interests, the 
Nixon administration confirmed support for the “creation of a strong political and economic 
entity in Europe.” President Nixon was enthusiastically in favour of the first European 
Community enlargement to include the United Kingdom. He even proclaimed that British 
failure to become a member of the European Community would cause “political damage to 
Europe.”579 President Nixon and his administration expected this first enlargement to include 
Ireland, Denmark, and especially the United Kingdom; a big country in Western Europe, 
would help to prevent the European Community from looking inward and improve political 
cohesion in the Atlantic community. President Nixon stressed that the United Kingdom 
entering Europe was a “great historic development” and expected that the United Kingdom, 
led by Prime Minister Edward Heath, would made significant contributions to this expanded 
European Community: 
I think we could say that he [Prime Minister Heath] is one of the prime 
architects of the new Europe and that the new Europe is an indispensable 
foundation for what we hope will be a new world, because it will contribute to 
that new world in which peace and, we trust, progress with freedom will be the 
watchword in the years ahead.580  
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Implicitly, President Nixon expected that the cornerstone of U.S. policy would be a 
cornerstone of British policy that placed an emphasis on promoting the cause of peace, 
freedom and progress in the world and making the military alliance and economic 
cooperation stronger in the Atlantic Community which both the United States and the United 
Kingdom were now a part.  
Along with the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway and Ireland concluded their 
negotiations and became new members of the European Community in 1973 which allowed 
deepened integration in Western Europe. Due to President Nixon’s enthusiasm for the United 
Kingdom to become a member of the European Community and the United Kingdom’s wish 
to maintain the special relationship with the United States, Prime Minister Heath shared much 
of President Nixon’s vision of Europe. It might not have made real difference which of them 
spoke first because the United Kingdom did not want to rile the Nixon administration. The 
Heath government had not been involved much in the European economic integration which 
was alleged by the Nixon administration as causing problems for the United States’ economy. 
As Prime Minister Pompidou reminded Chancellor Brandt, “Britain was eager to express 
opinions about Europe’s future, but left the detailed issues of economic integration to France 
and Germany.”581  
 Prime Minister Heath acknowledged the support from Washington and pledged with 
President Nixon his country’s dedication to the future of the enlarged Community and the 
United States relationship. The United Kingdom would continue to share with the United 
States the responsibility for securing peace in the world in general and making the expanded 
European Community a capable partner of the United States: 
today Britain is now a member of the European Community. And the future 
relations between that enlarged Community and the United States, good 
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relations which are vital for the whole future of the Western World, will figure 
prominently in our discussions. Now that we are a member of the European 
Community, you will not find our interest in the wider affairs of the world any 
less than it has ever been before.582 
  
 The Nixon administration saw the British entry to the European Community as a step 
to a closer relationship between the United States and the European Community. The United 
States hoped that British membership in the European Community would help Western 
European capitals to advance a positive, dynamic, and cooperative relationship with 
Washington. Telegram 4301, sent to the Department of State from the U.S. Embassy in 
London on April 5, 1974, showed its endorsement of a strong European Community to which 
the United Kingdom belonged: 
We should encourage Britain to view its ties with the U.S. as complementary 
to, not a substitute for, its ties with the EC. If Britain remains in the 
Community, it would be a force for closer U.S.–EC cooperation. Its 
withdrawal, though, could set in motion an unravelling of the entire structure 
of Atlantic cooperation. If the renegotiation on which the UK is now 
embarked shows signs of breaking down, the USG [U.S. Government] may 
have to go beyond simply voicing continued support for EC survival. We 
believe we should speak out clearly to the British Government … to 
underscore our basic commitment to a strong Europe of which Britain is a 
part.583  
 
This communication from the Embassy also underlined that it was in the United 
States’ interest to prevent British withdrawal from the renegotiation of British entry into the 
European Community. That the new British government, headed by Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson, was willing to support close consultation and cooperation between the United States 
and the European Community was what the Nixon administration expected from its special 
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relationship with the United Kingdom. Foreign Secretary Callaghan reassured the United 
States that “we are not interested in an anti-American direction.”584 Explicitly, the success of 
British renegotiations with the European Community was important to the United States as 
the Heath government clearly indicated that it wished to promote close consultation and 
cooperation between two sides of the Atlantic Oceans. From the Nixon administration’s point 
of view, the United Kingdom would be a strong force shaping the partnership between the 
United States and the European Community and, thus, the Nixon administration saw an “an 
obvious interest” in supporting an active British role in the European Community.585 The 
Nixon administration had strongly desired to prevent the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from 
renegotiating entry to the European Community: 
We also have an interest in preventing a withdrawal that could precipitate a 
general unravelling of West European relationships, involving the partial or 
total disintegration of the EC, the revival of rivalries between NATO 
members, the growth of Nordic neutralism, and various other developments 
inimical to the preservation of a strong Western Alliance. A special 
relationship with an introspective Britain, cast adrift from Europe and 
operating from a contracting economic and military base, would be of dubious 
value to the United States.586 
  
That the Nixon administration actively supported the renegotiation of British 
membership of the European Community was a strong indication that Washington did not 
actually take a “hands-off” position regarding EC enlargement. Despite criticizing the 
European Community’s protectionist trends and disagreeing with the European Community 
on economic and political matters, the Nixon administration did not show any real opposition 
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to European integration. Yet it should be noted that Washington’s support for European 
integration during Nixon’s presidency was more limited than in the past.  
 
The Nixon Administration and European Integration: Ambitions and Ambivalence  
In a 2014 speech, 45 years after 1969 when the Nixon administration came into office, 
Secretary of State John F. Kerry reconfirmed the U.S. wish to have more engagement with 
Europe. President Barack H. Obama, like President Nixon, considered relations with Europe 
as a priority on the U.S. foreign policy agenda though the United States had spent a great deal 
of efforts in the Asia Pacific region. In other words, the United States wanted to stress that its 
relationship with Europe would not be downgraded in any circumstances as both Washington 
and European capitals benefited from this engagement: 
The rebalancing that President Obama is engaged in does not and will not 
come at the expense of any relationship in Europe whatsoever. In fact, we 
want more engagement with Europe, and we think Europe can be more of a 
partner in those efforts, which is one of the reasons that President Obama is so 
firmly committed, as he said in the State of the Union message, to a trade and 
investment partnership initiative with Europe. 
     And I think Europe is, I hope, excited by it. I think there are huge 
possibilities. Both of our economies can benefit by this engagement. There’s 
an enormous amount of benefit for our citizens throughout Europe and here in 
the United States. We can create jobs. We will have greater market clout as a 
consequence of that. And I think this is something we can get through. We all 
know the difficulties, but I think this moment is one that we could really get 
through. And we’re going to talk about that in a little bit.587 
 
Going as far back as the late 1960s and early 1970s, President Nixon had desired to 
build a partnership with Western Europe and showed support for European integration with 
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hope that a united Europe would become a stronger partner of the American people and stand 
on the U.S. side in confronting communism. The United States desired to exert some basic 
influence on Europe and its policy was marked by certain ambivalence when it came to the 
question of final outcome of the European integration process: a unified, emancipated 
Europe. 
President Nixon’s thinking was influenced by realist notions of balancing power and 
protecting national interests. Underlying the Nixon administration’s vision of the European 
integration project was the assumption that a fully integrated, economically healthy and 
stable Europe would be an active supporter of the United States in the international arena. In 
addition, the development of a common market in Europe would open a huge market for U.S. 
exporters. The European integration process would eventually lead to not only permanent 
peace and prosperity in Europe but also ensure U.S. well-being as President Nixon wrote in 
his message to Chancellor Brandt in March 1973: “European integration should also be seen 
as a step towards increased Atlantic cooperation.”588 
President Nixon reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to partnership with Western Europe 
in his “State of World Message” to the Congress on February 18, 1970. He acknowledged 
that U.S. interests would necessarily be affected by European integration and the United 
States might have to make sacrifices in the common interest: “We consider that the possible 
economic price of a truly unified Europe is outweighed by the gain in the political vitality of 
the West as a whole.”589 President Nixon established the agenda for the future of U.S. 
relations with Western Europe by clearly stating the issues that the United States and the 
European Community were facing together: 
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The evolution of a mature partnership reflecting the vitality and the 
independence of Western European nations; 
The continuation of genuine consultation with our allies on the nature of the 
threats to alliance security, on maintenance of common and credible strategy, 
and on an appropriate and sustainable level of forces;  
The continuation of genuine consultations with our allies on the mutual 
interests affected by the U.S.-Soviet talks on strategic arms limitation;  
The development of a European-American understanding on our common 
purposes and respective roles in seeking a peaceful and stable order in all of 
Europe; 
The expansion of Allied and worldwide cooperation in facing the common 
social and human challenges of modern societies.590 
 
The economic system established at the end of the Second World War had undergone 
change during the Nixon administration, thus, U.S. support for European integration was 
modified. The relationship between the United States and the European Community was a 
crucial element in international economic relations, however, that relationship was constantly 
evolving as each side redefined both its own political identity and role in the international 
system. President Nixon said, “A more balanced association and a more genuine partnership 
are in America’s interest. As this process advances, the balance of burdens and 
responsibilities must gradually be adjusted, to reflect the economic and political realities of 
European process.”591 In their discussion on August 9, 1973, both President Nixon and 
Kissinger agreed that the Europeans were dependent on the United States and should be 
supporting Washington’s policy stance on the world affairs as they had taken too much for 
granted from the United States: 
Kissinger: They’ve been [the Europeans] taking us too much for granted. 
Nixon: That’s right. We’re going to have. … That we have to stay, that we 
need them and that we’re going to maintain the rein and so forth. All right, we 
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don’t have to stay Henry. We just don’t have to necessarily. You understand 
that? 
Kissinger: I couldn’t agree more. 
Nixon: Let me say, we do have to stay in Japan and Korea but that’s a 
different thing. 
Kissinger: Well, I think we have to stay to some extent in Europe but … 
Nixon: No, nobody even in Europe—I would play a different line and say all 
right and that means. … It’s up to you, you can’t have a free rein, they are not 
going to confront us and have us stay now. That’s all there is to it. 
Kissinger: They cannot exclude us from their deliberations and expect us to 
give them an undiluted nuclear guarantee. That just cannot be. 
Nixon: That is right.592 
 
This discussion provided evidence of Nixon’s disappointment with Western Europe. 
Like previous U.S. administrations, the Nixon administration had expected that the European 
integration process would create a genuine liberalization of trade and payments and the 
introduction of multilateralism and currency convertibility in Western Europe. Yet Western 
European leaders seemed to limit the integration process in a number of countries and 
concentrate on certain economic sectors. Western Europe obviously had a protectionism 
policy towards the United States. In addition, Western Europe endeavoured to compete with 
the United States economically and keep financial benefits out of its reach. Generally 
speaking, initial successes in European economic integration allowed the European 
Community “to stand up to the economic might of the United States and thus command for 
itself a more powerful voice in world affairs.”593 
The Nixon administration’s ambition of building an active supporter for the United 
States on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean was brought into doubt by the European 
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Community’s ever growing competition and exclusionary trade policies. Especially, in the 
context of the U.S. economic decline, Western Europe’s unfriendliness in trade, on the 
economic front and lack of cooperation in the 1973 oil crisis made the Nixon administration 
became more sceptical about the finality of the European integration process. It raised the 
question of whether the United States of Europe, when realized, would be a partner of the 
Americans. J. Robert Schaetzel, former Ambassador to the European community, questioned 
“whether Europe, forced by internal or external pressure, will be inclined to organize itself 
against the United States; or indeed, whether the very process of unification makes this 
inevitable.”594 
The Nixon administration was clearly both ambitious and ambivalent about European 
unification. On one hand, President Nixon believed in the Atlantic relationship and wanted to 
give consistent support to forces of unification in Western Europe. On the other hand, he 
dealt with the European allies in a realist manner, with tactics of confrontation, unilateralism 
and adversary relations. The changes in the Nixon administration’s policy towards European 
integration may cause debate as to what went wrong with the relationship of the United States 
and the European Community or whether the Europeans misinterpreted Nixon-Kissinger’s 
foreign policy. That was, though, the result of scepticism on behalf of the U.S. leaders 
regarding cooperation between the United States and the European Community in economic, 
political and security fronts. Shifting the focus of U.S. foreign relations to other areas, 
particularly the Soviet Union and China, and withdrawing the previously strong U.S. support 
for eco-political unity led to a real deterioration in U.S-EC relations. According to Schaetzel, 
the result of mismanaged and personality-centred diplomatic relations with Europe in the 
Nixon-Kissinger era had left for future U.S. administrations “a heritage of priorities, 
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prejudices and style which limits their manoeuvrability.”595 Considering the consequences of 
the U.S. modified supports for the European integration process, it could be recommended 
that it was important for the United States to revitalize U.S. commitments, revise the post-
Second World War framework of policy towards European integration, take a long view of 
the significance of Europe to the United States and formulate deliberate policy and strategy 
so as to avoid confrontations and conflicts. 
 
An Alliance of Necessity  
Both the United States and Western Europe benefited from a closer alliance. Security 
and trade issues made cooperation become more important between the two sides of the 
Atlantic, even though confrontations still emerged. During the post-war era, the United States 
had been both the military patron and the economic supporter of Western Europe. As these 
European states recovered and started the integration process they posed a challenge to both 
U.S. political hegemony and international economic predominance. These conflicts became 
more serious with the aggressiveness of the Nixon administration’s trade policies between 
1970 and 1971 which put an end to the Breton Wood System. The European Community in 
which the United States had sought to promote U.S. democracy and capitalism had been for a 
long time the United States’ natural strategic partners. Now, the European Community was 
also an open economic rival. 
By contrast, the Nixon administration’s foreign policy concentrated on friendly 
engagement with the Soviet Union and China. While old strategic partners became economic 
rivals, ideological and strategic foes became friends. While nation-states with the same values 
and practices were put aside, nation-states with opposing systems and values were accepted. 
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The longstanding post-war order had been changing as partners became rivals and foes 
became friends. The Nixon administration was unsuccessful in integrating its economic and 
strategic priorities subsequently U.S. national interests were negatively affected. This was not 
necessarily the consequence of détente or of the transformation of U.S. economic interests by 
the late 1960’s and the early 1970’s. Rather, it was the legacy of ineffective formulating, 
coordinating and implementing U.S. foreign policy. 
The increasing economic growth rate in the European Community and the strategic 
balance with the USSR should not be overlooked. It was clearly in the United States’ interest 
to be in détente with the USSR and China, just as it was manifestly in the United States’ 
interest to heighten its economic position by penetrating into the market of the enlarged 
European Community.  The problem facing the United States was how to reconcile these 
interests with its valuable alliance with Western European countries. President Nixon and his 
team could have made much wiser and better choices in its relationship with Western 
European allies. Rather than employing unilateralism, the Nixon administration could have 
used multilateralism and outlined a detailed plan for a new international economic order. 
Rather than considering the European Community as a dangerous economic rival, the United 
States could have strengthened cooperation with the Community as a long-time ally. 
Regrettably, the Nixon administration chose pragmatic policies which sacrificed strategic and 
traditional alliance for short-term economic gains. As it happened, a tense relationship with 
Western Europe under the Nixon presidential years became a big obstacle to U.S. strategy in 
following years. The U.S.-Western European alliance was so damaged that Washington 
hardly found any support from Western European capitals in helping Israel in the Yom 
Kippur War of 1973. 
Nevertheless, the United States and the European Community both acknowledged that 
the alliance was necessary for their peace and prosperity. Henceforth, U.S.-EC cooperation 
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grew more effective and the partnership grew stronger. Events during the Nixon 
administration indicated not only the differences that could arise but also the continued 
interdependence between the United States and the European Community. In his 1972 
foreign policy report, President Nixon demonstrated the consequences of what he considered 
as the striking change in politico-economic relations across the Atlantic. He also pointed out 
where U.S. and Western European interests lied: 
The United States is realistic. This change means the end of American tutelage 
and the end of the era of automatic unity. But discord is not inevitable either. 
The challenge to our maturity and political skill is to establish a new practice 
in Atlantic unity - finding common ground in a consensus of independent 
policies instead of in deference to American prescriptions. 
     This essential harmony of our purposes is the enduring link between a 
uniting Europe and the United States. This is why we have always favored 
European unity and why we welcome its growth not only in geographical area 
but into new spheres of policy.596  
 
In his speech to the Rotary Club of New York on June 7, 1973, Professor Ralf 
Dahrendorf, Member of the Commission of the European Communities, reaffirmed the 
necessity of the partnership between the United States and the EC: 
Our common values of humanity and democracy, our common interest in the 
defence of our values and the maintenance of an open world economy, our 
literally innumerable ties across the Atlantic will all enable us to work out 
ways of living with the  differences which may exist in this or that respect.597 
 
This historical reality highlighted the significance of the alliance with Western Europe 
in U.S. diplomacy in a contemporary framework. Such alliances needed to be maintained and 
expanded on the basis of common economic and strategic interests. President Nixon 
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reaffirmed, in his address to the United Nation General Assembly in 1970, that better 
relationships would be grounded in a powerful mutual interest in avoiding nuclear 
confrontation, the huge cost of arms, economic self-interests and in enhancing trade and 
consultation.598 
The prosperity of both Western Europe and the United States was required for the 
common interest. This meant that the U.S. and Western European policy makers needed to 
coordinate and concert their efforts towards free and expanded trade and restrain the 
protection of special interests. They had to negotiate a reduction in their trade restrictions. 
They had to work hard toward a more equitable trading system which was founded on their 
own defined interests and fundamental purposes. This was because Western European and 
U.S. interests in security and foreign policy were complementary.  
Scholars of diplomatic history and international politics may feel hesitant to discuss 
the technical complexity of economics, however, the examination of the Nixon 
administration’s policy towards European integration points out that failing to incorporate 
economic and strategic thinking is likely to lead to serious consequences undermining 
national interests.  
In an era of accelerating global economic interdependence this point will become 
more and more salient. The interweaving of economic and strategic interests becomes ever 
more problematic, as contemporary relations with China clearly indicate. Can a nation-state 
be both a strategic foe and the United States’ most important trading partner? Can the United 
States, with its pertinent issues on government debts and deficits, continue to finance its 
global hegemony?  As the world has moved into the twenty-first century, great minds in 
foreign policy and diplomacy must take into account not only guns and governments but also 
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markets and money. Trade and security are interplayed. Rather than use one to exert leverage 
over the other, they should both be enhanced for peace and prosperity worldwide. 
 
Conclusion 
From the outset, the United States strongly supported the European integration 
project. The European Community rapidly became the world’s second largest economic 
group after the United States and an important player in international politics. Though the 
high economic growth rate of the European Community and the enlargement of the 
Community to include the United Kingdom threatened to put the U.S. economy in an uneasy 
situation, Washington did not discontinue its traditional support for the European 
Community. The Nixon administration’s policy on Europe underlined that the tensions might 
emerge, yet the ties that bound the nations on the two sides of the Atlantic remained tight. 
President Nixon still showed that the United States was committed to defend Western 
Europe, promoted solidarity in the Atlantic partnership and encouraged the enlargement of 
the European Community. He believed that it served the United States’ interests by spreading 
democracy and economic prosperity and thereby creating a strong economic and political 
partner in Europe. Put simply, it should be noted that consistent support underpinned the 
Nixon administration’s attitudes towards European integration. A strong and cohesive Europe 
from a U.S. perspective would help to preserve and promote U.S. vital interests. This was 
demonstrated when the United States made efforts in encouraging the very first enlargement 
of the European Community to include the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland in 1973 
and maintaining U.S. troops stationed in Western Europe. Thus, U.S. policy towards 
European integration from 1969-1974 was basically a continuation of previous policy. In his 
essay “The Necessary Partnership,” J. Robert Schaetzel strongly affirmed that:  
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Over the full range of contemporary foreign affairs, American policy toward 
Western Europe has been marked by durability and rare continuity. The 
change of neither Presidents, Secretaries of State nor political parties has 
altered the lines of basic policy. The Government marches with American 
public opinion, for that ubiquitous man in the street still feels deeply that 
Western Europe is vital to the United States.599 
  
This had been cherished by President Nixon who wanted to build a peaceful world. In 
his first inaugural address on Monday January 20, 1969, he said, “I have taken an oath today 
in the presence of God and my countrymen to uphold and defend the Constitution of the 
United States. To that oath I now add this sacred commitment: I shall consecrate my office, 
my energies, and all the wisdom I can summon, to the cause of peace among nations.”600 
The “cause of peace among nations” that he had committed to during his presidency 
significantly meant that he needed to support and promote the European integration process. 
This was seen by President Nixon and his team as the key to maintaining peace among 
European nations and ultimately peace all over the world. A view that President Obama 
strongly reasserted in his response to the success of the Brexit vote in June 2016: 
The United States has a strong and enduring interest in a united, democratic 
Europe. We’re bound together by ties of history, family and our common 
values - our commitment to democracy, pluralism, human dignity. Our 
economies are deeply woven together, with the largest trade and investment 
relationship in the world. The security of America and Europe is indivisible, 
and that’s why, for nearly 70 years, the United States has been a staunch 
champion of European integration - and we will remain so.601 
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The Nixon administration had undoubtedly contributed to achieving an integrated 
Europe and the U.S. administrations in the twenty-first century maintain that “this is an 
achievement that has to be preserved.”602 
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Conclusion 
In spite of sharing a long and intertwined history, the United States and the European 
Community have experienced many ups and downs in the history of their partnership. 
Understanding U.S. policy toward European integration between 1969 and 1974 is important 
as it paves the way for deep analysis of the modern United States and European Union 
relations. The Nixon administration and the European Community’s leaders had together 
weaved a new thread in the fabric of transatlantic relations. The combination of United 
States’ relative decline, President Nixon’s realist approach to foreign relations, the growing 
assertiveness of Western Europe, the international oil crisis, and the relaxation of 
international relations made the United States reconsider its policy towards European 
integration. This was viewed as a historical turning point in U.S. policy towards European 
integration, from actively promoting and encouraging the European integration process to 
seeking to contain certain economic and political ambitions of the European Community and 
driving the European integration process in a desirable direction. The analysis of U.S. policy 
towards European integration has centred on a question - what are the sources of change and 
continuity? On which political scientists, strategists, economists, or specialists in 
international relations have spent much ink and paper, yet it remains intensely debated. This 
is the question that this thesis has aimed to explore. 
I have put forth three main arguments. First, the Nixon administration in the time 
period of 1969-1974 changed U.S. policy towards European integration. From the end of the 
Second World War until 1968, the support for the supranational form of continental European 
integration had been a firmly embedded, unchangeable and permanent part in the foreign 
policy of successive U.S. administrations. With the belief that a wealthier and more unified 
Western Europe would be in the best interest of the United States, U.S. governments showed 
a strong desire to be as helpful as possible in the achievement of more progress along the 
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lines of the Schuman Plan. Successive U.S. administrations welcomed the efforts the 
Europeans made to achieve an integrated community to develop a common market and 
provided consistent support to the European integration. It was evident that Washington 
endorsed the developments of Western Europe into a regional union based on the U.S. socio-
economic and political model. U.S. leaders from Truman to Johnson made fundamental 
decisions to rehabilitate Western Europe economically and build up its confidence politically. 
Their policy stance was clear, the best way to achieve stability in Europe was by uniting 
Europe. From the Marshall Plan and the creation of NATO, through to the promotion for the 
formation of the ECSC and the EEC, the United States had consistently shown its willingness 
to expend wealth and even troops to bring peace and prosperity to Europe. 
However, from 1969 to 1974 due to the relative decline of the United States, doubts 
were expressed and more focus was laid on the national interests of the United States. The 
Nixon administration became ambivalent about whether a mightier Europe would be in the 
interest of the United States. The Nixon administration, with a realist approach to foreign 
policy, had to reshape U.S. foreign policy and rebalance its foreign relations. The emerging 
of a new world order and the need to maintain and extend the United States’ global 
dominance led the Nixon administration to envisage an evolvement of the European 
integration in a way slightly different from the previous U.S. administrations. Though the 
United States during the Nixon presidential years still supported movements for integration in 
Western Europe, Washington could not hide their fear that a united Europe with increasing 
self-confidence and self-assertiveness would be running political and economic projects 
against U.S. national interests. Therefore, European integration, from the Nixon-Kissinger 
viewpoint, had to be taking place under U.S. influence and leadership. Consultative 
mechanisms were required by the United States to ensure that Washington could make its 
voice heard before the European Community made up its mind on important matters. Defence 
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commitments to the European Community and sustaining bilateral relations with the major 
nations of the European Community were also main strategies employed by the Nixon 
administration to keep Western Europe within arm’s reach in order to ensure that the 
European integration process would be undertaken in the direction that Washington desired.  
The Nixon administration’s decision to put an end to the Bretton Woods System and 
its policy to reduce tensions with the Soviet Union and open to China demonstrated the shift 
in U.S. policy towards Europe. The demise of the Bretton Woods System negatively 
impacted the European plan for a monetary union which aimed to deepen European 
integration. The détente with the Soviets and the search for diplomatic normalization with the 
Chinese can arguably be viewed as part of the imperatives for the European Community’s 
leaders to develop their plan for political cooperation and a stronger, unified voice. The 
Nixon administration’s policy changes towards European integration were further expressed 
by the Nixon administration’s initiatives regarding Europe including Reducing Free Riding 
on the United States, A Responsible European Community and A European Community in 
the Atlantic Framework. 
Second, I have argued that these changes in the Nixon administration’s policy towards 
European integration had certainly influenced the United States and European Community 
relations. There were growing differences between the United States and the European 
Community in both economic and political realms. The two sides of the Atlantic distrusted 
each other and their tensions were increasing. That the European Community attempted to 
compete economically with the United States and politically shielded itself from the 1973 
Arab-Israeli War as well as the oil crisis soured the United States-European Community 
relationship. The strained relations between the United States and the European Community 
illustrated that traditional friends might become foes for certain periods in the history of their 
relationship. The Nixon administration with a realist foreign policy would not let other 
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nations, even its presumably old and close friends, begin cutting into U.S. hegemony. Yet, 
Washington and the Western European capitals could not deny their economic and political 
interdependence. An uneasy partnership and uncomfortable cooperation were what both sides 
of the Atlantic might have perceived during the Nixon presidential years. In other words, the 
relationship between the United States and the European Community was characterized by 
confrontation and cooperation. 
Last, it is argued in this thesis that the Nixon administration’s policy change did not 
mean that the United States downplayed its relationship with Western Europe and opposed 
further attempts to expand the European Community. Nixon and Kissinger called on Western 
Europe to stand on its own feet and acknowledged that the Europeans could no longer rely on 
the United States for unlimited economic and military support. The Nixon administration 
accused the European members of NATO of failing to bear their fair share of the military 
burden and strongly requested the Europeans to do so. The United States wanted the 
Europeans to do considerably more on all fronts. These new elements in U.S. attitudes 
towards European integration were especially reflected in the Nixon administration’s policy 
initiatives towards Europe. However, the Nixon administration continued to favour a united 
Europe with a large common market, integrated into the Atlantic system. Nixon and 
Kissinger still assumed that a more unified Europe would be better able to share the 
responsibilities and burdens of world leadership with the United States. Henceforth, the 
Nixon administration favoured the very first enlargement of the European Community to 
include the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland. The Nixon administration also 
maintained its security commitment to Western Europe and opposed Congress’s proposal for 
reducing U.S. military expenditure and troop levels in Europe. Arguably, the changes in 
American orientations towards European integration between 1969 and 1974 did not signify a 
discontinuity of the traditional support of the United States to its European allies. The United 
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State did not opposed to the European integration project but the aid was more limited than in 
the past. Also, as U.S and European economic and strategic interests were closely intertwined 
and substantially affected each other, the Nixon administration continued to build economic 
cooperation with the European Community. This demonstrates that the Nixon administration 
did not discontinue traditional support for the European integration process and held that the 
partnership between the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean was necessary for both American 
and European peace and prosperity. The Nixon administration’s economic concerns and new 
foreign policy priorities led to changes in its policy towards European integration yet the 
continuity remained apparent. 
The thesis has shown that the Nixon administration did not break with established 
traditions in U.S. policy towards European integration. Washington’s commitments to 
transatlantic relations have continued to the present time. The Nixon administration’s shift 
from Europe to Asia did not mean that the United States would no longer be committed to the 
security of Europe. This seemed to be reaffirmed with the Obama administration’s pivot to 
Asia. In certain stages, when confronting unexpected challenges in international affairs, 
Washington has to change its foreign policy towards European integration and Western 
Europe to protect its strategic interest, yet these changes will not indicate a long-term shift in 
U.S. attitudes away from European integration and the European Union. 
For the Europeans, they have for a long time wanted to turn its wealth into global 
political influence. However, they have been constrained by three main factors; militarily, 
they have not developed a common military force or policy to act globally; politically, they 
have not established a common view on international problems; and institutionally, from the 
outset of the European integration project, European institutions have been built to deal with 
internal problems, such as German-French conflicts, not to deal with external issues. This 
underlined the European Union’s inadequate methods and mechanisms of unified foreign 
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policy making. These military, political and institutional constraints continue to make the 
European Union an imperfect union as it is still very much dependent on the United States for 
defence and security.  
Specifically, nation-states, in their relations with the United States and the European 
Union, should realize that; (i) a realist approach to foreign relations has been and will be the 
employed by consecutive U.S. administrations. Protecting the national interest is always 
underpinned in the United States’ foreign policy outlook even though Washington has sought 
to spread democracy, market economy and freedom; (ii) there can be differences between the 
United States and the Europe Union but Washington and Brussels remain vital to each other 
and they tend to avoid serious damage to their relationship; (iii) the European Union remains 
to be subservient to U.S. leadership. With its economic affluence, Brussels would be more 
assertive politically but it has to cede its need for U.S. military commitment. Furthermore, the 
United States would want to continue to have a voice in shaping the European integration 
process; and (iv) the United States would maintain staunch support for a multi-polar world 
and the European integration process. 
The United States and the European Union remain major powers in the multi-polar 
system, thus, developing socio-economic, politico-diplomatic and cultural relations with the 
Americans and the Europeans will be of significant interest for many nation-states, especially 
those developing and under-developed which are pursuing economic development policies. 
Isolationism proves not to be a sensible approach in the modern international relations. This 
realization would enable the contemporary policy-makers to devise polices which best suit 
their nation-states in relations with the United States and the European Union. 
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Appendix One 
Indices of the U.S. Manufacturing Output (1939 = 100) 
 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 
Aircraft 245 630 1706 2842 2805 
Munitions 140 423 2167 3803 2033 
Shipbuilding 159 375 1091 1815 1710 
Aluminium 126 189 318 561 474 
Rubber 109 144 152 202 206 
Steel 131 171 190 202 197 
 
Source: Milward, AS 1979, War, Economy, and Society, 1939-1945, Berkeley, University of 
California Press, p.69. 
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Appendix Two 
Civilian Employment and Unemployment during War II 
  1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
All Non-institutional Civilians* 99,840 99,900 98,640 94,640 93,220 94,090 
Civilian Labor 
Force 
Total 55,640 55,910 56,410 55,540 54,630 53,860 
% of 
Population 55.7% 56% 57.2% 58.7% 58.6% 57.2% 
Employed 
Total 47,520 50,350 53,750 54,470 53,960 52,820 
% of 
Population 47.6% 50.4% 54.5% 57.6% 57.9% 56.1% 
% of Labor 
Force 85.4% 90.1% 95.3% 98.1% 98.8% 98.1% 
Unemployed 
Total 8,120 5,560 2,660 1,070 670 1,040 
% of 
Population 8.1% 5.6% 2.7% 1.1% 0.7% 1.1% 
% of Labor 
Force 14.6% 9.9% 4.7% 1.9% 1.2% 1.9% 
 
* Numbers in thousands 
 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Employment” of the civilian non-institutional 
population, 1940 to date,” viewed September 20, 2014, 
<http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat1.pdf>. 
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Appendix Three 
Growth of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at market prices (percentage changes) 
 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
United States 2.3 - 0.3 2.7 4.9 5.0 -0.7 
West Germany 7.5 5.1 2.9 4.2 4.7 0.3 
France 7.0 5.7 5.4 5.9 5.4 3.2 
United 
Kingdom 
1.3 2.3 2.7 2.3 7.7 -0.1 




5.4 4.6 3.2 4.0 6.0 1.3 
Source: Adapted from Pianta, M 1988, Technologies across the Atlantic: U.S. Leadership or 
European Autonomy?, The United Nations University, Tokyo, Table 3.1. 
Definition: “GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy 
plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is 
calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion 
and degradation of natural resources.” (Index Mundi, viewed on March 25, 2015, 
<http://www.indexmundi.com/>. 
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Appendix Four 
Gross fixed capital formation as percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
United States 18.3 17.7 18.2 18.9 19.1 18.6 
West Germany 23.3 25.5 26.1 25.4 23.9 21.6 
France 23.4 23.4 23.6 23.7 23.8 24.3 
United Kingdom 18.9 19.0 18.9 18.7 20.0 20.9 
Italy 21.0 21.4 20.4 19.8 20.8 22.4 
Four major 
European countries  
21.9 22.7 22.8 22.5 22.6 22.3 
Source: Adapted from Pianta, M 1988, Technologies across the Atlantic: U.S. Leadership or 
European Autonomy?, The United Nations University, Tokyo, Table 3.1. 
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Appendix Five 
Gross saving as percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
United States 20.0 18.3 18.8 19.4 21.3 20.1 
Germany 27.6 28.1 27.1 26.4 26.6 24.8 
France 25.0 26.2 25.6 26.0 26.0 24.5 
United Kingdom 21.6 21.9 20.0 19.5 20.9 16.4 




24.9 25.5 24.4 24.0 24.6 22.6 
Source: Adapted from Pianta, M 1988, Technologies across the Atlantic: U.S. Leadership or 
European Autonomy? The United Nations University, Tokyo, Table 3.3. 
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Appendix Six 
Exports of goods and services (annual  percent growth) of the European Community 
and the United States, 1971-1974 
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Appendix Seven 
GDP growths (annual  percent) of the European Community and the United States, 
1969-1974 
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Appendix Eight 
GDP per capita growth (annual  percent) of the United States and the European 
Community, 1969-1974 
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Appendix Nine 
U.S. Troop Strength in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
1969-1974 
 
Source: Adapted from Zimmermann, H 2009, “The Improbable Permanence of a 
Commitment America’s Troop Presence in Europe during the Cold War,” in Journal of Cold 
War Studies Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 3 – 27. 
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